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This dissertation asks when and why leaders and members of ethno-religious 
groups choose to express one type of nationalist ideology and ethnic identity during 
armed conflict instead of another.  It argues that patterns of wartime violence and 
external actors play direct and indirect roles in making certain forms of nationalism and 
ethnic identity more useful for dealing with wartime circumstances.  The dissertation 
advances this argument by joining together four independent empirical chapters.  Each 
empirical chapter has its own research question, its own dependent variable, and its own 
theoretical argument.  All four chapters focus on one ethno-religious group in conflict: 
the Bosnian Muslims during the 1990s war in Bosnia.   
Methodologically, I apply statistical analysis to an original dataset of over 3,700 
speech acts by Bosnian Muslim leaders of the wartime Bosnian government in order to 
explain why the frequency and form of their wartime nationalist rhetoric varied.  I also 
employ historical evidence and qualitative text analysis to reveal the mechanisms 
underlying the statistical relationships.  In addition, one of the empirical chapters 
analyzes survey data to explain why, following the war, some Bosnian Muslims 
supported politicians that made religious appeals.   
 
 
Using this approach, the dissertation finds the following results.  First, intense 
violence against the predominantly Bosnian Muslim population of wartime Sarajevo 
prompted the Bosnian Muslim leaders of the Bosnian government to use nationalist 
ideological claims more frequently in domestic media.  Second, contingent wartime 
events spurred these leaders to shift their rhetoric in domestic media from civic to ethnic 
nationalism in the second year of the war.  Specifically, internal power struggles and 
external peace proposals increased the usefulness of making ethnic nationalist claims to 
domestic audiences.  Third, Bosnian leaders’ need for external aid combined with their 
uncertain likelihood of receiving Western military support led them to use both civic and 
religious nationalist rhetoric in foreign media.  Fourth, Bosnian Muslims who 
experienced internal displacement during the war became more religious as a means of 
coping with the trauma of displacement, which in turn made them more likely to vote for 
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“We shall turn to our own people, to all citizens who love this country, who carry 
Bosnia-Hercegovina in their hearts. We shall appeal to them to unite and to use all 
permissible means to defend the independent and sovereign Bosnia-Hercegovina, its 
integrity and freedom” (May 23, 1993). 
“My intimate preoccupation is also the fate of the Muslim nation. I think that 
nobody can blame me for the fact that on some occasions I have to feel as a member of 
this nation. The fate of this nation is in jeopardy now” (July 18, 1993). 
 “Therefore, if you ask me why, [it is] because we are Muslims.  I would like to 
draw attention to this fact - let the Muslims worldwide know now that this is the true 
reason. I would also like to draw attention not only to the Muslim leaders in the world 
today, to kings and presidents, but also to the ordinary people and the young people, to 
watch carefully what is going on and open the archives one day to examine from a 
distance what is currently the invisible side, everything that took place at these, allegedly, 
important meetings at which a reason was always found to prolong this agony” (July 18, 
1995). 
As the leader of the wartime government of Bosnia and Herzegovina between 
1992 and 1995, Alija Izetbegović varied the type of nationalist ideology he promoted in 
official media appearances during the war.  The three quotations above show how he 
emphasized, respectively, civic, ethnic, and religious tenets on Radio Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Herzegovina to explain the purpose and meaning of the conflict at 
different points in time, alternately extolling the unity of the Bosnian territorial state, the 
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primacy of the Bosnian Muslims as an ethnic group, and the plight of the Muslims of 
Bosnia as followers of Islam.  
Izetbegović could potentially draw on these three different kinds of nationalist 
ideology in his wartime rhetoric because he was a Bosnian Muslim.  Together with Serbs 
and Croats, the Bosnian Muslims are one of the principal ethnic groups within Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  More specifically, they are an ethno-religious group.  As a subset of 
ethnic groups, ethno-religious groups are unique in their overlap of religious and ethnic 
identity, to the point where even the group’s name denotes both a religion and an 
ethnicity.  This is the case for “Bosnian Muslims”, with the consequence that individual 
Bosnian Muslims can potentially express their group identity in a way that aligns with 
either Bosnian Muslim secular cultural traditions or Islamic religious values and beliefs.   
As a result of this choice, ethno-religious political leaders like Izetbegović can 
also use multiple kinds of nationalism to articulate their political interests, values, and 
goals.  They can align their nationalist principles with the group’s secular cultural 
identity, its religious faith, or, alternatively, with neither of these aspects of the group’s 
identity but rather with an overarching civic identity that deemphasizes both ethnicity and 
religion.  Therefore, given that they have multiple nationalist ideologies and identities to 
choose from, when and why do leaders and members of these kinds of groups choose to 
express just one of them?              
 In this dissertation, I investigate this phenomenon in the context of ethno-religious 
groups fighting armed conflicts.  I do so by joining four distinct and separate empirical 
papers in the body of the dissertation.  Each empirical chapter has its own separate 
research question, its own separate dependent variable, and its own separate theoretical 
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argument.  The four research questions are all framed within the context of armed 
conflict.  In order, the questions are: Why does the frequency of ethno-religious political 
leaders’ use of nationalist ideology in domestic media vary?  Why does the type of 
nationalist ideology ethno-religious political leaders’ promote in domestic media vary?  
Why does the type of nationalist ideology ethno-religious political leaders’ promote in 
foreign media vary?   And, following armed conflict, why do some members of ethno-
religious groups vote for political parties that use religious appeals while other members 
do not?   
I investigate all four questions through the case of the Bosnian Muslims, with a 
particular focus on the Bosnian Muslim leaders in charge of the wartime government in 
Bosnia between 1992 and 1995.  For the third question, I supplement my analysis through 
a qualitative historical comparison of the first Russian-Chechen war.  The theoretical 
explanations and causal mechanisms linking these variables are elaborated within each 
chapter.  The fourth empirical chapter (i.e. chapter six) is focused on mass identity and 
political behavior rather than the rhetoric of political leaders.  Its outcome of interest is 
individuals’ post-war support for religiously oriented political parties, with wartime 
internal displacement status as the key independent variable.   
Although these are four separate dependent variables with four separate 
theoretical explanations, the common argument is that wartime violence and external 
actors combine to play a fundamental role in altering the frequency and form of political 
leader’s ideological rhetoric, as well as ethno-religious group members’ identities.  The 
reason for this is, broadly, that these variables make certain patterns of rhetoric or 
expressions of identity more useful than others.  Thus, changes in wartime violence 
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trends have a direct impact on the frequency of ideological rhetoric and an indirect 
impact on the religiosity of ethno-religious group members via internal displacement.  
External actors, on the other hand, are vital in altering the type of nationalist ideology 
wartime ethno-religious leaders promote in state and foreign media.  
Using this approach, the dissertation finds the following empirical results.  First, 
intense violence against the predominantly Bosnian Muslim population of wartime 
Sarajevo prompted the Bosnian Muslim leaders of the Bosnian government to use 
ideological rhetoric more frequently in domestic media.  Second, an externally-sponsored 
peace plan favoring ethnic partition triggered a challenge to the authority of the top 
leaders of the wartime Bosnian government, which in turn spurred them to shift their 
rhetoric in domestic media from civic to ethnic nationalism in the second year of the war.   
Third, Bosnian leaders’ need for external aid combined with their uncertain 
likelihood of receiving Western military support led them to use both civic and religious 
nationalist rhetoric in various foreign media.  Fourth, Bosnian Muslims who experienced 
violence-induced internal displacement during the war became more religious, which in 
turn made them more likely to vote for religiously oriented politicians after the conflict.   
Each of the empirical chapters elaborates the theory and causal mechanisms behind these 
individual results. 
The rest of this introduction gives brief definitions of some of the dissertation’s 
key concepts before outlining its methodological approach.  It then elaborates the 
dissertation’s key contributions before discussing the importance of studying political 
ideology.  The introduction ends by summarizing the chapters to follow.  
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Key Concepts  
For my purposes, “ideology” means top political leaders’ proclamations of the 
political values and goals that their polity stands for and/or wishes to embody in practice.  
These values and goals are rooted in and manifest from broader sets of ideas and 
doctrines.  While it is true that ideology can be expressed in more than just verbal 
communication, I have decided to use the term ideology in this way on the supposition 
that political leaders’ choice to give official verbal expression to certain values and goals 
rather than others is a relatively transparent and direct way for these leaders to expose 
their citizens to the rudiments of a more systematic political orientation or doctrine.  By 
doing so, these leaders can potentially produce a change in the political self-perception 
and behavior of both their polity’s citizens and other elites (Wess 1996, 24).  In that 
sense, I posit that verbal articulation of these sorts of values and goals has potentially 
greater implications and consequences than ordinary discourse or shifts in rhetorical 
emphasis. 
This dissertation focuses in particular on political leaders’ official proclamation of 
principles that align with one of three ideal forms of nationalist ideology: civic, ethnic, 
and religious nationalism.  Briefly, civic nationalism promotes individual rights, upholds 
a community based on laws, and confers citizenship to all residents of a territory and state 
regardless of ethnic identity, whereas ethnic nationalism prioritizes collective rights 
based on ethnic group identity, language, and culture and emphasizes group members’ 
attachment and entitlement to a specific homeland based on blood (Smith 1988).  On the 
other hand, religious nationalism extols a group’s specifically religious rituals and 
traditions, calls for the involvement of religion in public life, supports governing 
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structures found in religious texts, and demands unity with fellow religious believers 
across state borders (Juergensmeyer 1993).  Religious nationalism is also a non-secular 
form of ethnic identity, in that it is rooted in intrinsic religious belief and faith.  This is in 
contrast to civic and ethnic nationalism, both of which are secular identities which do not 
demand belief in spiritual or religious precepts.  
Chapter one elaborates my conceptualization of ideology, as well as civic, ethnic, 
and religious nationalism.   
Methodology  
With one exception, my exploration of variation in nationalist ideology and 
identity during internal armed conflict uses evidence exclusively from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina before, during, and after the country’s war between 1992 and 1995.  More 
specifically, it focuses on the Bosnian Muslim ethno-religious group during this conflict, 
particularly its wartime leaders, who were in charge of the Bosnian state.  Since the group 
label “Bosnian Muslim” refers to both an ethnic and religious identity, focusing on this 
group enabled me to observe the use of both ethnic and religious nationalism at different 
times, whereas studying other groups might have only elicited observation of ethnic 
nationalist rhetoric or religious nationalism.  The sole exception to the exclusive focus on 
this case comes in the fifth chapter, where I also use historical evidence from the first 
Chechen-Russian war as additional support for my hypotheses. 
Accordingly, the primary body of empirical evidence in this dissertation is an 
original dataset of official wartime rhetoric by Bosnian Muslim leaders in the Bosnian 
government.  Consisting of three thousand, seven hundred twenty-six speech acts on both 
Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and foreign media outlets, this corpus of rhetoric allowed 
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me to code, classify, analyze and trace variation in the frequency and content of these 
leaders’ wartime nationalist ideological rhetoric on a yearly, monthly, weekly, and daily 
basis.  My sources for these speech acts were BBC Monitoring, Agence France Presse, 
and the New York Times.  These sources contained a significant amount of rhetorical data 
from the Bosnian war which could be captured and coded.  Using this methodological 
approach also generated three additional benefits. 
First, this approach helped me address any reverse causation issues involved in 
studying ideology as a dependent variable because I could compare the chronology of 
wartime events and trends to the occurrence of specific speech acts and ideological 
claims in order to ascertain whether the former occurred before the latter.  Second, by 
using a single case to code instances of ideological statements and the content of 
nationalist ideology, I was able to utilize case-specific context to categorize the different 
types of nationalism.  In contrast, some of the instances of nationalist rhetoric might have 
been categorized incorrectly or missed entirely if I had applied a general quantitative 
algorithm to code the speech acts or if I had coded a large number of cases and attempted 
to categorize different types of nationalist ideology for all of them.  This is because 
distinct forms of nationalism tend to be distinguished by different key words and phrases 
for different groups and states.  Proper coding of these ideologies thereby requires close 
attention to the specific details and rhetorical content of particular cases.           
Third, using these sources, especially BBC Monitoring, meant that my analysis 
utilized much of the same open source intelligence that the international policy 
community had available to it during the war.  Explaining rhetorical and ideological 
shifts observed in these sources thereby helps explain when and why policymakers are 
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likely to see changes in wartime ethno-religious leaders’ nationalist ideologies.  
Furthermore, BBC captured all of the wartime speech acts on Radio Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the official government media station during the conflict.  Examining this 
source was crucial, since it allowed me to observe when Bosnian leaders decided to 
change their ideological principles on the only wartime communications channel that was 
heard by a large population of Bosnians.  Ideological shifts on this medium thereby 
indicated when the leaders had the need or desire to attempt a shift in nationalist rhetoric 
that could reverberate throughout society.  
In my empirical analyses, I used my coding of Bosnian wartime leaders’ rhetoric 
to test a series of correlations corresponding to my theoretical arguments.  I then used 
historical evidence, both prior to and during the war, along with interpretive analysis of 
specific speech acts, in order to illustrate the various mechanisms driving these 
correlations.  To test the link between war and changes in group identity, I shifted away 
from Bosnian wartime political elites by analyzing a post-war survey of Bosnian 
Muslims’ war experiences and political attitudes. 
Contributions 
This dissertation makes several contributions through its explanation of 
ideological rhetoric, its methodological approach, its exploration of the sincerity of 
political leaders’ beliefs, its focus on the history of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, 
and its demonstration of how wartime violence, audiences, external actors, and structural 
constraints all shape wartime nationalist ideology and identity.   
First, changes in nationalist ideology are endogenous to specific variables within 
armed conflict, much like shifts in identity (Kalyvas 2008).  However, my dissertation 
9 
 
shows that these shifts in ideological rhetoric are not necessarily produced via a process 
of outbidding in which new leaders or factions holding alternate ideological views come 
to power.  Rather, a single set of leaders can and will alter the type of ideology they use 
under specific conditions and circumstances in armed conflict.   
Specifically, patterns of wartime violence change the frequency of their use of 
ideological rhetoric in domestic media, while particular wartime events alter the content 
of this ideological rhetoric.  However, since these leaders can choose from numerous 
competing ideologies when constructing their wartime rhetoric, and since this choice is 
shaped by contingent wartime events, ideological shifts during wartime may be 
reversible, such that a newly predominant wartime ideology may not remain dominant for 
the duration of the conflict.  This finding thus demonstrates that wartime ethno-religious 
leaders tend to be passive and reactive in their ability to alter their group’s predominant 
nationalist ideology.    
Second, the analytical task of tracing the evolution of wartime leaders’ official 
rhetoric to specific events and contexts requires precise disaggregated data.  Without 
examining the data and media source of various speech acts, Bosnian leaders’ ideological 
claims would appear to be haphazard.  Instead, the dissertation demonstrates that their 
use of specific ideologies corresponds to particular wartime events and audience contexts.  
Accordingly, from a methodological perspective, a large N dataset of speech acts from 
one case is particularly useful for pursuing this sort of analysis.  Using this kind of 
dataset allows me to trace changes in rhetoric at a fine-grained level of time and location.  
It also enables comparison of the chronology of speech acts to the chronology and pattern 
of specific wartime variables, such as violence against civilians.  Using a cross-country 
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large N analysis, on the other hand, could obscure shifts in the content of wartime 
ideological claims or hinder explanations of the reasons for the shifts.   
Third, the findings show that personal beliefs matter for wartime ethno-religious 
leaders’ promotion of specific ideologies, but more so for domestic rhetoric than speech 
acts to foreign audiences.  Thus, in the domestic sphere, Bosnian leaders invested in 
resources favoring their privately preferred form of nationalism.  Overall, though, the 
evidence shows that instrumental considerations and cost-benefit incentives trump 
personal views when it comes to wartime leaders’ official rhetoric, as Bosnian wartime 
leaders’ ideological shifts vis-à-vis both domestic and foreign audiences were driven 
principally by internal political competition and the need for external support.   
Fourth, the dissertation contributes to the literature on the wars of succession in 
the former Yugoslavia by examining how and why the Bosnian government used certain 
ideological principles in its communications to its citizens.  This effort thus comprises an 
initial step in answer to the need for a larger project concerning the use of propaganda by 
Bosnian, Serb, and Croat leaders during the war (Ramet 2005, 101-102). 
Fifth, I show that periods of intense violence prompt ethno-religious political 
elites to emphasize political values, beliefs, and goals in their official rhetoric to their 
citizens.  This dynamic is different from earlier work concerning the relationship between 
violence, identity, and rhetoric.  Specifically, V.P. Gagnon showed that Serbian political 
leaders used violence and war in the 1990s as a way to demobilize opposition to their 
authority.  In doing so, the use of large-scale violence helped alter the identities of Serbs 
in both Serbia and Bosnia (Gagnon 2004, 27).  For Gagnon, rhetoric relating to ethnic 
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conflict and ethnicity is thus a strategic tool used by the perpetrators of violence, as it 
allows political leaders to create hard ethnic boundaries (Gagnon 2004, 188).   
I build on this earlier work but reach a new finding, namely that instead of serving 
simply as a tool for its perpetrators to reshape mass identity, intense violence can impact 
the ideology and identity of ethno-religious group victims as they react to being its 
targets.  In direct response to this kind of violence, the victimized group’s leaders tend to 
employ more ideological principles in their rhetoric.  On the other hand, as seen in 
chapter six, more intense violence may also indirectly alter the identity of the group’s 
members, as it increases the likelihood that individuals within the group will be internally 
displaced, which in turn increases the chance that these individuals will embrace a more 
religious understanding of their group identity.   
 In terms of audiences, whether wartime political elites are speaking on domestic 
or foreign media shapes the process and content of any shift in nationalist ideology.  
Regarding process, it appears that wartime ethno-religious leaders can switch between 
nationalist ideologies more easily, more rapidly, and more often in foreign media 
(provided they are fighting in a geopolitical context that allows them to use more than 
one nationalist ideology to appeal for outside aid).  When speaking in official domestic 
media, on the other hand, the process of shifting between nationalist ideologies appears to 
occur more slowly and happen less often, as such shifts require specific opportune events.  
Considering both audiences, it appears that political leaders can take advantage of the 
information environment during war, namely that most citizens’ access to media will 
likely be limited to state channel(s) and/or local newspapers.  This limitation means that 
most ordinary people may not be aware of what their leaders are saying on other 
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countries’ media outlets and consequently will not be able to punish them or hold them to 
account for their ideological inconsistency between domestic and foreign media.        
 In either case, it will be difficult for those observing leaders’ ideological claims 
on domestic and foreign media to judge the sincerity of their beliefs in the content of the 
claims.  What should be understood is that wartime ethno-religious leaders’ ideological 
content in domestic media will be driven partly by a desire to remake the polity’s identity 
but also by a need to avoid and/or stop internal power struggles.  In contrast, ideological 
content in foreign media is more exclusively driven by an external power struggle, in the 
form of a need for aid to combat the wartime enemy.  Therefore, it seems more likely that 
leaders will sincerely believe in the ideological principles they espouse in their official 
domestic rhetoric rather than their rhetoric in foreign media.   
Regardless of the audience, external actors are highly influential for the content of 
ideological claims in both domestic and foreign media.  Domestically, the principles that 
external actors propose as foundations for peace negotiations can shape the ideological 
claims that leaders espouse to local audiences.  Which external actors are able to help a 
warring ethno-religious group also shapes the rhetorical strategies the leaders of these 
groups use to appeal for assistance from foreign governments.  These results go against 
the intuitive presumption that the formation and alteration of a country’s or group’s 
nationalist principles should be shaped predominantly or entirely by domestic actors and 
variables. 
Finally, the dissertation also shows that structural constraints can limit the kinds 
of nationalist tenets wartime leaders espouse, albeit not the sorts of domestic variables 
normally implied by the notion of structural constraints (e.g. economic performance, 
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demographics).  Instead, a pre-war path dependent nationalist ideology can impose a 
significant constraint on the ease and speed with which wartime ethno-religious leaders 
can insert different types of nationalist ideological claims in their official domestic 
rhetoric.  Furthermore, the geopolitical implications of the location of a post-Cold War 
internal armed conflict limit the types of nationalist ideological claims wartime ethno-
religious leaders can promote in foreign media.  At the same time, however, wartime 
leaders do retain agency in the face of these constraints in deciding how and when to 
promote specific alternate ideological claims.  
Why Ideology? 
That ideology is politically significant may seem like an uncontroversial 
statement, but its recent neglect as a topic of study in social science suggests that scholars 
have lost sight of its importance.  Ideology appears passé, to the point that one sociologist 
has decried the notion that “the academic equivalent of a mullet is the concept of 
ideology” (Malešević 2006, 2).  This dismissive attitude toward ideology undermines our 
ability to gain a complete understanding of contemporary political phenomena, 
particularly the motives driving many violent conflicts.  It also relegates the realm of 
political ideas to the abstract discussion of ideological “isms.”   
In contrast, this dissertation shows that careful analysis and explanation of 
political ideology as a dependent variable can reveal the agents and structures behind its 
creation and dissemination.  It can illuminate how human beings exercise agency to 
promote certain political ideologies instead of others and thereby indicate which 
individuals matter most for this process.  Explaining the rise and spread of political 
ideology as a dependent variable is a necessary foundation for understanding how 
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political ideology changes over time, how it helps or hinders politicians’ goals, and how 
it shapes the political behavior of elites and masses and the outcomes of political projects.  
Studying ideology thereby serves an academic purpose. 
Practically speaking, ideology is also not passé, as is evident from the 
contemporary tension between individuals and states whose perception of society and 
politics is framed around individual rights and secularism and those whose perception is 
rooted in collective rights and religious principles.  Normatively, political and intellectual 
elites from the United States and Western Europe should be particularly concerned with 
the continued clash between different forms of nationalist ideology.  Most of these 
countries’ underlying ideals of political community are based on liberal principles, 
including the primacy of individual and private interests and the desirability of territorial 
citizenship and multiethnic tolerance.      
Over the past generation, however, this civic form of nationalism has been 
challenged from both without and within Western countries by two principle alternatives.  
Both of these alternatives’ underlying ideals of political community are centered on 
collective entities and group rights.  The difference is that one of them promotes the 
primacy and rights of a given ethnic group while the other does so for a specific religious 
group.  In this dissertation, I refer to the former as ethnic nationalism and the latter as 
religious nationalism.  Leaders of Western societies committed to the continued defense 
and promotion of civic nationalism thus have to understand when and why these 
alternative ideologies become popular.  Doing so requires analysis and explanation of 
how and why ethnic or religious nationalism may undermine or even replace civic 
nationalism as the dominant form of nationalism within a society.  Understanding civic 
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nationalism’s weaknesses and failures precedes the ability to strengthen it and make it 
more successful.  
Accordingly, my dissertation shows the risks and challenges confronting civic 
nationalism during war.  For the Bosnian government led by the Bosnian Muslims, civic 
nationalism was undermined by both ethnic and religious nationalism.  How and why this 
occurred is instructive for those wishing to understand how armed conflict can push 
societies away from a liberal nationalist political order.  However, the war did not lead to 
the destruction or abandonment of civic nationalism either, suggesting lessons for 
policymakers wishing to preserve liberal nationalist principles in the midst of conflict.  
Thus, even though it is just one case, studying wartime shifts in nationalist ideology 
within the Bosnian Muslim ethno-religious group has broader normative implications.  In 
turn, understanding when and how this case’s lessons about civic nationalism in wartime 
may or may not be applicable in other circumstances could aid understanding of trends in 
nationalism in potential future conflicts involving ethno-religious groups, especially those 
in post-communist Eastern Europe or Central Asia.          
Chapter Summary 
The outline of the dissertation chapters is as follows.  The first chapter provides 
an overview of research on ideology and nationalism, focusing principally on 
explanations as to how and why nationalist ideology varies across time and place.  This 
chapter also reviews the literature regarding the impact of war on individual identity and 
political behavior.  Chapter two delves into the history of Bosnia and the Bosnian 
Muslims, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the Bosnian war and connects this history to 
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the variation in nationalist ideology elaborated in chapter one.  Chapter two also provides 
a series of maps of Bosnia in different historical periods. 
The third chapter is the first of the dissertation’s empirical chapters.  It examines 
the incidence of ideological rhetoric in domestic media as a dependent variable during 
war.  Specifically, it explains why wartime leaders vary the frequency of their use of 
ideological rhetoric to domestic audiences.  Unlike previous research which attempts to 
explain variation in political ideology via political structure, false consciousness, or 
leaders’ personal views, this chapter shows that the use of ideology in war is a dynamic 
process endogenous to the pattern of wartime violence.  The chapter’s theory advances 
four novel mechanisms to explain why intense wartime violence incentivizes leaders to 
use ideological claims more frequently: the need to sustain and comfort the population, 
mobilize and shape the goals of new military recruits, appear resolute, and gain an 
advantage in peace negotiations.  Statistical analysis of my dataset of Bosnian leaders’ 
speech acts during the 1990s Bosnian war demonstrates the empirical relationship 
between victimization by intense wartime violence and the use of ideological claims, 
while qualitative text analysis reveals the mechanisms at work. 
Chapter four explains how and why the content of nationalist ideology in 
domestic media may change during internal armed conflict.  My explanation is rooted in 
several mechanisms: to maintain social peace and order, a pre-war regime institutes a 
nationalist ideology which becomes path dependent.  Internal armed conflict discredits 
this path dependent ideology and gives wartime ethno-religious leaders an opportunity to 
promote a new nationalist ideology.   
17 
 
If these leaders’ personally preferred national ideology is different from the 
previously dominant one but does not initially provide them with significant political 
benefits, they will construct grassroots ideological infrastructure which will support a 
shift to their favored ideology in domestic media should the political calculus change.  
This calculus changes through contingent wartime events.  Once again using statistical, 
historical, and interpretive analysis of the behavior and rhetoric of the Bosnian Muslim 
leadership of the wartime Bosnian government, I show that these leaders’ ideological 
claims shifted from civic nationalism to ethnic nationalism in Bosnian domestic media in 
the second year of the war in response to internal threats to their power and external 
mediators’ promotion of ethnic partition. 
The fifth chapter shifts the focus of the dissertation to nationalist claims in foreign 
media.  Specifically, it shows how international structure and armed conflict shape the 
nationalist rhetoric that wartime leaders of ethno-religious groups make to foreign 
audiences.  I argue that in the post-Cold War era, leaders of warring ethno-religious 
groups with little chance of receiving Western military support and aid will employ 
religious nationalism to obtain external support.  Leaders of similar groups with a higher 
chance of receiving this kind of support will employ either civic or religious nationalism 
depending on the likelihood of the support.  Analyzing my dataset of Bosnian leaders’ 
wartime speech acts, I demonstrate that these leaders predominantly used civic nationalist 
claims in Western media and religious nationalist claims in co-religionist states’ media.  
A supplementary analysis of the first Chechen-Russian war demonstrates Chechen 
leaders’ use of religious nationalist rhetoric in a context where Western military 
intervention was highly unlikely. 
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The final empirical chapter analyzes the identity and political behavior of ethno-
religious group members during and after war rather than the ideology of wartime ethno-
religious political elites.  Building on work analyzing armed conflict’s impact on post-
war political attitudes and participation, I argue that conflict-induced internal 
displacement mediates the relationship between wartime experiences and post-war 
political behavior.  Specifically, I argue that individuals who become internally displaced 
during armed conflict are more likely to use an already well-developed religious faith to 
cope with the trauma of displacement, thereby strengthening their religiosity in the 
process.  This heightened religiosity then leads them to prefer religiously oriented 
political parties and leaders after conflict.   
Often, this kind of displacement is the result of intense violence, thus linking this 
chapter back to chapter three and showing that violence can have an indirect impact on 
ethnic identity and political behavior while simultaneously having a direct impact on 
political leaders’ use of ideological rhetoric.  The chapter’s analysis of growing 
religiosity among ethno-religious group members also suggests a reason why ethno-
religious leaders can credibly use religious nationalist claims in some media sources, as 
shown in chapter five, while utilizing ethnic and civic nationalist claims in others. 
Using survey data from Bosnian Muslim respondents collected eight years after 
the end of the 1990s Bosnian war, I show that internally displaced respondents were more 
likely to vote for the ethno-religious nationalist Party of Democratic Action (SDA) after 
the war.  Employing a matching technique, I then verify that these internally displaced 
respondents became more religious than other respondents compared to before the war.  
My findings therefore provide evidence that trauma and religiosity combine to shape 
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post-war voting behavior for ethno-religious groups.  In addition, this chapter also 
contains one of the first empirical examinations of the political impact of internally 
displaced populations. 
 Following the empirical chapters, the conclusion to the dissertation discusses the 
implications of my results for studies of the Bosnian war, analyses of rhetoric and 
ideology during armed conflict, and theories of ethnicity, nationalism, and religion in 
politics.  In addition, I address some of the rival hypotheses that could not be tested 
directly in this dissertation and offer suggestions for future research that can build on this 
dissertation’s findings.  I end the dissertation with a discussion of how my findings might 
be useful to policymakers and scholars wishing to protect and bolster civic nationalism’s 




1. Ideology, Nationalism, and Identity as Dependent 
Variables 
This chapter elaborates some of the key concepts I use throughout the 
dissertation.  It then briefly reviews the literature on political ideology and the use of 
ideology during armed conflict, as well as the relationship between ethnic divisions and 
conflict.  The subsequent section details the principal theories of the origins of 
nationalism, comparing the primordialist, perennialist, and constructivist paradigms.  It 
then identifies the three predominant types of nationalist ideology under analysis in this 
dissertation before reviewing previous explanations as to why states and societies adopt 
different types of nationalist ideology.  In doing so, the chapter notes the shortcomings of 
the principal paradigms of nationalism in explaining short-term and rapid fluctuations in 
nationalist ideology.  The last section delves into the literature concerning armed 
conflict’s impact on individual and collective identity and political behavior, which 
comprises the subject of the dissertation’s sixth chapter.              
1.1 Definitions 
In this dissertation I make frequent use of the term “ethno-religious group.” As a 
subset of an ethnic group, by “ethno-religious” groups I refer specifically to ethnic groups 
whose ethnic and religious identity markers overlap, such that individual group members 
can choose to prioritize either the ethnic or religious component of their group’s identity 
(Ruane and Todd 2010).  One example of this type of group identity is Judaism, where 
the adjective “Jewish” refers to both a religion and an ethnic category.  Another example 
of this type of identity is the group under analysis in this dissertation: the “Bosnian 
Muslims”, also known as the “Bosniaks.”   
21 
 
I define ideological claims as top political leaders’ proclamations of the political 
values and goals that their polity stands for and/or wishes to embody in practice.  This 
definition streamlines a view of ideology as the public expression of beliefs, ideas, and 
values concerning the orientation of group identity and the ordering of society and/or the 
state (Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009).  In the context of armed conflict, my concept of 
an ideological claim is similar to what Charles Tilly labeled a contentious identity or 
identity claim, in which contentious actors give collective answers to questions asking 
who they are, what they stand for, and who their opponents are (Tilly 2002, 6).  My 
definition, however, focuses on the articulation of what actors stand for and 
deemphasizes discussion of who they and their opponents are. 
By “ideological infrastructure”, I refer to what other scholars have labeled 
“institutional contexts” (Wuthnow 1989) and “ideological institutions” (van Dijk 1998), 
meaning the organizations that serve as venues and vehicles for the production of 
ideology and the transmission of ideological principles within society.  The broad form of 
ideology under examination is nationalism.  By “nationalism”, I refer to the normative 
desire for congruence between political and cultural boundaries, whereby the state and 
national group should be aligned (Gellner 1983, 1).  Naturally, individuals, groups, 
and/or states may also utilize ideologies such as socialism, liberalism, and 
fundamentalism during war, but ethnic groups tend to use one or more types of 
nationalist ideology during conflict (Sanín and Wood 2014, 215).   
1.2.1 Conceptualizing Ideology and Ideological Claims 
My definition of ideology also entails that political leaders’ proclaimed political 
values and goals be an expression of or embedded within a more systematic and coherent 
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body of ideas.  This view builds on a long line of theoretical and empirical research in the 
subject, which in its earliest incarnations emphasized the need to study ideology as a 
system of beliefs which was internally consistent, as opposed to viewing it as just a group 
of political attitudes or policy preferences (Barnes 1966, 514).  The criteria that ideology 
be systematic and consistent were joined to the aspiration that knowing a person’s 
position on one ideological tenet would enable prediction of their position on other 
ideological principles (Barnes 1966, 514).  On this basis, ideology is thus “a system of 
ideas that constitute a political or social doctrine and inspire the acts of a government or 
party” (Burke 1989, 303).      
Several decades later, scholars still characterized ideology in terms of a coherent 
body of ideas which should impart a “cognitive map” to individuals’ political positions 
and preferences (Shimoni 1995, 3). Against this notion other scholars held that 
individuals’ political ideologies should be conceptualized and measured on a spectrum, 
ranging from highly coherent and tightly linked beliefs on one end to much more loosely 
connected beliefs and values on the other (Snow and Bird 2007, 123). Here, I take a 
middle ground, adopting the notion that different political ideologies can be distinguished 
from each other because they endorse coherent, distinct, and often contrasting principles, 
but allowing for the possibility that this coherence may not be rigid and may occasionally 
produce inconsistencies and contradictions.  
 These conceptualizations of ideology are set apart from a much older normative 
view within political theory, going back to Karl Marx.  In this vein, ideology is a tool 
used by the ruling socio-economic class to gain the support and acquiescence of non-
elites to the existing socio-economic order (Larrain 1979), essentially serving to connect 
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elite claims of the legitimacy of their rule with the masses’ acceptance of these claims to 
legitimacy (Weiler 1993).  This dissertation steers clear of this view of ideology, sharing 
the critique that this perspective creates a selection bias against studying ideologies which 
do not come to dominate society or even those which are successful in taking hold within 
a section of society outside the ruling elite (Hanson 2006, 357).  
Thus, while I situate myself within the growing body of research on ideology 
during armed conflict, I do not share the current consensus definition within that research 
program, whereby ideology identifies a group, states its grievances, lists its goals, and 
articulates an agenda for achieving those goals (Sanín and Wood 2014, 215).  Instead, I 
view ideological claims as wartime leaders’ official proclamations of relatively coherent 
sets of values and goals concerning the present and future political orientation and 
policies of their community, particularly with respect to the content and scope of the 
rights to be enjoyed by its members.  These sets of values and goals in turn emanate from 
and are part of systems of ideas which form doctrines. 
Critically, different ideologies can have different consequences for popular 
attitudes and behaviors, as ideology can make a “‘body hop around in certain ways; and 
that same body would have hopped around in different ways had a different ideology 
happened to inhabit it’” (qtd. in Wess 1996, 24).  What this view entails is that ideology 
cannot be studied by simply examining the material conditions of society because it is 
tied to the use of symbols, principally words and rhetoric (Wess 1996, 7).   Thus, I focus 
on rhetoric in this dissertation because of its fundamental role in using symbolic 
communication to promote specific goals to audiences that also respond and react to 
symbols, in this case verbal and written speech (Burke 1989, 188).  Rhetoric also has the 
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capability to redefine who individual actors are and what they stand for by invoking and 
evoking different principles, values, and goals (Marin 2007, 21).  In that sense, it has 
important implications for elites and citizens’ political self-perception and behavior.        
In this focus on the symbolic form, ideology also resembles myth, particularly as 
myths promote a certain set of beliefs or values on behalf of a political community 
(Schöpflin 1997, 19).  As with ideology, political and intellectual elites are generally the 
main developers and promulgators of myths, typically via their control over public 
communication (Schöpflin 1997, 26-27).  Control over myths can in turn enable elites to 
mobilize members of their community for a cause and increase the solidarity and 
cohesiveness of this community in the face of crises (Schöpflin 1997, 22-23).  However, 
ideology is nonetheless conceptually distinct from myth.   
Primarily, myths tend to be framed as emotional narratives or stories, unlike 
ideologies, which compromise systematic bodies of ideas linked by logical propositions 
(Tismaneanu 1998, 28).  As such, myths may be a surrogate for ideology, offering mass 
publics easier access to and understanding of ideological tenets and propositions 
(Tismaneanu 1998, 7).  Or, alternatively, they may form a non-political core at the heart 
of political ideology (Burke 1989, 310).  My own view is that myths are a tool utilized 
within many, though not necessarily all, political ideologies.  They are a simplification of 
ideological doctrine in more vivid, emotional terms.  As such, elements of myth may 
sometimes show up in ideological rhetoric, but the mere presence of certain political 
values or goals in leaders’ rhetoric does not mean that myth has superseded ideology in 
their worldview or communications to citizens.  On the contrary, the values and goals are 
ideological claims offering an entry point to a broader ideological doctrine.   
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1.2.2 Ideology and Armed Conflict              
The general recent neglect of ideology in political science includes research on 
internal armed conflict.  Much of this research has focused on explaining the onset, 
duration, and settlement of civil wars (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 
2004; Cunningham 2006; Walter 2002; Toft 2010).  For the most part, it has not focused 
on how ideas and ideology can shape the goals and behavior of both state and non-state 
actors fighting these conflicts.  Exceptions to this trend include work showing that armed 
conflict can be dominated by a particular mobilizing ideology or ideology of resistance 
(Walker 2006), that a rebel organization’s ideology shapes its decision to employ 
selective versus indiscriminate violence (Thaler 2012), that shifting alliances between 
warring groups change the narratives they use to describe their allies and enemies 
(Christia 2012), and that warfare plays an important role in forming ethnic communities 
and shaping their shared history and overall sense of identity (Smith 1981).  Fortunately, 
this pattern has started to change in the last few years, as scholars are increasingly calling 
for research which can help the field advance its understanding of why and how wartime 
state and insurgent leaders use particular ideological principles during conflict and how 
those principles impact armed conflicts (Sanín and Wood 2014; Staniland 2015).   
On the other hand, while the budding growth of the study of ideology in armed 
conflict may be a relatively new focus in the civil war literature, an earlier generation of 
political science literature examined ideology from a mostly theoretical perspective.  
Although attuned to how ideology may be created by cultural and political elites, this 
body of work suggested that structural variables, such as economic performance, 
inequality, demographic makeup, and political institutions favored the rise and 
26 
 
dominance of particular ideologies, including nationalism, liberalism, Marxism, and 
fundamentalism (e.g. Brubaker 1992; Snyder 1993; Shulman 2002).  Such explanations 
allowed for ideological change over time, but only gradually. 
As regards nationalism in armed conflict specifically, a large literature has 
focused on the specific relationship between ethnicity, ethnic fractionalization, and armed 
conflict.  Reviewing some of the key studies in this vein, James Fearon and David Laitin 
demonstrated that ethnic fractionalization and grievances more generally play a small 
role in the outbreak of civil wars, a finding echoed in the work of Paul Collier and Anke 
Hoeffler (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  Other studies, on the other 
hand, indicate that both poor and wealthy ethnic groups are more likely to be involved in 
civil wars (Cederman, Weidman, and Gleditsch 2011), that ethnic groups excluded from 
state power and/or suffering a recent loss of status in political power are more likely to 
engage in violent rebellion (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010), and that ethnic 
grievances do matter for the outbreak of ethnic civil wars (Sambanis 2001). However, 
this literature’s focus on ethnicity means that it only potentially relates to ethnically 
oriented forms of nationalism.  In practice, though, since this work does not explore 
ethnicity or nationalism as either an ideology or a dependent variable, it is not as useful 
for explaining variation in ideology during armed conflict.      
Consequently, existing approaches cannot explain rapid ideological change, as is 
often observed in times of societal upheaval, including revolutions and civil wars.  They 
also cannot explain why we observe ideological change even when structural factors 
remain constant.   Conversely, the incipient focus on ideology during armed conflict 
speculates that most uses of ideology reflect the strategic calculations of political leaders, 
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without specifying how those calculations might vary in different contexts or points in 
time or considering the possibility that leaders’ personal beliefs may trump the 
importance of strategic motives in choosing which ideological principles they promote.   
1.3 Shifts in Nationalist Ideology 
This dissertation focuses specifically on explaining changes and shifts within one 
form of ideology during armed conflict: nationalism.  Traditionally, the literature on 
nationalism has been divided between constructivist, primordialist, and perennialist 
theories.  The constructivist approach most often ties the rise of nationalism to structural 
changes in the global economy and strategies of state-building.  Within the constructivist 
framework, the modernist interpretation of nationalism traces its origin to eighteenth and 
nineteenth century modernization and industrialization.  Significant work in this vein 
includes Benedict Anderson’s analysis of how capitalism and vernacular languages 
interacted to foster the rise of imagined national communities, which were then 
reinforced by settler colonies, particularly in the Western hemisphere.  In his formulation, 
“the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human 
language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic 
morphology set the stage for the modern nation.  The potential stretch of these 
communities was inherently limited, and, at the same time, bore none but the most 
fortuitous relationship to existing political boundaries” (Anderson 1983, 46). 
Conversely, Ernest Gellner’s modernist formulation attributes the rise of 
nationalism to newly industrializing societies’ need for an educated labor force centered 
on a unified culture.  Per Gellner, “The level of literacy and technical competence, in a 
standardized medium, a common conceptual currency, which is required of members of 
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this society if they are to be properly employable and enjoy full and effective moral 
citizenship, is so high that it simply cannot [emphasis original] be provided by the kin or 
local units, such as they are.  It can only be provided by something resembling a modern 
‘national’ educational system” (Gellner 1983, 33).  Following Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm 
pointed to the ways in which states and mass populations interacted to produce different 
forms of nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  According to him, “While 
governments were plainly engaged in conscious and deliberate ideological engineering, it 
would be a mistake to see these exercises as pure manipulation from above.  They were, 
indeed, most successful when they could build on already present unofficial nationalist 
sentiments…to the extent that such sentiments were not created but only borrowed and 
fostered by governments, those who did so became a kind of sorcerer’s apprentice” 
(Hobsbawm 1990, 92). 
More recently, newer constructivist approaches have explored whether Russian-
speaking diasporas in former Soviet-controlled states will develop a new identity as a 
“Russian speaking population” (Laitin 1998).  Other work points to the ways in which 
national identity is created and maintained through citizens’ routine performance of 
national rituals, which in turn are simultaneously created by and recreate social categories 
established by organizations and groups within society (Wedeen 2008).  Thus, 
constructed national identities may be reinterpreted or reconstructed by both elites and 
masses relatively easily and frequently.     
In contrast to constructivism, primordialist approaches focus on the enduring 
features of national bonds.  This perspective emphasizes the fixed nature of identities 
rooted in collective categories such as family, tribe, language, religion, and culture.  A 
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more contemporary variant of this position is perennialism, which focuses on the long-
running historical roots of ethnic ties.  The scholar who most closely approximates this 
position today is Anthony Smith, though he emphasizes that his position lies between 
perennialism and constructivism, particularly in its focus on myths and symbols at the 
root of ethnicity.  In his view, given that “ethnicity is largely ‘mythic’ and ‘symbolic’ in 
character, and because myths, symbols, memories, and values are ‘carried’ in and by 
forms and genres of artefacts and activities which change only very slowly, so ethnie 
[emphasis original], once formed, tend to be exceptionally durable under ‘normal’ 
vicissitudes and to persist over many generations, even centuries, forming ‘moulds’ 
within which all kinds of social and cultural processes can unfold and upon which all 
kinds of circumstances and pressures can exert an impact” (Smith 1988, 16).   
Thus, Smith’s focus on the varying survival and strength of pre-modern “ethnies” 
as the key to explaining variation in modern nationalism means that he thinks 
fundamental changes in ethnic or national identity are highly unlikely or very slow to 
occur. The issue of the speed of identity change is particularly significant, as 
contemporary scholarship on nationalism is arguably more divided over how rapidly and 
easily group identities can change, rather than over primordialism/essentialism vs. 
constructivism per se (Hale 2004).  Consequently, the perennialist twist on primordialism 
suggests that elites and masses can re-interpret or reconstruct their nationalist ideologies 
and identities, but that they do so rarely and slowly, to the point that these ideologies and 
identities will often be fixed in practical terms.     
A different twist on this approach explains the enduring resonance of nationalism 
as a reaction to the spread of scientific rationalism and technocracy across the globe.  In 
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this sense, nationalism is tied to power asymmetries, as relatively powerless communities 
use it to reclaim their dignity and autonomy in the face of humiliation and domination at 
the hands of more powerful actors (Berlin 1972).  Alternatively, nationalism may simply 
be a reflection of a universal need for human beings to be part of homogenous cultural 
communities (Miller 2005, 117).      
Unfortunately, the disagreement between these various perspectives does not shed 
light on some specific empirical questions regarding nationalism.  First, why do we 
observe minor shifts in groups’ and states’ nationalist ideologies at certain times while 
observing significant ones at others?  Second, why do we sometimes witness innovation 
in groups’ or states’ nationalist ideologies while observing reaction and a return to 
previously dominant forms of nationalism at other times?       
To explain shifts in nationalist ideology, this dissertation focuses on three kinds of 
nationalism that leaders of ethno-religious groups can use to make nationalist claims: 
civic, ethnic, and religious.  Civic nationalism promotes individual rights, upholds a 
community based on laws, and confers citizenship to all residents of a territory and state 
regardless of ethnic identity, whereas ethnic nationalism prioritizes collective rights 
based on ethnic group identity, language, and culture and emphasizes group members’ 
attachment and entitlement to a specific homeland based on blood (Smith 1988).   
On the other hand, religious nationalism extols a group’s specifically religious 
rituals and traditions, calls for the involvement of religion in public life, supports 
governing structures found in religious texts, and demands unity with fellow religious 
believers across state borders (Juergensmeyer 1993).  Religious nationalism is also a non-
secular form of ethnic identity, as it is rooted in intrinsic religious belief and faith.  This 
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is in contrast to civic and ethnic nationalism, both of which are secular identities which 
do not demand belief in spiritual or religious precepts.  I use these three forms of 
nationalist ideology as ideal types, categorizing instances of political leaders’ nationalist 
rhetoric in accordance with the extent to which they accord with the ideal type.   
Building on a foundation of earlier theoretical development (Kohn 1944), these 
forms of nationalism also dovetail with Anthony Smith’s depiction of the options an 
ethnic group’s intellectual elite has for constructing a nationalist ideology: 
assimilationist, which corresponds to the civic nationalist desire to emphasize a common 
humanity; traditionalist, which aligns with religious nationalism in focusing on the 
group’s religious customs and beliefs; and reformist, which accords with ethnic 
nationalism in its promotion of a group’s national spirit in place of its religion (Smith 
1983).      
In treating these forms of nationalist ideology as ideal types, I am aware that there 
are tradeoffs and limitations in doing so.  Principally, a binary categorical division 
between civic and ethnic nationalism may be somewhat ahistorical and can underestimate 
how often these forms of nationalism are intertwined (Chen 2007, 27-28).  In practical 
terms, most forms of ethnic nationalism also give due place to legal categories of 
citizenship as well as the process of naturalization (Roshwald 2006, 256-257).  On the 
other hand, civic nationalism in its pure form might no longer be considered nationalism, 
as a political community held together only by legal bonds and strictly political loyalties 
might theoretically be open to universal membership (Roshwald 2006, 257).   
In this sense, civic and ethnic nationalism could be placed along a spectrum, 
thereby allowing room for them to interact with each other to produce different variants 
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in between the ideal categories (Roshwald 2006, 258). Moreover, a stark division 
between civic and ethnic nationalism along geographic lines ignores the widespread 
reality of traditional ethnic interpretations of a nation’s past, as can still be found in parts 
of the United Kingdom and France (Tismaneanu 1998, 75).  It also slights the fact that 
many West European states were initially formed as ethnic nations and only later evolved 
into the principally civic nations they are today (Roshwald 2006, 288).  Of additional 
significance is the notion that civic nationalism can serve as a disguise for a majority 
ethnic group’s attempt to enshrine its culture and group as the dominant one in political 
practice under a cloak of neutral civic principles.  This was the case for some countries in 
inter-war Eastern Europe, where many groups viewed a pan-ethnic ideology of unity as 
an instrument for promoting the interests of one particular ethnic group over others 
(Roshwald 2006, 264; Kuzio 2002).    
However, as ideal types the discrete categories are still more useful for my 
analysis because nationalist values and goals expressed in rhetoric tend to be unified 
around and representative of the underlying system of ideas comprising one of these 
forms of nationalism relative to the others.  In addition, one of these forms of nationalism 
is still emphasized to a much greater degree or exclusively compared to the others in 
official state policies (Breton 1988).  Moreover, in practice, the national principles and 
myths of various contemporary and historical countries illustrate that clear distinctions 
can be made between these forms of nationalism, rendering the categorization of leaders’ 
rhetoric into one or another of these ideal types empirically justifiable.   
For example, France’s use of jus soli citizenship promotes civic nationalism, since 
anyone born on the territory of the French state is automatically a citizen, while 
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Germany’s use of jus sanguinis favors ethnic nationalism because it only grants 
citizenship to those whose parents are citizens (Brubaker 1992).  The United States is 
also generally upheld as an archetype of civic nationalism.  The US thus upholds and 
enshrines ideological forefathers rather than ethnic ones and emphasizes common 
sacrifice and joint blood shed on behalf of specific values for the sake of future 
generations rather than past generations of ethnic kin (Roshwald 2006, 271).  In this 
context, though, and in light of the scope of this study, it is interesting to note that civil 
war played a major role in the victory and pre-dominance of one set of US national ideals 
at the expense of another, as the Northern states’ ideal vision of the American nation won 
out over that of the Southern (Grant 1997).  This Northern ideal was a prototype of 
modern American civic nationalism, as expressed in an 1854 editorial in the New York 
Tribune, which asserted that the US is a “‘a thing of ideas solely, and not a thing of races.  
It is neither English nor Irish, nor Dutch, nor French; it is not Puritan nor Cavalier; it is 
not North nor South; our nationality is our self-government, our system of popular liberty 
and equal law’” (quoted in Grant 1997, 99).  
However, civic nationalist principles can also be found in states outside of the US 
and Western European liberal democracies.  Cheng Chen thus indicates that some 
communist regimes faced more constraints in merging their nation-building ideals with 
Leninist ideology, with the result that liberal nationalism has been able to take root in 
these countries more easily following the end of communism compared to communist 
regimes which managed to merge Leninism and nation-building (Chen 2007).  On the 
other hand, the official state identity of the Soviet Union can also be seen as a type of 
civic nationalism which repressed ethnic nationalist rights in the name of a universal 
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human brotherhood (Roshwald 2006, 280).  This is arguably the case for communist 
Yugoslavia as well, which adopted an indigenous form of communism that included a 
strong civic nationalist disposition.  However, this official identity ultimately proved 
incapable of suppressing ethnic nationalism, as the state’s civic ideals arguably could not 
provide the same kind of bonds of solidarity as ethnic ties (Schöpflin 2000, 337).  
Chapter two contains further discussion and elaboration of Yugoslav civic nationalism.   
Liberal nationalism, an attempt to reconcile liberal principles of individual rights 
with the collective privileges and duties entailed in nationalism, is an alternative way of 
conceptualizing or labeling civic nationalism.  Thus, liberal nationalism posits that liberal 
political goals can only be realized in a society sharing a single national identity or that 
national self-determination is only possible in a society that has guarantees of liberal 
rights and freedoms (Miller 2005, 113).  The former supposition thus asserts that 
nationalism provides the solidarity and common purpose that modern liberalism requires 
to achieve its ends (Miller 2005, 119).   
Yael Tamir in turn bases her liberal nationalist framework on the idea that liberals 
should appreciate the nationalist values of belonging, membership, and cultural identity, 
while nationalists should appreciate the liberal values of autonomy and individual rights, 
along with the need for tolerance between nations (Tamir 1993, 6).  Key to this 
compromise between liberalism and nationalism is the idea that “nationality, which is 
here used to describe membership in a nation and not in its misleading yet widespread 
connotation of citizenship, should not be a criterion for participating in the political 
sphere or for the allocation of goods and services” (Tamir 1993, 10-11).  In practice, this 
tenet is one of the core features of civic nationalism.  
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Furthermore, although it is possible to have different variants of both civic and 
ethnic nationalism (Greenfeld 1992), here I will focus on civic nationalism as a single 
ideology whereby residence in a common state and participation in the institutions and 
civil society of that state create a community based on a common civic culture (Brown 
1999).  I will also treat ethnic nationalism as a single ideology wherein the community is 
formed based on common language, culture, and ethnic descent (Kymlicka 1998).  The 
key distinction between these two ideologies is thus not the presence of a common 
culture, but rather how inclusive this culture is, what its contents are, and how individuals 
are incorporated into it (Kymlicka 1998).   
I also note here that religious nationalism is not the same as religious 
fundamentalism, since the former promotes the nation or state as the stronghold of 
religious values and the vehicle for preserving them, thereby unifying the political and 
religious worlds (Fox 2004).  In this light, although the United States is generally seen as 
a paragon of civic nationalism, during the US Civil War the rebel Confederate states 
relied on Christianity for political legitimation, believed that the Confederacy was 
divinely chosen to do God’s will, and held ritual fast days (Faust 1988).  Accordingly, the 
Confederacy extolled a religious nationalist vision of the polity.  
Moreover, although distinguishing between ethnic and religious nationalism may 
appear to be difficult at first glance, Gideon Shimoni’s characterization of the divide 
among early Zionists provides some criteria for doing so.  In the case of Israel, religious 
traditionalists thought that “this unique nation had been brought into existence by the 
terms of an essentially religious covenant emanating from God, whereas the secularized 
Jewish intelligentsia posited the natural evolution of a Jewish nation generating a culture 
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of which religious faith and precepts formed a part - for the major period of the nation's 
history a dominant part, but only one part nonetheless...religion was neither wholly 
coextensive with Jewish culture nor its original source; it was merely one of the 
ingredients of Jewish national culture” (Shimoni 1995, 269).  The difference between a 
vision of the nation tied to religious faith and myth versus one expressed in terms of 
culture, memory, and custom also effectively captures the distinction between religious 
nationalist and ethnic nationalist ideology for the Bosnian Muslims.   
Previous prominent explanations as to why certain polities adopt one or more of 
these types of nationalism as the foundation of their state principles, values, and myths 
tend to be historical and structural.  Rogers Brubaker, for example, uses both political and 
cultural geography to explain why Germany came to favor ethnic nationalism while 
France favored civic nationalism (Brubaker 1992).  Other scholars have argued that 
nationalism will contain more of a religious component the greater the influence that 
religion had in constructing a nation and/or the more frontiers a group shared historically 
with other religions (Hastings 1997).     
Other explanations for top political leaders’ decision to adopt a specific type of 
nationalist ideology are rooted in domestic politics and economics during peacetime.  
Thus, lower socio-economic status is correlated with favoring ethnic nationalism, while 
higher status is correlated with civic nationalism (Kunovich 2009).  However, socio-
economic status is a variable that is slow and difficult to change, whereas political leaders 
can change their nationalist rhetoric quite frequently.  Moreover, during armed conflict, 
socioeconomic status arguably declines rapidly for most warring parties, yet not all 
leaders employ ethnic nationalism.   
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Additional research posits that ethnic minorities and groups living in mature 
democracies are expected to favor civic nationalism, the former because this ideology 
increases their access to state resources and the latter because democracy is associated 
with the rule of law and the rights of citizens (Kunovich 2009).  Scholars have also 
emphasized states’ demographic profiles and ethnic composition, as governments in 
countries containing many small ethnic groups are expected to favor civic nationalism 
while those with a large majority ethnic group and a few smaller groups are held to favor 
ethnic nationalism (Shulman 2002).  The issue with these findings, though, is that, across 
countries, ethnic minorities and groups whose domestic ethnic composition is similar do 
not all adopt the same nationalist ideology over time, particularly during war.  Another 
explanation suggests that governments and groups in newer states with weak and unstable 
institutions will favor ethnic nationalism (Snyder 1993).  Unfortunately, during armed 
conflict many official institutions tend to be rendered weak and unstable, but, yet again, 
this does not produce homogenous nationalist ideological claims across political leaders 
of warring states and groups.   
In contrast to civic and ethnic nationalism, previous research tends to perceive 
religious nationalism as an alternative to these secular ideologies.  Prominent scholars see 
religious and secular nationalism as competing doctrines for producing public order in 
society, to the extent that religious nationalism becomes more popular after the continued 
and repeated failure of secular nationalism to produce political and economic benefits 
(Juergensmeyer 1993). Moreover, religious nationalism has arguably come to serve as an 
ideological substitute for both anti-imperialist and Marxist socialist critiques of Western 
countries since the end of the Cold War (Juergensmeyer 1993).  Though a compelling 
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starting point for explaining the rise of religious nationalism, this perspective does not 
specify to what degree secular nationalism has to fail before religious nationalism is 
adopted nor does it describe the mechanisms leading from this failure to the adoption of 
religious nationalism.  Arguably, many societies have reason to be frustrated with the 
failures of political orders tied to secular nationalist principles, yet only some of their 
leaders adopt religious nationalism in response.   
Therefore, previous research does not adequately address short-term variation in 
the types of nationalist ideology promoted across and within states.  In particular, prior 
research lacks compelling explanations for shifts in nationalist ideology during armed 
conflict.  One exception to this prevailing trend is the work of Mansoor Moaddel, who 
explains historical societal shifts between territorial nationalism, ethnic nationalism, and 
religious nationalism in the Muslim Middle East as a function of intellectual elites’ 
production of new ideological discourses in response to a dominant ideological regime 
(Moaddel 2005).  In addition, Nadav Shelef has proposed an evolutionary model to 
explain changes in the content of political movements’ nationalist ideologies, a process 
which is contingent and unpredictable (Shelef 2010).  This dissertation shares Moaddel’s 
focus on explaining shifts between civic (i.e. territorial) and ethnic nationalism.  It also 
builds on Shelef’s work by focusing on the importance of contingent events for 
ideological shifts while also discussing the role historical and structural factors play in 
establishing a path dependent nationalist ideology.   
However, my approach examines a relatively shorter timeframe of ideological 
change than these scholars, focusing just on the four years of the Bosnian war between 
1992 and 1995.  In addition, instead of Moaddel’s focus on intellectuals, I look at how 
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and why politicians produce different types of nationalist ideology.  And rather than 
Shelef’s analysis of movements, I examine a government and the top leaders within it.  
Most significantly, unlike these scholars, I hone in specifically on a wartime polity, thus 
showing how and why official nationalist ideology may vary in content during armed 
conflict.       
Thus, my dissertation shows why ethno-religious leaders are often motivated to 
maintain dominant pre-war nationalist principles in their official wartime rhetoric.  Its 
analyses thereby indicate when the perennialist perspective can offer more leverage for 
explaining nationalist ideology during internal armed conflict.  At the same time, I also 
reveal when wartime ethno-religious leaders believe they can or must alter their 
nationalist rhetoric in favor of an alternative type of nationalism, indicating the analytical 
scope of the constructivist approach in wartime.  My findings show how contingent 
events, political constraints, and the agency of political elites interact to shape variation 
in the speed, degree, and originality of changes in nationalist ideology during wartime.            
1.4 Shifts in Ethnic Identity 
Whereas chapters three through five present my arguments and findings 
concerning the frequency of wartime ethno-religious leaders’ ideological claims and the 
content of their nationalist claims on domestic and foreign media, chapter six explores the 
effects of armed conflict on ordinary people, particularly with respect to their religiosity 
and political behavior.  In doing so, chapter six makes four important contributions to the 
research literature concerning the relationship between armed conflict, religious identity, 
and political attitudes.    
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First, I present a new empirical relationship between wartime experiences and 
postwar political outcomes.  A number of recent studies have examined the impact of 
wartime experiences on individuals and groups, with a focus on economic and political 
behavior.  Specifically, the studies have shown that individuals experiencing wartime 
violence are more altruistic and risk-seeking (Voors et al. 2012) and more likely to vote 
and become involved in local community politics (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 
2009).  These findings extend outside the context of political violence, as victims of both 
violent and non-violent crime are also more likely to be politically active after the 
experience of victimization (Bateson 2012).  
However, violent victimization does not always lead to increased political 
participation, leading some researchers to suggest that this relationship is mediated by 
kinship networks (Dorff 2015), local social capital (Rojo-Mendoza 2015), or the 
emotions individuals experience after being victimized (Jarstad and Höglund 2015).  By 
showing that experiencing internal displacement during war increases the likelihood of 
voting for a specific type of political party, my results suggest a strong link between 
wartime experiences and post-war political attitudes and behavior outside of direct 
victimization by wartime violence.   
Second, the chapter fills a gap in the existing literature by analyzing how wartime 
experiences shape political attitudes via trauma and religion.  Within the growing number 
of studies examining the link between wartime experiences and postwar political 
participation, very few have investigated how wartime trauma can impact postwar 
political attitudes.  One important exception to this trend has been the work of Laia 
Balcells, who found that victims of violence during the Spanish Civil War remained 
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opposed to the political identity of the perpetrators of the violence, even passing this 
attitude down across generations within their families (Balcells 2012).  Another study 
found more post-war support for left-wing political parties in areas of Italy victimized by 
Nazi and Fascist violence during World War Two (Costalli and Ruggeri 2015), while an 
analysis of IDF soldiers found that combat experience led them to prefer military 
solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and spurred them to vote for more hawkish 
political parties (Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownik 2015). More broadly, it also 
appears that on a societal level, higher levels of violent victimization are associated with 
lower perceived legitimacy of political institutions and lower levels of political trust 
(Grosjean 2014).  
  Though insightful, none of these studies has examined how wartime trauma may 
shape religious beliefs and how religious views shaped by war may subsequently impact 
postwar political attitudes and behavior.  This is a potentially significant omission, since 
experimental research indicates that individuals whose religious identity is primed instead 
of their ethnic identity give higher priority to social issues and moral values in politics 
and exhibit a preference for candidates who focus on moral issues (McCauley 2014).  
Furthermore, given the long-term impact of violent trauma on political ideology and 
political behavior in post-civil war Spain and post-World War Two Italy, heightened 
religiosity and religious identity resulting from wartime trauma may also have a 
significant effect on political preferences in postwar democratic politics.     
Third, in conjunction with this contribution, one of the mechanisms outlined in 
chapter six bridges academic disciplines by incorporating research on the psychology of 
trauma and the psychology of religion into the study of armed conflict.  By showing the 
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value of this inter-disciplinary approach, the chapter’s findings emphasize the need for a 
new sub-area of study within political science research on war.  
Fourth, chapter six is one of the first studies to investigate the political attitudes 
and behaviors of IDPs.  Though it is understudied in social science, internal displacement 
is a public policy issue that is growing in magnitude across the world, as the total number 
of internally displaced persons worldwide rose from 23.3 million to 38 million between 
2005 and 2014, an increase of 63% (IDMC 2015).  Consequently, it is important to 
examine whether the experiences, beliefs, and attitudes of IDP populations have a 
political impact.  This study thus comprises a pioneering effort to trace the form and 
degree of political participation and agency among IDPs in postwar democratic politics.    
In the conclusion to the dissertation, I discuss some of the connections between 
shifts in the type of nationalist ideology that predominates among a society’s elites and 
changes in its citizens’ conceptions of their ethnic or religious identity.  In the next 
chapter, however, I present a historical overview of Bosnia and Yugoslavia.  In reviewing 
the case history, I also connect this chapter’s discussion of nationalist ideology and 
identity to the Bosnian Muslim ethno-religious group.  The case history thus reveals both 
the predominant pre-war form of nationalist ideology and identity among the Bosnian 
Muslims as well as the latent alternative nationalist ideologies which rose to prominence 
during the war in the 1990s.         
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2. Bosnia and the Bosnian War in Historical Context 
This chapter provides historical background regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the Bosnian Muslim ethno-religious group, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the war in 
Bosnia between 1992 and 1995.  Part of the communist state of Yugoslavia between 1945 
and 1990, the Bosnian Muslims became one of the three officially recognized ethnic 
groups within the Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1960s, joining the 
Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats.  As Yugoslavia dissolved in the early 1990s, the 
former constituent republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia all declared independence.  
What remained of Yugoslavia was dominated by Serbia, which supported Bosnian Serb 
separatists rebelling against the central Bosnian state while independent Croatia initially 
did the same with Bosnian Croat separatists.  Sitting atop what was left of a multiethnic 
central Bosnian state and bureaucracy, political leaders belonging to the Bosnian Muslim 
ethno-religious group had to decide how to construct their rhetoric to domestic and 
foreign audiences. 
The chapter starts with a historical overview of Bosnia and the Bosnian Muslims, 
connecting this history to the civic, ethnic, and religious nationalist ideologies described 
in chapter one.  The second section describes the principal causes leading to the breakup 
of Yugoslavia and the start of the war in Bosnia.  The third section briefly reviews the 
history of the war and the peace settlement which ended the conflict.  Additional 
historical details are included in chapters three through six, where they are presented as 
evidence for the mechanisms behind Bosnian leaders’ use of different nationalist 
ideologies during the war.  
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2.1 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnian Muslims 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is comprised of three principal ethnic groups: the Serbs, 
Croats, and Muslims, formerly called the Bosnian Muslims and now typically referred to 
as Bosniaks.  The Bosnian Muslims are the only one of these groups that lacks an ethnic 
homeland outside Bosnia.  Now independent, Bosnia was successively part of the 
Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Yugoslav states for a period of over five hundred years.  
In this section, I show how key developments in Bosnian society since its loss of 
independent statehood in the Middle Ages built the foundations for Bosnian Muslim 
elites’ eventual ability and inclination to promote either civic, ethnic, or religious 
nationalism for the group and state during the 1990s war.  Maps of Bosnia in each major 
historical period are provided in Figures 2.1 through 2.5. 
The medieval history of Bosnia and Herzegovina laid the initial groundwork for 
both a civic and religious identity among the Bosnian Muslims.  Prior to the Ottoman 
Empire’s conquest of Bosnia in 1463, the religious make-up of Bosnia included 
Catholics, Orthodox Christians, and Bosnian Christians.  The latter belonged to the 
Bosnian Church, an indigenous, schismatic, and relatively short-lived institution  
(Friedman 1996, 13).  Following the Ottoman conquest, conversions to Islam in Bosnia 
occurred gradually but steadily throughout the rest of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries.  The conversions were most rapid and widespread in towns but occurred in 
rural areas as well.  The principal reasons for much of the Bosnian population’s 
willingness to convert to Islam were that Christian churches in the country were very 
weakly organized as compared to the strong Islamic institutions of the Ottomans, and that 
converts could obtain political and economic benefits by becoming members of the 
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state’s favored religion (Friedman 1996, 17-19).  Figure 2.1 depicts a map of the Balkans 
region, including Bosnia, during the Ottoman era.  




In tandem, the pre-Ottoman weakness of Christianity in Bosnia, combined with 
the Ottoman Empire’s maintenance of the medieval Bosnian kingdom’s administrative 
borders, favored a strong territorial view of Bosnian identity (Hastings 1997).  Moreover, 
since the medieval indigenous Bosnian church never really developed strong or 
widespread ties to the population, organized religion generally had a weak foundation in 
the area (Velikonja 2003). In fact, not only was the pre-Ottoman clergy in Bosnia not 
well-organized, it also eschewed doctrine in favor of local mystical rituals and syncretism 
between Christianity and pre-existing folk customs and beliefs (Velikonja 2003).  The 
widespread conversions to Islam following the arrival of Ottoman authority thus overlaid 
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Muslim beliefs and practices on top of a mostly rural society dominated by superstition, 
magic, and the worship of nature, meaning that strict doctrinal religious beliefs remained 
fairly weak among the Muslim section of the Bosnian population (Wilmer 2002).  The 
under-developed religious infrastructure in Bosnia prior to the Ottoman conquest 
combined with the syncretic religious doctrines of the Bosnian Muslims thus favored a 
weak religious identity and a relatively strong sense of territorial identification within the 
group, a mindset conducive to what would later become civic nationalism.   
The one exception to this pattern, and it was a major one, was that the Ottoman 
Empire imposed its millet system in Bosnia, which categorized the population by religion 
rather than language, territory, or ethnicity (Andjelić 2003, 146).  Consequently, the 
Ottoman era also planted the seeds of Bosnian Muslims’ later potential affinity with 
religious nationalist ideology, notwithstanding the fact that Islamic religious 
infrastructure was initially underdeveloped.  Moreover, this religious infrastructure 
became stronger over time and began to play a larger role in the life of the Bosnian 
Muslim community.  The Ottoman era thus provided the initial resources for both civic 
and religious nationalist identification among the Bosnian Muslims.  On the other hand, 
there is no evidence of strong ethnic consciousness or national identification among the 
Bosnian Muslims during the time of Ottoman rule (Friedman 1996, 46).  
In 1878, control of Bosnia was transferred from the Ottomans to the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, although the Austrians did not formally annex Bosnia until 1908.  





Figure 2.2: Map 2 – Bosnia and Herzegovina within the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
 
Source: http://familypedia.wikia.com/wiki/Austria-Hungary  
 
 During their rule, which lasted until the end of World War One, Austro-Hungarian 
officials promoted the identity of “Bosnianism” (“bošnjaštvo”) within Bosnia, which 
denoted a single indigenous Bosnian people regardless of religion or ethnicity (Friedman 
1996, 64).  Thus, these officials attempted to instill a more robust form of territorial or 
proto-civic nationalism on the Bosnian population via central state fiat.  Unfortunately for 
the Austrians, the policy did not work, as Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats found it 
completely unpersuasive and Bosnian Muslims rejected it in favor of either traditional 
Islamic identity (Friedman 1996, 64) or an even broader cosmopolitanism which sought 
closer ties with neighboring Serbia and Croatia (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007, 338).         
Following World War One, Bosnia became part of the first Yugoslavia, which 
was known formally as the “Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes” until 1929.  








The country was governed under a constitutional parliamentary monarchy from 1918 
until 1929 and a monarchical dictatorship from 1929 until the start of World War Two.  
During this period, many Bosnian Muslims were pressured to identify as Croats or Serbs.  
In response, some Bosnian Muslims, mostly within the landowning and urban elites, 
chose to identify as Muslim Croats or Muslim Serbs (i.e. as a religious minority within 
the Serb or Croat ethnic group), but most did not.  Moreover, this pressure to identify as 
Serb or Croat generally spurred greater communal solidarity among Bosnian Muslims 
(Friedman 1996, 105).  The most significant example of this solidarity occurred when a 
group of Bosnian Muslim elites founded the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO) in 
1919 to represent and defend the interests of the Bosnian Muslim community.   
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On the one hand, the creation of this organization indicated acceptance of the 
official Yugoslav government view that Bosnian Muslims were a religious community.  
In addition, the organization also resisted pressure to identify as an ethnic group.  At the 
same time, a minority of Bosnian Muslims did entertain the idea of advocating for a 
unique and separate Bosnian Muslim nation (Friedman 1996, 97-100).  This notion 
represented a new option for Bosnian Muslim political ideology and identity, because 
even though the Bosnian Muslims stood out as a separate group from Serbs and Croats 
during the Austrian era, they did not develop a widespread sense of ethnic identity or 
belonging at that time (Andjelić 2003, 11).  Thus, this era saw the first stirrings of ethnic 
nationalism among segments of the Bosnian Muslim elite.        
In part, this was also the result of the introduction of mass democratic politics in 
the first Yugoslav state, which encouraged each of the ethnic groups to rally around 
communal parties and organizations.  In this context, the Bosnian Muslims were at a 
disadvantage, as they lacked proportional representation within the Bosnian political 
system.  Their political strategy was thus to help balance and build coalitions with other 
groups and parties in Bosnia and Yugoslavia.  In particular, they offered strong support 
for the central Yugoslav government and a muted ethnic identity in exchange for security, 
patronage, and tolerance of Islam (Friedman 1996, 106-109).  Thus, Bosnian Muslims in 
the first Yugoslavia maintained a strong territorial identity centered on Bosnia while 
upholding religious institutions.  They also developed the first stirrings of an ethnic 
nationalist outlook.            
 This period of Bosnia’s history came to an end with the Nazi take-over of 
Yugoslavia on April 6
th
, 1941.  The Nazis split Croatia and Bosnia between themselves 
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and Fascist Italy, but left both under the administration of the Ustaše puppet regime in 
Croatia, which was officially known as the Independent State of Croatia (NDH).  The 
Ustaše government’s official view of the Bosnian Muslims was that they were all Muslim 
Croats, thus bidding for their support by treating them as ethnic brethren of the Islamic 
faith (Friedman 1996, 122).  In response, the most conservative members of the Bosnian 
Muslim religious and political elite tended to support and collaborate with the Ustaše.  
However, Bosnian Muslims on the whole were divided during the war, as many ended up 
joining the Communist Partisan resistance forces while others allied with the fascists, 
home guard units, or purely Muslim militias (Friedman 1996, 125).   
During this time a group of Bosnian Muslims also formed an organization known 
as the Young Muslims (“Mladi Muslimani”).  Its activities centered on charity and social 
work, especially with respect to Bosnian Muslim war refugees.  They also organized 
younger members of the group into cultural, social, and religious activities (Friedman 
1996, 149-150).  Therefore, this organization comprised one of the first grassroots 
institutional carriers and promoters of practices and beliefs conducive to both ethnic and 
religious nationalism among the Bosnian Muslims (Friedman 1996, 149-150).  One of its 
leaders was Alija Izetbegović, who would later become Bosnia’s first President following 
the demise of Communist Yugoslavia in 1990.   
On the other hand, the Bosnian Muslims who joined the Partisan units came to 
develop an even stronger territorial or civic view of inter-ethnic relations and nationalism 
by the end of the war.  Ultimately, the Communist Partisan forces achieved military 
success against both the Axis powers and rival groups and organizations within 
Yugoslavia.  By 1945, they were the victors of the civil war that had been fought 
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concurrently with World War Two and had established the second Yugoslavia under the 
leadership of Josip Broz Tito.  Figure 2.4 shows the new Yugoslavia and Bosnia’s place 
within it. 
Figure 2.4: Map 4 – Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Second Yugoslavia, 1945-1990 
 
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:SocialistYugoslavia_en.svg      
 
 Following the war, the Communist Yugoslav government imposed policies which 
limited the religious practices of the Bosnian Muslim population.  These measures 
included nationalization of religious property, abolition of sharia courts, an end to 
religious instruction in schools, and a ban on the wearing of the veil (Bougarel and 
Rashid 1997, 538).  The Yugoslav government also assumed the education and judicial 
duties previously exercised by Islamic community leaders.  Many mosques damaged in 
the war were also not rebuilt or were used for other purposes (Friedman 1996, 150).   
These policies produced a rift between more secular Bosnian Muslim leaders, 
most of whom had joined the Partisans during the war, versus those who were more 
religiously conservative and thus anti-Communist (Friedman 1996, 151).  The Young 
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Muslims organization was in the latter camp, opposing the Yugoslav regime during this 
period as a result of its restrictions on the practice of Islam as well as the fact that 
Bosnian Muslims had not received distinction as a constituent nation within Yugoslavia 
(Friedman 1996, 150).  In response, the Yugoslav government arrested most of the 
organization’s leaders and drove it underground.  
The Yugoslav Communist Party (known as the League of Communists) also 
established a branch in Bosnia in 1949 (Friedman 1996, 153).  At this time, the Bosnian 
Muslims had not yet received official state recognition as a separate ethnic group.  On the 
1948 Yugoslav census, they could identify as either “Serb-Muslims”, “Croat-Muslims”, 
or ethnically undeclared Muslims (Ramet 2006, 287-288).  Approximately 800,000 
Bosnian Muslims chose the undeclared category, while just under 100,000 chose the 
Serb-Muslim or Croat-Muslim options.  In contrast, 83% of Muslims in Serbia identified 
as Serbs and 70% of Muslims in Croatia identified as Croats.  These figures thus indicate 
that Bosnian Muslims had come to perceive themselves as a separate ethnic group by the 
end of World War Two (Friedman 1996, 151).   
Bosnian Muslims’ options for ethnic identification changed slightly in the next 
two censuses, as the 1953 census provided an option to identify as “Yugoslav, nationally 
undetermined”, while the 1961 census created a category for “Muslims in the ethnic 
sense”, which fell short of labeling the group an official ethnic group within Yugoslavia 
like the Croats or Serbs (Waardenburg 1997, 388).  In 1953, evidence suggests that 
nearly all of the respondents who reported Islam as their religion selected the option of 
undetermined Yugoslav as their ethnicity, thereby confirming the existence of a separate 
Bosnian Muslim collective identity (Burg 1983, 22).  In 1963, Bosnia adopted a new 
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constitution, which deemed Bosnian Muslims a separate ethnic group just like the Serbs 
and Croats.   
Thus, the Bosnian leadership granted official recognition of Bosnian Muslims’ 
unique ethnic identity (Burg 1983, 40).  The Central Committee of the Bosnian 
Communist Party confirmed this status in February of 1968, after which the Fifth 
Congress of the Bosnian Communist Party proclaimed the full equality of the Muslim 
ethnic group with other Yugoslav ethnic groups in January of 1969.  Subsequently, the 
option of “Muslim in the national sense” was introduced on the 1971 Yugoslav census 
(Ramet 2006, 287). 
Figure 2.5 shows the changing demographics of Bosnia throughout the twentieth 
century.  In particular, the figures indicate that the Bosnian Muslims gained in population 
relative to the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, particularly with respect to the former.  
However, given the larger relative increase in the Bosnian Muslim population between 
1961 and 1971, a major part of this change arguably occurred as a result of the newfound 
option to identify officially as Bosnian Muslim. 
Figure 2.5: Historical Ethnic Composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Year Era % Muslims % Serbs % Croats 
1910 Austria-Hungary 32.3 43.5 19.9 
1921 Yugoslavia I 31.3 43.9 23.5 
1931 Yugoslavia I 30.8 40.5 22.2 
1948 Yugoslavia II 30.7 44.3 23.9 
1953 Yugoslavia II 31.3 44.4 23 
1961 Yugoslavia II 34.1 42.9 21.7 
1971 Yugoslavia II 39.6 37.2 20.6 
1981 Yugoslavia II 39.5 32 18.4 
1991 Yugoslavia II 43.7 31.4 17.3 




The reasons for granting Bosnian Muslims official status as a constituent ethnic 
group in Yugoslavia included promoting Bosnia’s economic development by aligning 
economic and ethnic interests in the state, heading off the reach of international Pan-
Islamism in Yugoslavia, using the Muslims in Yugoslavia to enhance the appeal of Tito’s 
non-aligned foreign policy to Muslim-majority countries in the developing world, and 
limiting tension between Serbs and Croats regarding Bosnia (Friedman 1996, 164-167).  
In terms of the practical consequences of official recognition of Bosnian Muslims as a 
separate ethnic group, the main impact was to give the group’s members access to a 
greater number of public-sector jobs, particularly higher ranking ones, since these 
positions were allocated according to the percentage of the group’s members in the larger 
population, i.e. by ethnic quotas (Friedman 1996, 160-161).  In terms of ideology and 
identity, official recognition re-ignited tensions between Bosnian Muslims who favored a 
secular understanding of their identity versus those who argued that religion should be 
the guiding principle of the new official identity (Perica 2002).     
Moreover, many leaders within the Bosnian Muslim community now started to 
believe that Bosnia should be considered their national homeland because they comprised 
a plurality of the population – just as Serbia was for Serbs and Croatia for Croats 
(Friedman 1996, 162).  Those favoring this more ethnic nationalist orientation for 
Bosnian Muslims thus wanted the Bosnian constitution amended so that the 'Muslim 
nation' would be the titular nation in Bosnia, as opposed to the prevailing wording of the 
Bosnian constitution, which called the republic a “socialist democratic state...of the 
working people, citizens, and nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Muslims, Serbs, and 
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Croats” (Ramet 2006, 291).  They also started lobbying to have Bosnian designated as a 
distinct language (Ramet 2006, 291).   
One of the prominent members of this wing of the Bosnian Muslim intelligentsia 
was Adil Zulfikarpasic, an exiled opponent of the Yugoslav regime.  He championed a 
blend of civic and ethnic nationalism in that he promoted a “Bosniak” nation that could 
also be inclusive of Serbs and Croats in Bosnia (Filandra and Karić 2004, 245).  He thus 
preferred to move away from the Bosnian Muslim label to refer to the group, as he held 
that retaining the religious term in the group’s name would cause confusion and 
undermine the group’s ability to achieve full national identity and rights (Filandra and 
Karić 2004, 247). 
At the same time, official recognition of Bosnian Muslims’ ethnic group status 
also spurred a renewal of some of the official religious institutions seeking to shape 
Bosnian Muslim identity (Friedman 1996, 162).  This represented a small but still 
significant change of fortune for these organizations, since during the period between 
1945 and 1971 mosques had mostly been empty and many Bosnian Muslims had started 
giving their children non-Muslim names (Gjelten 1995, 61).  Furthermore, the societal 
impact of more ethnically or religiously oriented activists had been minimal.  Alija 
Izetbegović, for example, purportedly did not have any influence outside of a circle of 
friends centered on the mosque he attended in Sarajevo (Andjelić 2003, 46).   
Now, however, the official Islamic organization in Yugoslavia changed its name 
from the Islamic Religious Community to the Islamic Community in 1969, aiming to 
become a Muslim national institution (Perica 2002, 77-78).  Thus, the acknowledgment 
of secular Bosnian Muslim identity in the 1970s prompted increased emphasis on the 
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group’s religious identity on the part of some of its members and intellectual leaders 
(Velikonja 2003).  This burgeoning awakening of religious identity included increased 
financial and educational connections between the official Islamic Community in 
Yugoslavia and Bosnia and countries such as Pakistan, Algeria, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, and Libya (Velikonja 2003).  It also meant that the Islamic clergy attempted to 
play a more active and public role in the Bosnian Muslim community (Freidman 1996, 
163).  This section of the community’s cultural leadership also started a nationalist 
publication called Preporod (“Rebirth”), whose circulation increased from 30,000 to over 
70,000 between the 1970s and 1980s (Perica 2002, 79).  In addition, this renewed ethnic 
and religious activism included some former members of the Young Muslims (Bougarel 
1999, 2).     
However, the influence of these leaders and activists was still severely 
circumscribed under the Communist regime, since religion could still not be expressed in 
the public sphere and religious organizations could only operate inside religious buildings 
(e.g. mosques) and then only for strictly religious purposes (Waardenburg 1997).  Thus, 
although the 1970s and 1980s witnessed more openness and reform within the Yugoslav 
Communist system, thus contributing to the increased reconstruction and building of 
mosques, more opportunities for religious education, and the distribution of Islamic 
literature (Fazlić 2011), the regime nonetheless carefully controlled the official Islamic 
Community, especially via infiltration with spies and collaborators (Karčić 1997).  In 
essence, the regime showed a grudging tolerance toward religion while still repressing 
more overt expressions of religion tied to politics, particularly those which aggressively 
promoted ethnic or religious nationalism (Cohen 1998). 
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 More importantly, during the 1970s and 1980s, most of the Bosnian Muslim 
political and intellectual elite retained strong loyalty to both Communist Yugoslavia and 
Bosnia, such that it provided much of what support remained for the civic-oriented 
ideology of “Yugoslavism” (Burg and Shoup 1999, 43).  In fact, although these leaders 
were drawn from all three of the principal Bosnian ethnic groups on an equal basis, they 
promoted the interests of Bosnia and created a Bosnian political identity at an elite level, 
rather than advancing the narrow interests of their respective ethnic groups (Andjelić 
2003, 19).  However, these leaders did not attempt to impose a civic Bosnian identity or 
nationhood on the Muslim, Serb, and Croat populations within Bosnia either (Andjelić 
2003, 37).  Bosnian Muslims also came to comprise a greater proportion of Bosnian 
Communist Party members between the 1970s and 1980s, indicating their continued faith 
in both the Communist system and the civic Yugoslav identity (Andjelić 2003, 38).           
Organized religious and ethnic activism on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims 
consequently remained strictly regulated during this period.  Of most significance in this 
regard, the Bosnian party leadership tried thirteen accused “Muslim nationalists” of anti-
regime activities in April of 1983, one of whom was Izetbegović.  As a result, he was 
jailed until 1988 (Friedman 1996, 193).  On the eve of war in 1990, religiously oriented 
activists within the group’s intelligentsia numbered only a few hundred and were still in 
the minority among members of the official Islamic Community (Bougarel 1999, 3).   
Accordingly, most Bosnian Muslims prior to the war stated that they were 
“‘Muslim only in terms of culture and tradition’”, which generally meant having Muslim 
names, practicing circumcision, and observing important traditional holidays and feasts 
(Velikonja 2003).  In fact, in 1988 only 37 percent of Bosnian Muslims reported that they 
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were religious believers (Velikonja 2003, 261), while fewer Bosnian Muslims than 
Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Croats agreed with the notion that religion had had a very 
positive or mainly positive impact on the development of their ethnic group (Velikonja 
2003, 231).  The civil society that had emerged in Bosnia by 1989 was also supportive of 
civic views of Bosnian citizenship and nationhood (Andjelić 2003, 81). 
The civic nationalist outlook thus predominated among both the Bosnian 
Muslims’ political and intellectual elite and many of its members right before the war.  
However, the foundation for the counter-ideologies of ethnic and religious nationalism 
had also been laid by the developments of the 1970s and 1980s.  The producers and 
promoters of these alternative ideologies held a minority position within the group’s 
intelligentsia, while its potential adherents and carriers resided in smaller towns and rural 
villages (Andjelić 2003, 134-135).  The competition between civic, ethnic, and religious 
nationalist views of Bosnian Muslim identity and Bosnian statehood would play out 
during the ensuing war.  Chapter four elaborates more of the pre-war balance in 
nationalist ideology among the Bosnian Muslims and provides further historical details in 
support of an argument regarding elite shifts between these nationalist ideologies.  
2.2 The End of Yugoslavia and the Beginning of the Bosnian War 
 The road to war in Bosnia runs through the collapse of the state of Yugoslavia.  
The following summary of the breakup of Yugoslavia is drawn from three principal 
sources: Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, by Laura Silber and Allan Little; The War in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention, by Steven Burg and 
Paul Shoup; and Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito 
to the Fall of Milošević, by Sabrina Ramet. 
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Following World War Two, the Yugoslav League of Communists ran Yugoslavia 
as a multi-ethnic federal state comprised of six federal units.  These were the republics of 
Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Macedonia.  In 
1974, the Yugoslav leadership under Tito issued a new constitution which gave 
autonomy to two provinces within Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo, and raised them to the 
level of federal constituent units.  This constitution also essentially transformed 
Yugoslavia into a confederal state, as each of the republics, as well as Vojvodina and 
Kosovo, were given a central bank, together with their own agencies for policing, 
education, and justice.   
Along with greater autonomy and responsibilities for each of the constituent 
republics, this constitution prepared the path for succession from Tito’s leadership by 
instituting decision-making by consensus within a collective Yugoslav presidency.  Each 
constituent republic would have one vote within the collective presidency as well as a 
veto over many areas of federal legislation, with the chairmanship of the presidency 
rotating among the republics at fixed intervals.  This institutional structure arguably 
incentivized aspiring politicians to promote the interests of their respective republics 
rather than the central Yugoslav state as a means of advancing their careers.  It also made 
it difficult for the central state to pass significant economic and political reforms. 
This institutional design had particularly harmful effects on Yugoslavia as a result 
of the confluence of several events in the early 1980s.  First, Tito passed away in 1980.  
His death left Yugoslavia without a firm source of political legitimacy, a problem which 
became worse later in the decade as Communist governments began to unravel across the 
region, thereby further undermining what legitimacy the Communist party had left.  It 
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also facilitated a great deal of competition and gridlock within federal institutions in 
Yugoslavia, as no single leader could now unify the state or impose decisions in the face 
of impasses.   
Concurrently, Yugoslavia also experienced another shock in the form of a major 
economic crisis, which set in during 1981 and ultimately produced a decade of economic 
malaise marked by extreme inflation, high unemployment, stagnant wage growth, and 
significant public indebtedness.  In 1988, for example, GDP decreased 2%, 
unemployment reached 16.8%, and inflation went to 160% (Ramet 2002, 50).  The 
institutional design of the Yugoslav federal state arguably exacerbated the effects and 
duration of this crisis, as its governing structures inhibited its leaders’ ability to reach 
consensus on the economic policies needed to improve the situation and to implement 
major economic and political reforms.  As this political gridlock continued, the Yugoslav 
state lost even more credibility and legitimacy.   
The early 1980s, however, also offered a preview of an alternative source of 
political legitimacy which would come to the fore by the end of the decade.  In the spring 
and fall of 1981, pro-independence Albanians rioted in Kosovo, leaving the region’s 
minority Serbs feeling threatened and aggrieved.  Their plight helped spark a renaissance 
of Serbian nationalism and an increase in collective Serb political resentment against the 
Yugoslav state by the mid-1980s. 
It was at this point that Slobodan Milošević began his rise to power within Serbia 
and Yugoslavia from his position as head of the Serbian Communist Party, which he 
attained in May of 1986.  He did so by capitalizing on burgeoning Serb nationalism to 
spearhead what he labeled an “Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution” against contemporary 
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political elites, particularly in Kosovo and Vojvodina.  Between 1987 and 1989, he 
mobilized mass demonstrations of Serbs in both Serbia and Kosovo, as Serb nationalism 
became an organized political movement.  By 1989, he effectively controlled the 
leaderships of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro, which together gave him four of the 
eight votes on the collective Yugoslav presidency.  He then instructed his political allies 
in the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina to amend their constitutions so as to eliminate 
their autonomy and bring themselves back under Serbian purview.     
Viewing these developments in Serbia with concern, leaders in Slovenia and 
Croatia paired their frustrations over perceived economic asymmetry within Yugoslavia 
with their fears and worries over Serb nationalism.  Both Slovenia’s and Croatia’s 
economies were stronger than those in the rest of Yugoslavia, leading their officials to 
question the value and benefits of a state structure in which they believed they were 
effectively subsidizing the poorer republics within the country.  Moreover, while the 
rebirth of Serbian nationalism had its roots in a perception that Serbs were under threat 
and losing power across Yugoslavia, the reality was that Serbs still held many of the most 
powerful positions within the Yugoslav army and the Yugoslav state bureaucracy.  These 
circumstances increased Croatian and Slovenian suspicions and anxieties in relation to 
the Serbian nationalist rhetoric emanating from Milošević, especially as he secured his 
dominance over Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro.  On the other hand, Milošević and 
his Serb nationalist allies viewed both Croatian and Slovenian critiques of the Yugoslav 
state structure and their respective nationalist movements as threats to their vision of 
greater Serbian power and influence within Yugoslavia. 
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In this context, the introduction of multi-party elections across Yugoslavia in 
1990 produced resounding wins for ethnic nationalist politicians in Serbia, Croatia, and 
Bosnia.  In the latter, these elections led to the formation of a coalition government 
comprised of ethno-religious nationalist parties representing the Bosnian Muslims, 
Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs.  Over the course of the following year, the individual 
Yugoslav republics experienced significant internal political tensions and impasses over 
whether and how to grant special protection, status, and/or degrees of autonomy for the 
ethnic minorities within their borders.  This was especially true for Croatia and Bosnia.   
Simultaneously, the republics could not come to an agreement with each other 
regarding the future of the Yugoslav state.  Serbs led by Milošević favored the 
continuation of Yugoslavia, on the condition that it be re-centralized (and therefore 
ensure greater dominance for Serbs within the state).  The Croats and Slovenes initially 
pushed for an even more decentralized and confederal structure but eventually chose 
outright independence in the summer of 1991.  As a result, what was now a smaller 
Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia went to war with both Slovenia and Croatia.   
Consequently, in the fall of 1991, the Bosnian Muslim leaders within the Bosnian 
government made it clear they would not stay in a smaller Yugoslavia without Croatia.  
In turn, Bosnian Croats started making overtures to join Croatia and began creating 
autonomous regions within Bosnia.  Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, reiterated their 
desire to remain part of Yugoslavia and therefore maintain unity with the Serbs in Serbia 
(part of a collective Serb nationalist vision of using Yugoslavia as a vehicle for creating a 
“Greater Serbia”).  Bosnian Serb leaders proceeded to create several autonomous regions 
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within Bosnia in the fall of 1991 and indicated that they would rebel against and secede 
from an independent Bosnia.   
In March of 1992, most Serbs in Bosnia boycotted a referendum which ratified 
Bosnia’s independence.  The international community, led by the European Community, 
proceeded to grant the independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina official recognition.  
The following month, the Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army attacked Bosnia in 
conjunction with Serb paramilitary groups from both Serbia and Bosnia.  The war in 
Bosnia had begun.  
2.3 The War in Bosnia 
The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which began on April 6
th
, 1992 and did not 
officially end until the ceremony marking the signing of the Dayton agreement on 
December 14
th
, 1995, was a particularly brutal one.  The conflict included atrocities, mass 
killings, and the systematic use of rape as a weapon of war, mostly against the Bosnian 
Muslim population. Just under 100,000 people were killed, a little over 64,000 of them 
Bosnian Muslims (Toal and Dahlman 2011).  A total of 1.2 million Bosnian Muslims also 
fled their homes, of which roughly 300,000 were IDPs.  Thus, approximately 15% of the 
pre-war Bosnian Muslim population became internally displaced as a result of the 
conflict (Kukić 2001).  Unless noted otherwise, the following summary of the Bosnian 
war is drawn from Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, by Laura Silber and Allan Little; The 
War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention, by Steven 
Burg and Paul Shoup; and How Bosnia Armed, by Marko Hoare.     
 Once the war began, Serb military forces laid siege to the Bosnian capital of 
Sarajevo and carried out an organized campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Bosnian 
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Muslim population, most of which occurred during the spring and summer of 1992.  This 
campaign, which included the use of concentration camps, was most extensive and 
horrific in towns and villages in the Eastern part of Bosnia.  The Bosnian government 
sought to protect the Bosnian Muslim population and save what remained of Bosnia by 
turning to various actors for military support and humanitarian relief, since this kind of 
aid was crucial for its survival.   
 One of these actors was Croatia, along with the separatist Croat forces within 
Bosnia.  Although the government in Sarajevo was able to ally with these Croatian forces 
against the Serbs early in the conflict, the two sides soon went to war as well, clashing 
sporadically in central Bosnia in the fall of 1992 and more frequently starting in April of 
1993 (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007, 346).  The war between the increasingly Muslim-
dominated Bosnian army and the separatist Croat state of Herceg-Bosna continued until 
March of 1994, when negotiations led by the United States produced the Washington 
Agreement.  This settlement ended the intra-Bosnian conflict between the Muslims and 
the Croats and created both a new military coalition against the Serbs as well as a 
Muslim-Croat political federation which would serve as one of the foundations for the 
eventual peace settlement ending the entire conflict.  Subsequently, a Croatian military 
offensive between May and August of 1995 routed Serb forces in the Krajina region 
spanning Croatia and Bosnia and thereby helped push the leaders of both Serbia and the 
Bosnian Serbs to make concessions in peace negotiations.   
Aside from Croatia, the Bosnian government looked mainly to the United States, 
Europe, the United Nations, and NATO for help.  These countries responded with 
support, although the Bosnian leadership viewed their assistance as insufficient and at 
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times counterproductive.  This was especially true for military aid, as Western countries 
imposed an arms embargo on all parties to the Bosnian conflict, thereby effectively 
leaving the Bosnian government at a constant disadvantage relative to Serb and Croat 
forces.  In these circumstances, the Bosnian government sought and received aid from 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as other Muslim-majority countries.   
Thus, the Saudi government began sending some relief supplies to Bosnia in the 
summer of 1992, along with large private financial donations from Saudi citizens.  
Volunteer fighters traveled from Saudi Arabia to Bosnia as well (Karčić 1997, 525-526).  
Iran also sent humanitarian supplies to the Bosnian government starting in July of 1992.  
Later in the war, its government started supplying covert weapons shipments to Bosnia in 
violation of the arms embargo, as well as military advisers and intelligence agents 
(Karčić 1997, 529).  In regards to these later weapons shipments, US President Bill 
Clinton secretly approved the deliveries by directing the United States to do nothing to 
stop them.  This classified decision was not publicly disclosed until several months after 
the war ended (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007, 348).   
The Bosnian government fared better in terms of receiving humanitarian relief 
from the West.  United Nations’ aid convoys supplied Sarajevo as well as several other 
Bosnian cities intermittently throughout the war depending on the status of negotiations 
with the warring sides for entry and safe passage.  The UN also placed a peacekeeping 
force in Bosnia and declared several towns to be ‘safe areas’ where citizens would be 
protected from attack by UN forces.  However, this policy failed completely in the safe 
area of Srebrenica, where Serb forces committed genocide against the local Bosnian 
Muslim population in July of 1995.    
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NATO, on the other hand, continually threatened to use military force against 
Bosnian Serb forces committing aggression against the Bosnian government and civilian 
populations. Until the last year of the war, though, these threats were mostly empty, with 
the exception of the downing of four Bosnian Serb aircraft in February of 1994.  
(Bideleux and Jeffries 2007, 348).  However, on August 28
th
, 1995, Serb forces around 
Sarajevo launched a mortar attack which killed thirty-nine people in the center of the city.  
Led by the United States, NATO responded with two sustained campaigns of airstrikes 
against Bosnian Serb military installations over the following two weeks.  Combined 
with the Croatian offensive in northwest Bosnia and the Bosnian army’s own increasingly 
successful offensive to reclaim territory taken by Bosnian Serb forces early in the war, 
the NATO campaign created the conditions needed to negotiate an end to the war.   
 Subsequently, the warring parties in Bosnia signed a ceasefire on October 5
th
, 
1995, which came into effect on October 11
th
, 1995.  The peace negotiations began in 
Dayton, Ohio at the start of November and concluded with the Dayton Agreement three 
weeks later, followed by a formal signing ceremony in Paris on December 14
th
.   The 
peace settlement preserved a unitary and sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina by creating a 
weak central state presiding over two sub-state entities of roughly equal territorial scope.  
One of these was called the Republika Srpska, representing the areas taken by Serb forces 
and populated mostly by Serbs.  The other was the Muslim-Croat Federation, which was 
populated mostly by Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.  Figure 2.6 provides a map of 





Figure 2.6: Map 5 – Bosnia and Herzegovina post-1995 
 
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bih_dayton_en.png    
 
Unlike the Serb entity, which had a unitary system of government administration, 
the Muslim-Croat Federation included local cantons which were more ethnically 
homogenous and thus granted more exclusive local political authority to either the 
Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats.  The peace settlement also provided for ethnic 
power-sharing at all levels of government.  Thus, the agreement ended the conflict while 
reinforcing Bosnia’s ethnic cleavages via the ethnic partition of Bosnian territory and the 
ethnic apportionment of political institutions and official positions.   
Assessing the role of the international community in the conflict, it is clear that 
the Bosnian government did receive some measure of consistent support from leading 
Western countries early in the conflict, providing it with a basis for hoping for and 
expecting eve greater help as the war progressed.  Hence, although military aid from 
NATO and the leading Western powers may have been minimal until several years into 
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the conflict, the Bosnian government persisted in its attempts to lift the arms embargo 
and win Western military support on its behalf, knowing that it stood a reasonable chance 
of having the United States lead a military intervention on humanitarian grounds.  The 
Bosnian leadership’s efforts eventually bore fruit, as US-led military action was decisive 
for ending the war.  In the meantime, Western countries helped the Bosnian state survive 
via aid deliveries through the UN.             
The chapters below contain further details of key trends and events within the 
war, including earlier peace proposals which failed to stop the conflict.  Further 
elaboration of the history of the war in the following chapters is done in connection with 
Bosnian Muslim leaders’ decisions to use particular types of rhetoric when speaking to 
domestic and foreign audiences, as well as Bosnian Muslim citizens’ changing 
conceptions of their identity.    
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3. Ideological Claims in the Bosnian War: Violence and 
Rhetoric in Domestic Media 
3.1 Introduction  
On May 26
th
, 1992, Alija Izetbegović, the wartime president of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, issued a statement on Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina reporting on the 
substance of peace negotiations, which he said included:  
a permanent truce in Bosnia-Hercegovina at all points where there is fighting with, of course, the 
withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Bosnia-Hercegovina; the necessity to ensure the presence 
in Bosnia- Hercegovina of international forces, above all, of the United Nations, which would 
guarantee the maintenance of the truce and the process of calming down the situation in Bosnia-
Hercegovina, in which respect the return of the refugees to their homes is certainly the most 
important thing (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1992). 
The following day Izetbegović’s rhetoric on the same radio station shifted from the dry, 
matter of fact tone above, as he proclaimed:  
I am calling on the citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina at this moment, in these difficult hours, by 
remembering today's misfortune, to rise up as one in the struggle against these criminals who are 
making our lives difficult not only in Sarajevo, but also throughout Bosnia-Hercegovina. I am 
calling on them to defend Bosnia-Hercegovina. I am calling on them to use all means, all 
permissible means, all human means, as people in the struggle against those who have assaulted 
freedom and life, primarily the life and freedom of the citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina (Radio 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1992). 
Izetbegović’s rhetoric now included a defense of ideals and values, particularly human 
life and freedom.  And even though he was a member of the Bosnian Muslim ethno-
religious group, Izetbegović exhorted the citizens of Bosnia to come to the country’s 
defense, implicitly promoting a multiethnic, tolerant, and civic foundation for the 
Bosnian polity, rather than one based on ethnic or religious particularism.  Why did 
Izetbegović’s rhetoric suddenly include an ideological claim where none was present the 
day before?   
 In this chapter, I undertake a systematic examination of this political 
phenomenon, offering an explanation for the variation in the likelihood and frequency of 
top political leaders’ use of ideological claims in their official wartime domestic rhetoric.  
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My argument is that these leaders will generally employ ideological claims sparingly in 
their wartime rhetoric in domestic media.  This will occur in part because citizens will 
have a low level of demand for political ideology, but mostly because ideological claims 
are relatively costly to produce.  However, if wartime violence against the leaders’ polity 
and citizens increases to a high level, I argue that four mechanisms will increase the 
benefits and lower the costs for leaders to employ ideological claims in their domestic 
rhetoric.   
First, the leaders will need to use their rhetoric to sustain and comfort the wartime 
population following a surge in violence against the population.  Second, they will look 
to take advantage of a spike in violence against the polity to mobilize more citizens into 
the armed forces while shaping these recruits’ goals for fighting.  Third, leaders in this 
context will be rewarded for showing conviction and resolution, qualities they can 
demonstrate via more ideological rhetoric.  Fourth, the leaders will occupy at least a 
temporary moral high ground as victims of violence, giving them room to use ideological 
principles as a bargaining strategy to extract more concessions in peace negotiations.  
Accordingly, spikes in wartime violence make ideological rhetoric more useful for 
wartime leaders. 
Using micro-level large N data from the Bosnian conflict in the 1990s, I show that 
high levels of wartime violence against the residents of the capital city of Sarajevo 
prompted the top political leaders of the Bosnian government to use ideological claims 
more frequently.  I demonstrate this relationship empirically via quantitative analyses of 
2,455 speech acts on Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina, aggregated at both the level of the 
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speech act and the conflict month.  I then use qualitative text analysis to provide evidence 
of the mechanisms underlying this relationship.     
This chapter’s theory and results offer three main contributions to the research 
literature on armed conflict.  First, the chapter makes both empirical and theoretical 
contributions to a new research program on ideology during civil war.  Thus far, this 
research agenda has begun to explore why warring parties adopt certain ideologies during 
civil wars and how these ideologies shape their strategies and institutional development 
in conflict, including their relationships with other state and non-state actors (Sanín and 
Wood 2014; Staniland 2015).  Rather than explaining why wartime actors use specific 
ideologies, I focus here on the incidence and frequency of wartime ideological claims in 
general, a dependent variable that has not yet been the subject of extensive analysis.  
Empirically, I demonstrate a correlation between patterns of wartime violence and 
changes in this dependent variable.  Theoretically, I also contribute four new mechanisms 
to explain why certain patterns of violence against their polity spur wartime leaders to use 
ideological claims more frequently.    
Second, I show that the level of violence a polity suffers during conflict shapes 
the frequency of its leaders’ use of ideological claims, rather than the standard view 
whereby ideology shapes and facilitates a group’s use of violence (Juergensmeyer 1987).  
In that sense, the volume of political leaders’ ideological rhetoric is an endogenous 
outgrowth of trends during armed conflict, much like shifts in identity during war 
(Kalyvas 2008).  My findings also build on prior work which indicates that the use of 
violence can be a strategic response adopted by elites wishing to remold co-ethnics’ 
identities when facing a threat to their hold on power. (Gagnon 2004, 189)  The 
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difference is that I focus on the victims of violence and the impact of violence on the 
victims’ ideologies, rather than the use and consequences of violence for its perpetrators.   
Third, I make use of an original large N monthly dataset of speech acts by top 
Bosnian government leaders during the war in Bosnia, which enables me to show that a 
polity’s experience of violence precedes its leaders’ use of ideological claims.  In doing 
so, my analysis offers an explanation for the incidence and frequency of ideological 
rhetoric during one armed conflict, but the argument and results are potentially applicable 
to a broader set of armed conflicts. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows.  The next section briefly summarizes 
the theoretical argument and presents the central hypothesis tested in the chapter.  The 
following section elaborates the research design.  The fourth section presents quantitative 
evidence for the empirical correlation between increases in wartime violence and 
ideological claims in domestic media.  The fifth section details a set of theoretical 
mechanisms to explain why higher levels of violence against residents of Sarajevo 
spurred Bosnia’s wartime leaders to use ideological claims more frequently when 
speaking to domestic audiences.  It also uses qualitative text analysis to illustrate these 
mechanisms.  The final section concludes.     
3.2 The Argument in Brief: Wartime Violence and Ideological Claims  
I argue that top wartime leaders will generally tend to face five disincentives 
against using ideological claims in their rhetoric to domestic audiences.  First, the 
relatively greater complexity of ideological rhetoric makes it costlier to produce than 
non-ideological rhetoric.  Second, the requirement that ideological claims be principled 
and consistent may limit the flexibility of leaders’ actions and policies.  Third, 
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committing to one set of ideological claims runs the risk of alienating portions of leaders’ 
coalition of supporters who do not ascribe to that set of claims or do not share their 
interpretation of the claims.  Fourth, employing a particular group of ideological claims 
may limit leaders’ ability to negotiate with the enemy during war, as ideological 
principles may constrain the bargaining range the leaders can commit to. Fifth, I argue 
that, in most contexts, the domestic public will exhibit a low level of demand for political 
ideology, meaning that ideological rhetoric will be a mostly irrelevant strategy for leaders 
trying to generate greater mass support. 
In contrast, periods of intense wartime violence will prompt a need for top 
political leaders to use ideological claims to sustain and comfort their populations, as 
ordinary people look to their leaders to buoy their spirits and offer explanations for the 
chaos and destruction of intense violence.  Moreover, these contexts will also provide 
these leaders with opportunities to use ideological claims to mobilize and shape new 
soldiers’ fighting ethos, appear firm and resolute, and elicit greater concessions in peace 
negotiations.  As a result, I posit that during periods of intense wartime violence top 
political leaders will decide to invest in the costly time and effort required to produce 
ideological claims effectively.  If so, wartime leaders should employ ideological claims in 
their domestic rhetoric sparingly when their group is experiencing low levels of violence.  
In contrast, these leaders should employ ideological claims much more frequently during 
periods when their group experiences higher levels of violence.  Formally, the hypothesis 
I test is:  
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Top political leaders of ethno-religious groups involved in armed conflict will be 
more likely to employ ideological claims in their rhetoric to domestic audiences when the 
group experiences intense violence directed against it.  
3.3 Research Design: Coding Bosnian Leaders’ Wartime Speech Acts, 1992-1995 
To measure my dependent variable, I collected and coded an original large N 
dataset of texts containing official wartime rhetoric by Alija Izetbegović, Haris Silajdžić, 
Ejup Ganić, Muhamed Sacirbey, and Rasim Delić, along with a few miscellaneous 
officials who worked for them.  These individuals constituted the top wartime leadership 
of the Bosnian government. Specifically, Alija Izetbegović was the President of the 
collective Bosnian presidency and head of the Bosnian government. Haris Silajdžić was 
the foreign minister until late October 1993 and Prime Minister from that point onward. 
Ejup Ganić served as the second Bosnian Muslim/Bosniak member of the Bosnian 
collective presidency for the entire war.  Muhamed Sacirbey served as Bosnia’s 
ambassador the United Nations until the middle of 1995, when he became foreign 
minister.  Rasim Delić was the head of the Bosnian army from June 1992 onward.  These 
leaders were the primary policymakers responsible for directing and guiding the Bosnian 
state during the conflict.  Consequently, their media appearances and rhetoric were 
broadcast throughout Bosnian government territory, thereby shaping the information, 
perception, and views that Bosnian citizens held concerning the war. 
I searched for these texts in BBC Monitoring, Agence-France Presse, and the New 
York Times between April 6th, 1992 and December 14th, 1995. These organizations 
provided thorough coverage of the conflicts, including transcripts of daily and weekly 
press conferences, speeches, statements, and interviews.  BBC Monitoring was 
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particularly useful in this regard, since it translated, transcribed, and aggregated local 
media broadcasts into single stories and noted the name of the original local media source 
for each story.  Since my focus in this chapter is on these leaders’ official rhetoric to 
domestic audiences, the data coded and analyzed here stem exclusively from BBC 
Monitoring’s transcripts of broadcasts on Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Sarajevo-
based media station that broadcast throughout the city and Bosnian government territory 
during the war.    
Within each broadcast, a single speech act consisted of the following criteria:  
nearly all speech acts comprised direct quotations which featured at least one complete 
sentence.  I included a small number of incomplete quotations as well, although in these 
instances I usually bracketed the words that seemed to have actually been used by the 
speaker.   For interviews and press conferences, each answer to a question was a single 
speech act.  For statements, speeches, and letters, each paragraph was a speech act, unless 
the source reporting the speech act sub-divided it into different subjects editorially, in 
which case these sub-headings represented distinct speech acts.   
 Since I define ideology and ideological claims as political leaders’ proclamations 
of the political values and goals that their polity stands for and/or wishes to embody in 
practice, I coded speech acts that discussed one or more of the following elements as 
including an ideological claim: the future political regime of Bosnia; the present or future 
purpose of the Bosnian state; the historical values of the Bosnian community or Bosnian 
state; the relative value or weight that should be accorded to ethnic identity in Bosnia; 
policies regarding citizenship and membership in the state; the values and ideals that 
should take future priority in Bosnia; discussion of the values or principles that caused 
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the war.  I interpreted the entirety of a speech act to determine whether it included an 
ideological claim, including the theme of the speech act, the meaning of all of its 
sentences and words, and/or its central argument.   
The dependent variable is thus a dichotomous indicator denoting whether or not a 
speech act made by a top Bosnian government leader included an ideological claim.  To 
supplement this measure, I also coded a variable measuring the percentage of these 
leaders’ speech acts which included an ideological claim in each month of the conflict.      
To provide a better sense of what an ideological claim looks like as opposed to a 
non-ideological claim, I present the following comparison of sentences spoken by Alija 
Izetbegović at different points in the conflict: 
No Ideological Claim Ideological Claim 
The US can help Bosnia-Hercegovina either 
by neutralising by force the vast military 
hardware used by the aggressor in the 
destruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina or by 
supplying us with the arms which would 
enable us to face the enemy on equal terms. 
In a crazy hope, we are trying to preserve 
a vision of a civilian and cosmopolitan 
Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
In our state delegation were, with me, Dr 
Ljubijankic, the foreign minister, and Mr 
Komsic. On their side, apart from Tudjman 
and Dr Granic, their deputy premier and 
foreign minister, was also a representative of 
the Bosnian Croats.  
We will win…because we will respect 
other people's religion, other nations, 
different political convictions, because 
we will try to be democrats in this grave 
situation. 
We know that a huge force has been 
unleashed on Goražde but the town can and 
must hold out. 
Those who are among us today, those 
who have been with us for two years, the 
Serbs who have been with us for two 
years on the free territory, in the state, 
and Sarajevo, they are our fellow-
fighters against that evil. 
In these talks we told them about the situation 
in Bosnia-Hercegovina, they told us about 
their problems and the position of our 
expatriate community in the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 
We adhere to the position that it [Bosnia] 
should be a democratic state in which 
human rights are respected - this is the 





Whereas the sentences on the left merely represent descriptions of different events in the 
war along with some demands and negotiating principles, the sentences on the right 
emphasize specific political values and goals for Bosnia.  The first, third, and fifth 
comments in the right-hand column explicitly promote cosmopolitanism, multiethnic 
tolerance, and democracy, while the fourth comment implicitly promotes multiethnic 
coexistence around an overarching Bosnian identity. 
 My principal independent variable is the level of violence in Sarajevo during the 
conflict.  My data source for this variable is a report prepared by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which contains monthly estimates 
of the number of people killed in Sarajevo during the war (Tabeau, Bijak, and Lončarić 
2003: 561).  Although using this data risks falling prey to the “urban bias” in the study of 
civil war (Kalyvas 2004), I argue that it is justifiable in this case because, aside from 
diplomatic trips abroad, these Bosnian leaders were mostly confined to Sarajevo during 
the war and their authority extended only nominally to other areas under Bosnian 
government control in the conflict.  As a result, these leaders’ perceptions and knowledge 
of the dynamics of the war were significantly shaped by events in Sarajevo, including the 
level and patterns of violence in the city and their knowledge of how civilians were 
experiencing this violence.  
In addition, the fact that the residents of Sarajevo were almost entirely on the 
receiving end of violence during the siege makes violence within the city a particularly 
effective measure for testing the hypothesized relationship, since the leaders of the 
Bosnian government were representing a community that was mostly a victim of violence 
rather than a perpetrator.  Therefore, wartime violence in Sarajevo was much less likely 
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to have been produced by the Bosnian government leadership in response to a 
legitimating ideology or set of ideological claims, which helps address endogeneity 
concerns.  Furthermore, the level of violence in Sarajevo also varied at different points in 
the conflict, from very high in certain periods to quite low in others, thus enabling a test 
of the hypothesis using large N intra-conflict data.  Consequently, confirmation of the 
hypothesis in this case would establish its plausibility and enable future testing in other 
contexts. 
In addition, the violence in Sarajevo is particularly well suited for this analysis 
because of its random pattern with respect to residents of the city.  In the words of a UN 
report: 
A review of the incidents in the chronology also indicates a random process of shelling throughout 
the civilian areas of the city. The shelling, which occurs at different times of the day without any 
apparent pattern or specific target, has a terror-inspiring effect on the civilian population. It is 
particularly telling that deaths, injuries and destruction have occurred in various parts of the city 
and in such well-known non-military settings as schools, open streets, public parks, football and 
athletic fields, cemeteries, hospitals, and even bread, water and relief lines in the city (United 
Nations 1994: 45).       
This pattern of violence also addresses any endogeneity concerns that the Bosnian 
leadership used ideological claims because the violence was systematically biased against 
citizens with particular ideological views or backgrounds.     
 Using this report, I coded the level of violence as a categorical variable based on 
the median number of people killed in Sarajevo during each month of the conflict.  The 
median was 112 killed, while the 25th centile was 29.5 and the 75th centile was 223.  In 
order to capture the distinction between low, average, and high levels of violence, I coded 
months with fewer than 30 deaths as low violence months, months with 30 to 223 deaths 
as medium violence months, and months with more than 223 deaths as high violence 
months.  I then appended the categories of this variable to each row of the dataset for a 
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given month, i.e. to each speech act that occurred in a month with a given level of 
violence.       
I also coded two lag variables to use as controls.  One lag variable captures the 
level of violence in the previous month, in order to account for the likelihood that the 
previous month’s level of violence may be related both to the current month’s violence 
and to the frequency of ideological claims due to a possible delay in the impact of war 
events on leaders’ official rhetoric.  The other lag variable captures the previous month’s 
percentage of ideological claims, so as to account for the possibility of inertia and 
temporal spillover in the leaders’ use of more ideological rhetoric.                
3.4 Analysis: The Correlation between Wartime Violence and Ideological Claims    
Based on my data, it is clear that Bosnian leaders generally employed ideological 
claims sparingly in their rhetoric to domestic audiences.  Out of 2,455 speech acts on 
Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina, only 213, or 8.7%, included ideological claims.  This 
proportion of ideological claims corroborates my theoretical expectation that top wartime 
leaders should generally be hesitant to utilize ideological claims in their official domestic 
rhetoric.    
However, the following figure illustrates how the pattern of violence in Sarajevo 
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Figure 3.1 provides significant visual support for my hypothesis, in that the 
number of people killed in Sarajevo demonstrates a strong positive correlation with the 
monthly percentage of Bosnian leaders’ speech acts on Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina 
that included ideological claims.   
I then proceeded to test my hypothesis via a statistical model.  Since my 
dependent variable is binary, I used a probit regression to capture the non-linear 
functional form of its relationship with my explanatory variables. Table 3.1 presents the 
results.  The model indicates that the level of violence in a given month positively 
impacts the frequency of Bosnian leaders’ use of ideological claims in domestic media.  
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Moreover, this relationship is statistically significant at 99% confidence and is robust in 
the presence of the prior month’s level of violence.   
Table 3.1: Probability of Ideological Claims vs. Violence in Sarajevo             
















Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
However, since the coefficients from a non-linear model cannot be interpreted on 
their own, I calculated the substantive impact that a shift in the level of violence would 
have on the predicted probability that Bosnian leaders made an ideological claim in 
domestic media, holding the control variable at its observed values (Hanmer and Kalkan 
2013).  I computed both a single calculation of the predicted probability, as well as one 
thousand simulations of the calculation, which provided the mean effect and 95% 
confidence interval for the predicted probability.  The results indicate that shifting from 
low to medium violence corresponds, on average, with a 3.6 percentage point increase in 
the likelihood of an ideological claim, while a shift from medium to high violence 
corresponds with a 5.2 percentage point increase.   
Consequently, shifting from low to high violence in a month corresponds to an 
8.8 percentage point increase in the likelihood that Bosnian leaders made ideological 
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claims in their official rhetoric to domestic audiences.  This is a significant effect 
considering that only about 9% of all speech acts in domestic media in the entire war 
included ideological claims.  Moreover, the simulation confirms that the mean effects for 
these shifts are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.  Overall, these results 
show strong support for my hypothesis, since higher levels of violence are associated 
with a much greater likelihood of ideological claims in these leaders’ speech acts in 
domestic media. 
 To corroborate these results, I also examined the data aggregated by month.  
Table 3.2 presents the results of a regression model comparing the relationship between 
the level of violence in a given month and the percentage of ideological claims made on 
Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina in the same month.  Controlling for the previous month’s 
level of violence and percentage of ideological claims in domestic media, the current 
month’s level of violence is positively related to the percentage of Bosnian leaders’ 
speech acts in domestic media that included ideological claims.  This relationship is also 
statistically significant at 95% confidence.  Substantively, a shift in the level of violence 
increased the percentage of ideological claims made in domestic media by 4.4%.  This 









Table 3.2: Monthly Percentage of Ideological Claims vs.  Violence in Sarajevo  
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3.5.1 Theory: The Prevailing High Costs of Ideological Claims    
Having used statistical analyses to demonstrate the correlation between intense 
wartime violence and domestic ideological claims, I now proceed to lay out my argument 
as to why this relationship exists.  Before detailing why higher levels of violence should 
prompt wartime leaders to employ ideological claims more frequently to domestic 
audiences, I first review why ideological claims are generally costly for political leaders 
and should therefore be a relatively rare feature of their rhetoric. In brief, these types of 
claims are costly because of their complexity, their inflexibility, their potential to alienate 
both members of leaders’ political coalitions and wartime negotiating partners, and their 
low appeal to members of the public. 
As regards its complexity compared to non-ideological rhetoric, long-standing 
research into ideology and ideological rhetoric argues that it should exhibit constraint, or 
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a degree of association between beliefs such that it is possible to predict a person’s 
political position on a range of issues given that one already knows their position on a 
single issue (Converse 1964; Kritzer 1978).  In addition, ideological rhetoric arguably 
approaches the complexity of theory and philosophy in an attempt to persuade the 
recipients of its message of its content and position (Weiler 1993).   These features of 
ideological rhetoric entail that political leaders or their speechwriters must give careful 
thought and consideration to creating and maintaining precise and consistent principles 
within the set of ideological claims they wish to promote.  Alternatively, political leaders 
could circumvent the need for precision and consistency in ideological rhetoric by 
promoting highly persuasive and resonant images, stories, and dichotomies, but this will 
also require additional time and thought.  Either way, ideological claims will be more 
costly for leaders to produce.     
 Aside from this cost, government leaders who commit to consistent principles and 
ideals within ideological claims issued to domestic audiences may limit their ability to 
alter both their rhetoric and policies (Krebs and Jackson 2007).  Leaders of social 
movements with strong ideological commitments also face this concern over political 
flexibility, as their ideology can constrain them from making politically beneficial 
strategic decisions (Collins 2007).  Top wartime leaders may have their political 
flexibility limited in a similar way because their domestic audiences may hold them 
accountable to their ideological rhetoric similar to the way they punish leaders for 
backing down in a foreign policy crisis (Fearon 1994).   
Opposition movements in semi-authoritarian regimes may also make use of 
discrepancies in leaders’ rhetoric through a process of “rhetorical coercion”, whereby the 
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opposition utilizes contradictions and inconsistencies in a leader’s rhetoric to force him or 
her to follow through on specific policies (Lyall 2006).  Other research suggests that 
mass publics may restrain their leaders’ ability to shift away from a specific type of 
nationalist ideology once the leaders have publicly promoted it (Staniland 2015).  I argue 
that top political leaders are aware of this risk of inflexibility resulting from ideological 
rhetoric and will consequently hesitate to employ ideological claims to domestic 
audiences for fear of limiting their future policy options. 
 Another factor that makes ideological claims highly costly for leaders to employ 
in their rhetoric to domestic audiences is their potential to alienate sections of their 
coalition.  In the context of complex organizations such as governments, research 
suggests that they benefit from top leaders who can serve as a focal point for coordinating 
the goals and behavior of other individuals in the organization, generally via 
informational cues (Ahlquist and Levi 2011) and more specifically through signaling in 
rhetoric and speeches (Baturo and Mikhaylov 2013).  Here, ideological claims could play 
an important role, as they tend to offer clear principles and prescriptions for political 
attitudes and action.  However, if the organization in question contains different factions 
of elites and officials, the top leaders may need to navigate and manage these inter-
personal tensions in order to maintain the viability of the organization’s political projects, 
especially during war (Thompson 1967). To the extent that different factions exist and 
have contrasting preferences regarding political ideology, the top leaders will be 
constrained from promoting ideological claims in order to avoid spurning one or more 
factions.           
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 Ideological rhetoric also runs the risk of potentially alienating the opposing side 
during armed conflict in a way that undermines peace negotiations.  For example, in the 
case of territorial armed conflict, leaders may use ideological principles to justify or 
legitimize their stance on a particular issue within the conflict (Goddard 2006, 40).  Some 
of these strategies can bolster ties between a group or state and its wartime opponent, but 
most tend to create rigid and “indivisible” demands, so that reaching a negotiated 
settlement becomes very difficult (Goddard 2006, 36-37).  Assuming that the leaders of a 
state or group wish to reach a favorable negotiated settlement to an armed conflict, it may 
be more useful for them to appear pragmatic and non-ideological, so that the other side 
cannot accuse them of intransigence and has little motive or ability to reject their wartime 
demands out of hand.      
 While these factors combine to make ideological claims highly costly for wartime 
leaders to include in their domestic rhetoric, citizens will also not exhibit a high demand 
for ideological rhetoric in most contexts.  Early research on political ideology and 
attitudes indicated that mass publics are much less likely to subscribe to consistent and 
coherent political ideologies than elites are (Converse 1964).  More recent research 
suggests that most people still tend to hold political values and ideals that contradict or 
conflict with one another according to the standards of a coherent and consistent 
ideological system (Snow and Bird 2007).  These findings extend to insurgent groups in 
armed conflict, where the leaders tend to be motivated by ideological principles to a 
much greater degree than lower level recruits and followers in the organization or 
movement (Marks 2004).  To the extent that mass publics do not relate to and are 
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unmotivated by ideological claims, it will generally make little sense for political leaders 
to use these types of claims.   
However, other research suggests that even if most people do not subscribe to 
consistent political ideals and ideologies, they nonetheless hold a few core beliefs or 
values which shape their judgments of politicians and policies (Feldman 1988).  The 
presence of these core beliefs and values arguably creates an opportunity for mass publics 
to demonstrate greater demand for a clear and delineated set of ideological claims in 
some contexts.  As I argue below, periods of intense levels of violence during war 
constitute one of these contexts.   
3.5.2 Theory: The Mechanisms behind the Violence and Ideological Claims 
Relationship 
 In contrast to the general costliness of ideological principles, I posit that four 
mechanisms incentivize political leaders to use ideological claims in their domestic 
rhetoric during periods of intense wartime violence.  First, suffering intense violence, 
people will look to their leaders to sustain their spirits and morale and offer comforting 
explanations for the suffering.  I argue that top political leaders’ use of political ideals 
and values will be one of their most effective instruments for promoting popular morale 
and offering consolation.  Second, the leaders will be able to employ ideological claims 
to mobilize more recruits into the military effort and to bring these new recruits’ motives 
and goals for fighting into alignment with the leadership’s.  Third, the process of 
responding to an intensification of violent attacks on their people rewards leaders who 
demonstrate greater conviction and resoluteness.  One way to demonstrate this conviction 
is to employ consistent ideological principles in political rhetoric.  Fourth, now enjoying 
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the moral high ground as the principal victim of wartime violence, political leaders will 
not have to worry about alienating the wartime enemy via ideological rhetoric and can 
use ideological claims as signs of commitment to firm negotiating principles, thereby 
pushing the other side to compromise.  In what follows I elaborate the logic behind these 
mechanisms and interpret a set of Bosnian leaders’ ideological claims to provide 
evidence of their operation. 
3.5.2.1 Mechanism 1 - Comforting the Population 
 In the face of intense wartime violence directed against them, ordinary people will 
seek to boost their spirits and find an explanation for their wartime experiences.  One way 
for leaders to meet the public’s high demand for morale and comfort is to articulate the 
purpose and values for which the polity is fighting.  Ideological claims are especially 
effective for communicating these morale-boosting values because they tend to include 
sharp imagery and key beliefs for the public to rally around (Carton, Murphy, and Clark 
2014).  Normally ambivalent and apathetic about political ideology, I argue that the 
public’s demoralization during periods of intense violence will leave them receptive to 
these types of claims emanating from its leadership, provided that the leadership focuses 
on a few core beliefs or values.  Research in other contexts demonstrates a similar 
functional role for ideological claims, as insurgent fighters motivated by ideology are less 
likely to defect or demobilize (Oppenheim et al. 2015) and ideological political parties 
are more likely to achieve political success in conditions of political and social 
uncertainty because they attract more committed activists (Hanson 2006).        
In addition to boosting the morale of their population in this context, I argue that 
top political leaders will need to console the public by offering an explanation as to why 
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it is being forced to suffer intense violence.  Aside from promoting specific beliefs and 
values, ideological claims tend to be embedded within stories that praise or condemn 
specific sets of political practices or actors.  Since most people tend to employ narrative 
structures in thinking about, perceiving, and making moral judgments about the world 
(Shenhav 2006), and since narratives or stories can help people come to terms with both 
the logical reasons for and moral meaning of everyday events (Zellman 2015), 
ideological rhetoric should be highly beneficial as a means of explaining why the public 
is experiencing the horrors of war.  To do so, the ideological claims must articulate why 
the public is being targeted, why its cause and plight are more just than its opponents, and 
what it is fighting for.  Such rhetoric helps prepare the civilian population for more 
hardship to come and galvanizes it to withstand suffering.        
 Alija Izetbegović utilized this type of rhetoric in the second year of the conflict, 
addressing Bosnians with the following message in the wake of a spike in violence 
following a decline in the prior month: “Dear citizens, the world has not left us much 
choice. I believe that I share your thoughts and feelings when I say that we are not going 
to bend our heads and that we shall take the risk of a struggle for freedom and dignity. Do 
not fear and do not doubt, a people struggling for survival and freedom, if its struggle is 
genuine, cannot lose” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993).  Thus, he 
specifically urged Bosnians not to doubt in an ultimately good outcome in the war, while 
galvanizing their spirits by explicitly reminding them of what was at stake in the conflict 
and implicitly reminding them of why they were being targeted.  In this case, he 
identified the reason for the Bosnians’ plight with specific ideals and values of the state 
and people.   
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Toward the end of the year, following another rapid increase in violence, 
Izetbegović celebrated the morale and the cause of the Bosnian state even while 
reminding listeners of the need to persevere, asserting that, “with their dignity, courage 
and determination, the people of Bosnia-Hercegovina, especially the Bosniak Muslim 
people, have surprised Europe and the entire world, who expected a quick defeat and the 
destruction of the political and state-creating being of our people when the war broke out. 
Contrary to this, our people have shown vitality and the ability to preserve their dignity” 
(Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993).  
3.5.2.2 Mechanism 2 - Mobilizing Recruits  
Aside from enjoying greater public demand for the use of ideological claims in 
order to boost the public’s morale and explain why it is suffering intense violence, top 
political leaders can also use ideological claims to channel citizens’ frustration and anger 
over wartime violence to their advantage.  This is because during conflict, people’s 
experience of intense violent victimization will produce potential pools of recruits for a 
state’s military or security forces, motivated by resentment against victimization and by 
the desire to defend the community.  To help transform these potential recruits into 
combatants, top political leaders can benefit from communicating ideological claims 
which impose an overarching purpose and mission to the war effort.   
This process is consistent with research which indicates that ideology can provide 
a set of reasons for actors to justify their actions in war (Kalyvas 2004), that rebel 
organizations use ideological instruction as a costly induction mechanism to screen the 
commitment level of potential recruits (Weinstein 2007), that social movements can 
increase participation by strengthening or creating new ideological commitments among 
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followers (Ferree and Miller 1985), and that armed organizations experiencing consistent 
losses on the battlefield may utilize ideological indoctrination to retain the commitment 
of their fighters to the cause and to offer higher benefits to fighters in the form of 
symbolic capital (Eck 2007).  More ideological recruits have also been found to boost 
armed groups’ fighting capacity (Sanín and Wood 2014), enhance their internal cohesion 
(Ugarriza and Craig 2013), and increase the production of violence in armed conflict by 
transferring guilt for violent attacks from an individual to the group (Sen and Wagner 
2009).  In the case analyzed here, one scholar has also noted that Islamic values and 
principles were “expected to bolster the fighting spirit of the Bosnian army and to 
broaden the primarily local motivation of its soldiers” (Bougarel 2007, 172).     
Although ideological claims appear to offer clear benefits to political leaders 
looking to increase the size and commitment of their wartime armed forces following a 
steep rise in violence, they offer the additional benefit of allowing the leaders to have a 
degree of influence and control over the motives and goals of the new combatants.  
Research on insurgent groups, for example, suggests that ideology offers an effective tool 
for socializing combatants into the organization and disciplining them (Sanín and Wood 
2014), while social movement leaders can also use ideological principles to shape their 
followers’ identities (Collins 2007.  Top political leaders can thus prevent new recruits 
from fighting merely because of anger or a desire to get even following a sharp increase 
in violence.  Instead, they can use the principles and values embedded in ideological 
claims to give the recruits a long-term vision of the polity and community they are 
fighting for.  By identifying themselves with specific ideological claims and getting new 
recruits to identify with these claims as well, top political leaders can also generate a 
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personal identification and bond between themselves and newly recruited combatants.  
This bond may in turn significantly boost these leaders’ political power.     
The Bosnian leadership utilized ideological claims in this way early in the war.  
For example, in the days following the massacre of Sarajevo residents waiting in line for 
bread, Alija Izetbegović supplemented the statements quoted at the outset of the chapter 
by proclaiming “I am calling on all people in Bosnia-Hercegovina. After today, we 
should differentiate only between people and monsters. People are all those who we do 
not ask what they are called or what nation they are or religion. One knows where the 
monsters are. They are on the hills around Sarajevo” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Herzegovina 1992).  This statement is a reminder that all residents of Bosnia are part of 
the polity and should rise to the defense of a political community whose members do not 
care about each other’s religious or ethnic identity, thereby enacting a vision of a 
multiethnic state.   
Several days later, on May 31
st
, 1992, Izetbegović used an interview on Radio 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to assert that “Finally, I can say now that the world is standing 
behind us, now that the world has stepped on our side, it is our [sic] that we ourselves do 
something that is needed, that we rise as one to defend the republic and its democratic 
institutions” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1992).  Here, Izetbegović 
explicitly outlined the political goal behind the mobilization of Bosnian’s war effort, 
namely building a democratic political order.   
Following a summer of intense violence, defense minister Sefer Halilović issued 
another call for mobilization, stating in August of 1992 “Dear citizens of Sarajevo, the 
most illustrious pages of our history are being written. Join us so that we can write them 
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together with the best heroes of our beloved city and the youngest republic in the world” 
(Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1992).  Once again, the appeal to ‘join 
us’ was paired to the purpose of fighting for the ‘citizens of Sarajevo’ and the ‘republic’ 
of Bosnia.       
Bosnia’s leaders joined mobilization to ideals again in early January of 1993, after 
the number of people killed in Sarajevo had increased over 100% during the previous two 
months.  Izetbegović then told Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina that “Bosnia-Hercegovina 
has to be an independent and sovereign state that is not divided into three ethnic units” 
(Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993), while Halilović told the same 
media outlet the next day that the Bosnian army was “fighting for a democratic state in 
which all people would be equal regardless of their nationality and religion, and the army 
was waging a liberation war, not an ethnic one” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Herzegovina 1993).  Another telling example occurred in May of the same year, when 
Izetbegović sought to shape potential recruits’ views of the goals of Bosnia’s defense, 
stating, “We shall turn to our own people, to all citizens who love this country, who carry 
Bosnia-Hercegovina in their hearts. We shall appeal to them to unite and to use all 
permissible means to defend the independent and sovereign Bosnia-Hercegovina, its 
integrity and freedom” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993).      
Moreover, in gathering support for the military defense effort and the building of 
the Bosnian army, the Bosnian government leadership also reminded recruits of the 
guiding ideological precepts of the state and how these precepts should inform the tactics 
and behavior of Bosnian soldiers.  Thus, for example, following another sharp 
intensification of violence toward the end of the war, Ejup Ganić stated that, “Preventive 
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actions by our army are directed at preventing new terrorist actions of the same nature. 
As the legitimate government of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina we cannot nor will 
use such methods. We cannot commit massacre [sic] on civilian population because we 
believe that the people on the other side are also citizens of this country irrespective of 
their political orientation. We shall never use such methods” (Radio Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1995).  Thus, Ganić sought to contain any impulse toward 
vengeance on the part of Bosnian soldiers in response to heightened violence against 
Sarajevo.  In doing so, he also indicated that the Bosnian government’s official 
ideological values constrained and shaped the Bosnian army’s military tactics.  
3.5.2.3 Mechanism 3 - Appearing Resolute 
Furthermore, whereas contexts of low wartime violence expose political leaders 
employing ideological claims to higher costs in the form of political inflexibility, 
contexts of high wartime violence arguably reward such inflexibility in the guise of 
conviction and resoluteness.  After experiencing a significant increase in violence, 
citizens will expect their top leaders to issue clear and simple condemnations of the 
enemy while stating why the polity is justified in its cause.  Ideological claims can thus 
be of significant use in creating the impression of firm and forceful leadership in this 
scenario, particularly if political leaders employ ideological claims that describe and 
illustrate stark contrasts and dichotomies between opposing values and principles, 
including good and evil.   
Examples of this type of resolute rhetoric include Izetbegović striking a very 
firm tone early in 1993, asserting that, “I said here that a nation brought to a situation like 
this and whose existence is at stake has the right to use all means to survive and persevere 
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and we will use these means” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993) 
and following this up after a sharp rise in violence later in the year by pronouncing “They 
have not managed to destroy this nation, and they will not manage to do it” (Radio 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993).  Thus, Izetbegović found it politically 
advantageous, perhaps even necessary, to identify his government with the ‘nation’, 
meaning Bosnian Muslims/Bosniaks, even at the cost of some of his earlier rhetoric about 
a multiethnic and civic state.  On the other hand, Izetbegović also sought to preserve 
some flexibility in ideological principles while remaining firm on key wartime issues, 
arguing in May of 1993 that, “The UN Security Council ought to accept the decision of 
the majority of the population of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina to live in an 
undivided and united state which has the support of over 64% of the population and 
which has the right to fight for its survival and democratic prosperity by all legal means” 
(Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993).   
3.5.2.4 Mechanism 4 - Gaining a Negotiating Advantage 
Finally, if a state’s wartime enemy has just launched severe and intense attacks 
against it, the state will find itself, at least temporarily, in the position of an innocent 
wartime victim (provided it does not respond with the same type of violence).  With the 
moral high ground consequently in its favor, the polity’s top political leaders will not be 
as concerned that committing to ideological principles will undermine their ability to 
negotiate.  In fact, abiding by clear and consistent ideological claims at the negotiating 
table may now be beneficial, as the leaders can use these claims to convey that their 
public now demands greater concessions to make up for the injustice of the intense 
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violence they have experienced, thus pressuring their wartime enemy to compromise 
(Zellman 2015; Goddard 2006). 
 The Bosnian leadership demonstrated this mechanism in its rhetoric early on, as 
Izetbegović laid down a firm negotiating position following a summer of intense violence 
against the residents of Sarajevo, proclaiming in September 1992, “I promised that a 
delegation at government level would go to Geneva, but clearly it would present the 
views of a democratic, secular Bosnia that will not be divided along ethnic lines” (Radio 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1992).  In March of 1993, after another period 
of sustained violence, Silajdžić again promulgated a firm negotiating stance, resting on a 
particular vision for Bosnia: “The delegation represents the sovereign and independent 
state of Bosnia -Hercegovina and all activities must be directed towards the preservation 
of the sovereignty, independence and political and territorial integrity of the state within 
the framework of the entrusted mandate” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Herzegovina 1993).          
 Izetbegović also asserted an ideological basis for negotiations after another rise in 
violence in November of 1994, stating of the Bosnian Serbs that “Those there only 
recognize one nation, their own nation; one religion, their own religion; and one party, 
their own party. Everything else is supposed to be exterminated. I said that in such a 
situation, the secretary-general cannot and has no right to be neutral. He should clearly 
say to the French, English and all other forces that are hindering him in his actions from 
time to time that the legal authorities and this country should be protected. I told him that. 
I asked him to do it” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1994).   
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And, after another spike in violence in March of 1995, Izetbegović again felt no 
need to compromise his government’s stance with respect to peace negotiations, stating 
“Thus we adhere to the position of a unitary and sovereign Bosnia-Hercegovina within its 
internationally-recognized borders. We adhere to the position that it should be a 
democratic state in which human rights are respected - this is the main characteristic of 
our internal set-up of Bosnia-Hercegovina” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Herzegovina 1995).  In each of these instances, Bosnia’s leaders placed renewed 
emphasis on the ideological foundations of their negotiating stance, namely a unitary, 
democratic, and multi-ethnic Bosnia organized as a civic state.  Their tone indicated that 
they viewed their position as self-evidently just and morally superior to their opponents’ 
position, with no need to compromise on their views following a fresh round of intense 
victimization of Sarajevo’s residents at the hands of enemy forces.   
3.6 Conclusion 
Therefore, this chapter’s analyses demonstrate that high levels of wartime 
violence motivate wartime leaders to increase the use of ideological claims in their 
official domestic rhetoric to their citizens.  Analysis of micro-level large N data of speech 
acts and violence in the Bosnian conflict from 1992 to 1995 provided strong evidence for 
the empirical plausibility of this relationship.  According to my analysis, higher amounts 
of violence directed at the residents of Sarajevo prompted the top leaders of the Bosnian 
government based in Sarajevo to articulate and emphasize the political goals and values 
for which the war was being fought and to outline the basis for citizenship rights and 
political institutions in the future Bosnian state.  Qualitative analysis of Bosnian leaders’ 
speech acts revealed the four principal mechanisms driving this empirical relationship: 
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the need to galvanize and comfort the wartime civilian population, mobilize military 
recruits while shaping their goals for fighting, demonstrate resolute leadership, and gain 
leverage in peace negotiations.    
These results indicate that the likelihood and frequency of political leaders’ use of 
political ideology during war is a function of processes and circumstances within the 
conflict.  Thus, this study is one of the first to examine political ideology as a dependent 
variable in armed conflict, advancing an explanation for why the incidence and volume of 
political ideology will vary across time within a single conflict and across political 
leaders in different conflicts. My explanation also indicates that the volume of leaders’ 
use of ideological rhetoric during war is not rooted in their personal preferences or tastes 
for abstract ideological principles, nor is it simply a reflection of ruling elites’ need to 
legitimate their power.   
If the newly ascendant political leaders of the wartime Bosnian government had 
wanted to use political ideology as a tool of legitimation, then they would have used 
ideological claims in their rhetoric to domestic audiences consistently and frequently 
throughout the war.  This was not the case.  Furthermore, the top Bosnian leader, Alija 
Izetbegović, had written several political treatises earlier in his life, suggesting a strong 
interest in and facility with political theory and ideology.  If he had simply acted on his 
personal theoretical interests and commitments, however, then his government should 
have produced a greater and more consistent volume of ideological rhetoric throughout 
the war.  Instead, the top leaders of the Bosnian government tended to use ideological 
claims much more often when the population of Sarajevo was targeted by higher levels of 
violence.       
99 
 
This analysis has important practical implications. Knowing when top political 
leaders are more likely to issue ideological claims during armed conflict provides other 
parties to the conflict and outside observers with a signpost as to when to pay greater 
attention to the words of wartime leaders.  In situations where the likelihood of 
ideological rhetoric increases, wartime leaders’ communications to domestic audiences 
will disclose details of their future plans for their people and country.  As the leaders thus 
become committed to a particular set of ideological principles, other parties to the 
conflict may gain significant insight into the leaders’ future military strategies and 
negotiating demands in the conflict, since political ideologies arguably differ in their 
acceptance or condemnation of various military tactics and peace proposals.          
Though compelling, future research should test the results described here in other 
contexts to determine their degree of generalizability.  My analysis focused on political 
leaders controlling a wartime state apparatus, but the leaders of a non-state group fighting 
armed conflict may face somewhat different costs or benefits for using ideological 
rhetoric in relation to wartime violence.  A first step in this extension could be to examine 
the frequency of ideological claims by the leaders of the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat 
separatist entities during the Bosnian war, neither of whom controlled the central state.  
Another extension would be to test whether leaders of parties to non-ethnic conflicts 
behave similarly with respect to the volume and pattern of ideological principles they 
include in their wartime rhetoric.  In addition, looking at peacetime leaders would enable 
a systematic examination of if and how major terrorist attacks alter the likelihood and 
frequency of their use of ideological rhetoric to domestic audiences.  
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As a first extension, however, I move beyond the rate or likelihood of ideological 
claims as a dependent variable to investigate why the content of ideological principles in 
top wartime leaders’ domestic rhetoric also varies during an armed conflict.  As I show, 
although fluctuations in violence may impact the frequency of ideological claims issued 
to domestic audiences, the substance of the claims changes as a result of other factors.  A 
key point to remember here is that ideological claims still occur under conditions of low 
violence.  They just occur with much less frequency because of the mechanisms outlined 
in this chapter.   A shift in the type of nationalist ideology expressed in ideological claims 
may thus occur regardless of their frequency.    
As shown in this chapter, the ideological claims issued by Bosnian political 
leaders early in the war tended to endorse an ideology of civic nationalism.  But some of 
the quoted claims emphasized the ethnic identity and wartime cause of the Bosnian 
Muslims/Bosniaks.  As chapter four demonstrates, Bosnia’s wartime leaders altered the 
content of their ideological claims in official domestic rhetoric in the second year of the 
war, shifting from a more inclusive civic nationalism to a more exclusive ethnic 
nationalism during that year.  The chapter describes this shift and explains why wartime 




4. Ideological Shifts in the Bosnian War: Civic and 
Ethnic Nationalism in Domestic Media 
4.1. Introduction  
 In the first year of the Bosnian war, all of the ideological claims that top Bosnian 
government leaders made on Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina endorsed a civic nationalist 
vision for Bosnia, emphasizing multi-ethnic coexistence, individual rights, and the 
Bosnian people.  The following year, top Bosnian government leaders’ ideological claims 
in domestic media endorsed ethnic nationalism much more often compared to the 
previous year.  In line with the ethnic background of the government’s top leaders, these 
principles emphasized collective rights and the primacy of the Bosnian Muslim ethno-
religious group.  The following figures provide a visual demonstration of this change in 
emphasis from civic nationalism to ethnic nationalism between 1992 and 1993.  What 
explains this variation? 









































In this chapter, I answer this question by providing an explanation as to why the 
content of the nationalist ideological claims wartime ethno-religious leaders employ in 
their official domestic rhetoric may vary over the course of an armed conflict.  My 
argument is that ethno-religious groups enter conflict with a path-dependent nationalist 
ideology, by which I mean a set of ideological claims that predominates among 
intellectual and political elites and resonates strongly with ordinary people.  This path 
dependent ideology arises in the previous regime’s attempt to maintain social peace and 
order.  The onset of internal armed conflict then discredits the path dependent nationalist 




However, although the predominant nationalist ideology has been discredited, the 
actual occurrence and direction of an ideological shift will depend on the interaction of 
the wartime leaders’ personal preferences regarding nationalist ideology, their calculation 
of which nationalist ideology will provide them with the greatest political benefits, and 
their construction of an underlying ideological infrastructure to support the spread of a 
new nationalist ideology.  If the leaders’ preferred nationalist ideology is different from 
the previously dominant ideology and will confer immediate political benefits, then they 
will promote this new ideology in their official rhetoric in wartime domestic media.  But 
if their preferred ideology differs from the previously dominant one without conferring 
such benefits, then they will have to construct new ideological infrastructure at a 
grassroots level to help support an eventual shift to their preferred ideology.  Doing so 
will lay a foundation for promoting the new ideology in official rhetoric in domestic 
media depending on the incentives created by contingent wartime events.             
The case analyzed in support of my argument provides evidence for the second 
scenario and illustrates how and why a polity’s leaders may shift their official domestic 
rhetoric from civic nationalism to ethnic nationalism during an armed conflict.  In the 
Bosnian conflict, top wartime Bosnian government leaders saw an opportunity to move 
away from a pre-war path dependent ideology of civic nationalism which had been 
imposed in an attempt to guarantee inter-ethnic social peace but had failed to help prevent 
this peace from breaking down.  Though these leaders’ personal ideological preferences 
pushed them to promote ethnic nationalism, the strategic political calculus initially 
confined them to the continued use of civic nationalism in domestic media.   
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However, by constructing grassroots ideological infrastructure supportive of 
ethnic nationalism, the leaders put themselves in a position to use ethnic nationalist 
claims in domestic media in the second year of the war in response to a challenge to the 
top leader’s power and to the content of externally-sponsored peace proposals.  Thus, 
these contingent wartime events, sparked by the diplomatic intervention of external 
actors, led ethnic nationalism to become more useful than civic nationalism in these 
leaders’ communications to domestic audiences.     
Empirically, I use both statistical analysis and qualitative interpretation of 
Bosnian leaders’ speech acts as evidence for my argument, showing how the content of 
these leaders’ ideological claims shifted strongly toward ethnic nationalism in July and 
September of 1993, while moving back away from this form of nationalism in November 
of 1993.  July of 1993 was the month following a serious challenge to Bosnian President 
Izetbegović’s power, while September of 1993 followed the official unveiling of an 
international peace plan promoting ethnic partition.  Subsequently, the Bosnian 
government rejected the peace plan at the end of September.  In late October, Izetbegović 
and other top Bosnian officials executed a military operation to consolidate their power 
and control over the government.  With both the plan for partition and any threats to 
Izetbegović’s political power removed, ethnic nationalism was once again de-emphasized 
in top Bosnian leaders’ rhetoric in Bosnian domestic media for the duration of the war.   
This chapter thus advances the research literature on nationalism in several ways.  
First, it shows that states’ official nationalist ideologies can vary and fluctuate 
significantly between different forms of nationalism over short periods of time.  This 
empirical trend is in contrast to the prevailing view that nationalism and nationalist 
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ideology arise and change very slowly.  In addition, the chapter posits an explanation for 
this variation and provides evidence for this explanation.  Furthermore, the analysis here 
demonstrates how both domestic political events, in the form of wartime power struggles, 
as well as international political events, in the form of peace proposals, may spur a shift 
in the content of ethno-religious leaders’ domestic nationalist claims, rather than either 
domestic or international politics or events doing so on their own.  In fact, the Bosnian 
case suggests that external actors may play a more significant role, as informal discussion 
of particular principles for peace set off the internal power struggle in the first place.   
Moreover, this chapter sheds light on when exactly movement away from a stable 
path dependent ideological equilibrium will occur, enabling an understanding of 
ideological change as contingent but nonetheless circumscribed within patterns that 
preserve the ability to predict an ideological shift.  It also shows that rather than resulting 
from the replacement of one set of leaders by another faction promoting a different 
ideology, movement away from a path dependent ideology can be the result of the same 
leaders choosing different ideologies in reaction to contingent events.  Thus, political 
leaders during war may alter their group’s and/or state’s nationalist ideology in a passive 
or reactive manner, rather than being active and instrumental manipulators of 
nationalism. 
 The chapter is structured as follows.  The second section briefly elaborates the 
theoretical argument.  The subsequent section describes the research design.  The fourth 
section presents the results of statistical analyses showing the correlations predicted by 
the theory.  The fifth section then provides qualitative and interpretive evidence of the 
mechanisms behind the correlations in the Bosnian case.  The final section concludes.    
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4.2 Theory: Explaining Shifts in Domestic Wartime Nationalist Ideological Claims  
My argument posits that internal armed conflict offers wartime ethno-religious 
leaders an opportunity to shift away from a dominant, or path dependent, set of 
nationalist ideological claims. Using the concept of path dependence is appropriate here, 
because even though it is generally employed to analyze political institutions and 
structures, it has also been applied to ideas and beliefs, as individuals’ and groups’ social 
interpretations and mental maps of politics are subject to high start-up costs, learning 
effects, and positive feedback loops (Pierson 2000).  
Assuming, then, that pre-war political elites have instituted a predominant 
nationalist ideology in order to help maintain societal order and stability, the occurrence 
of internal armed conflict discredits this ideology by demonstrating its failure to help 
achieve this purpose.  Wartime ethno-religious leaders then have an opportunity to 
promote a new nationalist ideology.  Whether they will do so, however, depends on 
whether their personally preferred nationalist ideology is different from the previous path 
dependent ideology.  Provided that it is different, they will promote their preferred 
ideology in their official rhetoric in domestic media unless they are limited from doing so 
by instrumental calculations of political benefit.  If an ideology other than their preferred 
one is initially more politically useful to their position and goals, then the leaders will 
have to initiate the construction of new grassroots ideological infrastructure to aid the 
spread of their privately favored nationalist ideology below the level of official rhetoric.   
This ideological infrastructure will help support an ideological shift in domestic media 
should contingent wartime events later provide greater political benefits for the official 
use of their preferred nationalist ideology.       
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Focusing specifically on a transition from civic to ethnic nationalism, one wartime 
event which may spur this kind of shift is a power struggle within the leadership of an 
ethno-religious group, to the point that the authority or power of the top leader or leaders 
is seriously threatened.  The top leader or leaders may then capitalize on any burgeoning 
ideological infrastructure supportive of ethnic nationalism to bolster their political 
support.  In this scenario, nationalist ideological claims issued in official domestic 
rhetoric may serve as the leaders’ public affirmation of their ethnic commitment and as a 
call and response of support between them and their mass and elite supporters within the 
population and security forces. 
An additional wartime event which may produce a shift from civic to ethnic 
nationalism in ethno-religious leaders’ official domestic rhetoric is an internationally-
sponsored peace proposal.  More specifically, if international mediators propose peace 
plans based on ethnic partition of warring parties, then the top leaders of warring ethno-
religious groups will have an incentive to utilize ethnic nationalist claims in order to 
adapt their vision of the future political order to that called for in the peace proposals.     
4.3 Research Design: Coding Nationalist Ideology in the Bosnian War 
To code Bosnian leaders’ speech acts and the occurrence of ideological claims, I 
used the same methods described in chapter three.  I then used the following criteria to 
code a given ideological claim as an instance of civic, ethnic, or religious nationalism.  
Statements that endorsed an integral or unified Bosnia, discussed the possibility of 
assimilation under a Bosnian identity, emphasized that Bosnia was a country based on 
universal citizenship and laws, promoted and defended inter-ethnic tolerance and 
denounced ethnic segregation and separatism, and/or focused on “Bosnians” were 
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categorized under civic nationalism.  Statements that focused on a homeland for the 
Bosnian Muslims, exclusively discussed or prioritized the Bosnian Muslims as a people 
or nation, promoted the political superiority and dominance of the Bosnian Muslims 
within Bosnia, extolled the virtues of separation from other ethnic groups, and/or focused 
on “Bosniaks”, “Bosniak Muslims”, or “Bosnian Muslims” were categorized under ethnic 
nationalism.   
Statements that focused on the plight of Bosnian Muslims based mainly on their 
religious identity, discussed the political problems confronting Muslims around the 
world, framed the conflict in terms of a religious struggle between Muslims and 
Christians, linked the Bosnian Muslims to Muslim groups experiencing war and human 
rights abuses in other countries, used specifically religious language, extolled Muslim 
religious myths and beliefs, and/or focused on the “Muslims” were categorized under 
religious nationalism.  As in chapter one, I interpreted the entirety of an ideological claim 
to determine the type of nationalist ideology it espoused. 
 In coding the data, I constructed three dichotomous dependent variables.  Civic 
denotes whether an ideological claim predominantly promoted civic nationalism; Ethnic 
indicates whether it predominantly advanced ethnic nationalism; and Religious captured 
whether it predominantly supported religious nationalism.  My independent variables are 
a series of dummy variables for each month of the war, thus capturing when Bosnian 
leaders made a given type of ideological claim on Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina. To 
supplement this measure, I also coded a set of variables measuring the percentage of 




4.4 Statistical Analysis of the Shift from Civic to Ethnic Nationalism in the Bosnian 
War  
Statistical analysis of top Bosnian leaders’ ideological claims in different months 
of the war supports my theory.  A comparison of means test shows that Bosnian leaders 
were 21% more likely to issue an ethnic nationalist claim in Bosnian domestic media in 
July of 1993.  This was the month immediately following a major challenge to President 
Izetbegović’s power and authority.  Another comparison of means test shows that these 
leaders were also 36% more likely to use an ethnic nationalist claim in Bosnian domestic 
media in September of 1993, which followed the official unveiling of an international 
peace plan rooted in ethnic partition.  The first result is statistically significant at 90% 
confidence, while the second is significant at 95% confidence.  In contrast, a comparison 
of means test for the month of November of 1993, following Izetbegović’s consolidation 
of power and the withdrawal of the peace plan, indicates only a slightly greater and 
statistically insignificant increase in the likelihood of ethnic nationalist claims.  Probit 
regressions corroborate these results, with the coefficients and significance levels 
reported in Table 4.1.   
Table 4.1: Probability of Domestic Ethnic Nationalist Claims vs. Contingent Events 
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In terms of actual percentages rather than probabilities, the data indicate that 
ethnic nationalist claims increased 25% in July of 1993 compared to June as well as 26% 
in September compared to August.  Conversely, these types of claims decreased 38% in 
November compared to October.  Concurrently, civic nationalist claims dropped 25% in 
July versus June and 32% in September versus August.  They then increased 38% in 
November versus October.  These results demonstrate that Bosnian government leaders 
shifted to using ethnic nationalist claims in official Bosnian domestic media in the 
summer and fall of 1993.  The following sections develop the mechanisms underlying 
these correlations by analyzing the historical context of nationalist ideology prior to and 
during the Bosnian conflict, the impact of contingent wartime events on nationalist 
ideology in the summer and fall of 1993, and the text of Bosnian government leaders’ 
ideological claims in Bosnian domestic media during key periods of the war.                     
4.5.1 Social Peace: Creating a Path Dependent Nationalist Ideology 
This section expands on the second chapter’s description of the Yugoslav-era 
ideological dispositions of the Bosnian Muslims.  In that period, one of the tools with 
which the Communist Yugoslav regime attempted to maintain social peace between 
multiple ethnic groups was the use of an overarching ideology of multi-ethnic unity 
which conformed in many respects to civic nationalism.  In particular, the regime utilized 
Bosnia and the Bosnian Muslims as a means of promoting and cementing this civic 
multiethnic ideology.  Regime officials termed Bosnia a mini Yugoslavia and, hewing to 
the World War II slogan ‘Without Bosnia there is no Yugoslavia and without Yugoslavia 
there is no Bosnia’, the civic ethos of Bosnia and the Bosnian Muslims was meant to 
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demonstrate how territory did not have to be joined to a single nationality or ethnic group 
but could in fact accommodate multiple ethnicities and cultures (Toal and Dahlman 
2011).  In this way, Bosnian Muslim identity was linked most strongly to the official 
Communist slogan “Brotherhood and Unity”, which promoted a unified multi-ethnic 
Yugoslav national identity instead of individual ethnic identities.   
In turn, from the 1950s to the 1970s, the Islamic Religious Community supported 
the Brotherhood and Unity ideology more than any other official religious institution 
(Perica 2002).  Bosnian Muslim intellectual leaders were also highly supportive of and 
loyal to the Communist order and helped to promote a secular identity founded on 
interethnic equality, a viewpoint which was shared by most ordinary Bosnian Muslims at 
the time (Burg and Shoup 1999). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, just prior to the 
outbreak of the war, surveys demonstrated that Bosnian Muslims were still highly secular 
and very supportive of Yugoslavia, that Bosnia had the highest percentage of individuals 
refusing to identify with an ethnic identity, and that Bosnian Muslims identified with 
Yugoslavia more than Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats did (Fazlić 2011).  Thus, at the 
outbreak of war, it seems fair to assert that the Yugoslav regime, seeking to keep social 
peace, had established a dominant path dependent ideology of multiethnic coexistence 
among Bosnian Muslim elites and masses, meaning that the nationalist ideological claims 
most familiar to this group would have aligned with civic nationalism.  
Significantly, prior research on nationalist mobilization and ideology indicates 
that, once they are established, path dependent nationalist ideologies can impose 
significant constraints on the behavior of political elites, as nationalist appeals have to 
resonate with people’s values, cultural narratives, beliefs, and especially their “lived 
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experiences” in order to actually produce nationalist mobilization (Giuliano 2011, 3).  
Therefore, it may be very difficult for political elites to shift to an entirely new ideology.  
Francisco Sanín and Elisabeth Wood note that this dynamic is present during armed 
conflict as well, arguing that since “ideology implies particular skills, routines, 
institutions, and rules of thumb, adoption of an ideology generates strongly path 
dependent dynamics” to the point of constraining the adoption of a new ideology (Sanín 
and Wood 2014, 220).  
However, some groups and/or polities do change their ideological principles and 
the content of their ideological claims during armed conflict despite ideological path 
dependence.  This phenomenon speaks to a critique of the historical institutionalist or 
path dependence approach, namely that “there appears to be no means of predicting the 
occurrence of…punctuations in the stable path” (Peters, Pierre, and King 2005, 1289).  
Below I elaborate how internal armed conflict provides an opportunity to shift away from 
a path-dependent nationalist ideology, conditional on other mechanisms. 
4.5.2 Armed Conflict: Discrediting a Path Dependent Nationalist Ideology  
I suggest that the shock of internal armed conflict provides political elites with a 
critical juncture in which to shift away from a path dependent nationalist ideology.  As 
articulated by Ruth and David Collier, the analysis of a critical juncture involves, among 
other elements, baseline conditions, the crisis that produced the juncture, and the 
occurrence of a major change of some type (Collier and Collier 1991). Critical junctures 
have also been defined as “relatively short periods of time during which there is a 
substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of 
interest” (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 348).  I employ a mix of these conceptualizations 
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here, as I analyze the previous ideology within an ethno-religious group as the baseline 
and internal armed conflict as the crisis which can prompt a loss of faith in older and 
previously dominant ideological norms.  The loss of ideological morale then provides an 
opening for top political leaders to promote a new ideology.    
In Bosnia, the demise of Communism in 1990 and the break-up of Yugoslavia in 
1991 indicated that the multi-ethnic ethos of ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ had failed to help 
maintain a stable political order.  At the same time, religious identity among the Bosnian 
Muslims was starting to resurface prior to the war, as mosque attendance began to 
increase (Ramet 2006), hundreds of mosques were built or renovated (Ramet 2002), and 
clerics sought a more active public leadership role within the group (Friedman 1996).  
Furthermore, anthropologist Tone Bringa’s fieldwork in Bosnia before the war indicated 
that Bosnian Muslims living in rural villages had stronger religious faith and traditions 
compared to those living in towns and cities (Bringa 1995).  Therefore, although 
secularism predominated within the Bosnian Muslim ethno-religious group before the 
war, this was not a universal disposition, as some members expressed a more ethnic or 
religious interpretation of their group identity.  Moreover, as chronicled in the historical 
overview in chapter two, both ethnic and religious nationalism had latent potential as 
alternative ideologies within the Bosnian Muslim community.  These circumstances 
provided Bosnian leaders with some measure of grassroots support for initiating a 
wartime shift in the country’s predominant type of nationalist ideology.   
4.5.3 Private Ideological Preferences: Goals for a New Nationalist Ideology  
Which type of ideology top political leaders then choose to promote during the 
critical juncture of internal armed conflict is likely to be the result of an interaction 
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between their personal ideological preferences and instrumental political incentives.  
Based on their own political beliefs, the top leaders may have a particular set of 
ideological claims they would like to impose.  Over time, these leaders may come to 
identify their ambitions and fortunes with maintaining both the integrity of their private 
ideological views and seeing these views spread in the public arena.  Therefore, if and 
when these individuals achieve top positions in organizations representing their ethno-
religious group and/or state, they will likely wish to promote their preferred ideology 
within the organization and among the group’s members.   
Not only may they see the spread of this ideology as an extension of their 
personal political ambitions, but they may also wish to remake the polity or society in 
their own ideological image.  These suppositions are supported by the observations that 
founders of insurgent groups and movements are often normatively committed to a 
certain ideology (Sanín and Wood 2014, 222) and that nationalist entrepreneurs may act 
out of conviction rather than strategic calculations, believing sincerely in the ideas and 
beliefs they transmit to their mass followers (Giuliano 2011). 
Regarding his personal views and political background, wartime Bosnian 
President Alija Izetbegović’s history as a political activist went back to World War II, 
when he was a member of the Young Muslims in Bosnia, an organization dedicated to 
aiding young Bosnian Muslims’ understanding of Islam, enhancing Islamic unity, and 
conducting social work and charity in the Bosnian Muslim community (Friedman 1996). 
After the war, Yugoslavia’s government imprisoned many of the organization’s leaders, 
including Izetbegović, who received a six-year sentence (Friedman 1996).  Izetbegović 
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practiced law afterward, but he also wrote two political treatises.  One of these, written in 
1970, was titled the Islamic Declaration.   
This book remains the subject of controversy and varying interpretations, with 
some readers seeing it as a framework for organizing a state on Islamic principles and 
others viewing it as a call for a democratic multicultural state (Cohen 1998).  Though 
most scholars discount and critique such polarizing interpretations, many also see at least 
the outlines of a greater public and political role for Islam in the book (Burg and Shoup 
1999). On balance, these features of Izetbegović’s own writings suggest that his privately 
preferred nationalist ideology for the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnia was a mix of ethnic 
and religious nationalism. 
Two years before the war started, Izetbegović had also formed the Party of 
Democratic Action (SDA) as an ethno-religious nationalist party representing the 
Bosnian Muslims.  Cooperating with religious leaders, the party tasked imams to help 
establish local branches of the SDA in more remote rural areas.  Islamic clergy also 
appeared regularly at major party meetings and promoted its policies to mosque 
attendees, thereby implicitly shaping the choices of voters (Andjelić 2003, 149).   
The party subsequently performed very well in the 1990 elections and entered into 
a coalition government with other ethno-religious nationalist parties representing the 
Serbs and Croats in Bosnia.  During the war, many of this party’s top leaders were also 
the top leaders of the internationally-recognized Bosnian government.  From this 
position, they thus had an opportunity to promote policies which could enhance the 
primacy of Islamic traditions and ethnic customs within the identity of Bosnian Muslims.   
116 
 
4.5.4 Strategic Political Calculations: Limitations on a New Nationalist Ideology  
However, political calculations and incentives may still trump top leaders’ 
personal beliefs in limiting which ideology, if any, they decide to shift the group and 
polity toward during armed conflict.  With respect to Bosnia’s top wartime leaders, one 
such limiting factor was that Sarajevo remained the capital city.  As one anthropologist 
observed, even in the midst of the conflict, many people who remained in Sarajevo 
continued to favor a civic-oriented Yugoslav identity.  She relates that, “when it came to 
Sarajevans and people they knew personally, the tendency was to stress their common 
Sarajevan culture, where differences in national identity and ethno-religious background 
were not important” (Maček  2009, 187-188).  This pattern may help explain why, 
between the 1990 multi-party Bosnian elections and the start of the war, Izetbegović, as 
the leader of both the SDA and the Bosnian government based in Sarajevo, promoted a 
vision of Bosnia centered on multiculturalism and regionalism rather than ethnicity or 
religion, with political legitimacy rooted in its people as individual citizens and not in its 
constituent nations as groups (Friedman 1996, 214).            
Aside from the continued dominance of civic nationalism among key segments of 
the Bosnian population, Izetbegović also faced several political constraints at the elite 
level which restrained his ability to shift away from civic nationalism.  Before the war, 
the SDA political party was itself divided into a conservative religious faction and a 
liberal one that favored a multicultural state (Burg and Shoup 1999), such that 
Izetbegović had to manage both sides to keep the organization afloat.  And many of the 
new SDA officials in the conservative wing also seemed to be adopting public religiosity 
purely for political advancement (Maček 2009), indicating that their private views may 
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not have been aligned with Izetbegović’s.  Izetbegović had also already toned down some 
of his private views during the pre-war election in order to gain support from secular 
Bosnian Muslims (Gjelten 1995).     
In addition, when the war began on April 6
th
, 1992, Izetbegović was not just the 
head of the SDA but also the leader of a Bosnian government which still contained 
moderate Bosnian Serbs and Croats, as well as Bosnian Muslims who did not share his 
personal political views.  Thus, he had to broaden his leadership of an ethno-religious 
political party to preside over a multi-ethnic Bosnian state and government (Hoare 2001), 
meaning that he had to coordinate officials whose preferences on nationalist ideology 
differed greatly from his own and each other’s.  Both mass beliefs and elite politics thus 
favored the continued official dominance of civic nationalism. 
4.5.5 Building New Ideological Infrastructure: Reconciling Goals and Limitations 
Since the political calculus did not initially favor top wartime Bosnian leaders’ 
private ideological preferences, they proceeded by adhering to civic nationalism in 
domestic media while also beginning to construct grassroots infrastructure that would 
support a shift toward either or both ethnic or religious nationalism.  This behavior is in 
line with work that suggests elites have significant opportunities to emphasize different 
forms of group identity during periods of political uncertainty and instability (Suny 
1999/2000, 177).  In fact, during times of social transformation such as armed conflict, 
ordinary people will have to learn new routines and modes of individual and collective 
action, a process which new ideological principles can facilitate (Swidler 1986, 278).  
The process of linking ideology to behavior, however, requires organizations (Barnes 
1966, 522), which form a key element of ideological infrastructure.      
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The organizations within this infrastructure are of primary importance for 
generating and sustaining any shift in the content of ideological claims because they 
provide sites for the routine production and dissemination of the rhetoric and discourse 
containing the new ideology, with the result that this ideology will not just be created but 
also attain popularity, dominance, and stability during and after the critical juncture 
(Wuthnow 1989, 10).  Aside from organizations, other components of this ideological 
infrastructure may include access to intellectual resources and control over evaluation 
and debate of the new ideology (Wuthnow 1989,11), as well as new communications 
networks and social networks with which to spread and reinforce the values aligned with 
the new set of ideological claims (Krebs and Jackson 2007).    
In Bosnia, the construction of new ideological infrastructure during the war has 
been characterized as a top-down project which attempted to substitute Islam for 
Communism as an ideological loyalty test for political recruitment (Bougarel 2007).  The 
principal part of this new ideological infrastructure was the Bosnian army, which 
gradually shifted from supporting Bosnian patriotism to promoting Bosnian Muslim 
ethnic nationalism and, in some units, even religious nationalism (Hoare 2004; Mojzes 
1998).  The SDA also set up its own communal and political organizations during the 
war, including a cultural association, a humanitarian agency, and a central assembly of 
Bosnian Muslim political and cultural leaders (Bougarel 1999).   
Other elements of this infrastructure included the public education system, where 
religion was introduced as an optional class in primary and secondary schools two years 
into the war (Maček  2009).  This effectively meant that courses on Islam were offered 
mostly to the exclusion of other religions, and that the courses were only nominally 
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optional because children who did not want to take them during the war faced social 
ostracism (Maček  2009).  Other components of the groundwork for a domestic 
ideological shift included changes in street names to favor historical Bosnian Muslim 
figures (Maček  2009) and public celebration of Bosnian Muslim soldiers killed during 
the war as religious martyrs, spread through speeches, songs, obituaries, monuments, and 
plaques (Bougarel 2007).  Some of these measures continued after the war as well, as 
many mosques, Islamic centers, and schools were built while new school textbooks 
celebrated the Ottoman period and some Muslim-majority counties required the use of 
the more religious "Selaam Aleikum" greeting in specific contexts (Perica 2002, 169-
170). 
During this process, Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina reported very little on the 
new ideological infrastructure and budding ideological shift.  In fact, except for a few key 
moments, elaborated below, the push to shift the Bosnian Muslims’ and Bosnia’s national 
ideology toward ethnic nationalism remained under the radar of official Bosnian 
domestic media during the war (Interview with Marko Hoare 2015).  These 
circumstances suggest that simply building new ideological infrastructure will not be 
sufficient to produce an observable ideological shift in official rhetoric.  Specific wartime 
events, often contingent, must occur to enable this incipient ideological shift to rise to 
inclusion in top leaders’ rhetoric in official domestic media.                    
4.5.6 Threats to Power: An Opportunity for an Ideological Shift  
 One contingent wartime event which may spur a shift from a broad, multi-ethnic 
civic nationalist vision for an ethno-religious group and polity to a narrower, exclusive 
ethnic nationalist agenda within official domestic rhetoric is a power struggle, to the point 
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that the authority or power of the top leader or leaders is seriously threatened.  The top 
leader or leaders may then capitalize on any burgeoning ideological infrastructure 
supportive of ethnic nationalism to bolster their political support.  In this scenario, 
nationalist ideological claims issued in official domestic rhetoric may serve as the 
leaders’ public affirmation of their ethnic commitment and as a call and response of 
support between them and their mass and elite supporters within the population and 
security forces.    
In terms of rallying support from the population, ethno-religious leaders under 
political threat during ethnic conflict can use ethnic nationalist claims to engage in ethnic 
flanking or outbidding, such that they paint themselves as the most loyal and most 
effective defenders of the warring group (Hislope 1997; Gormley-Heenan and Macginty 
2008).  According to Monica Toft, outbidding usually occurs in transitional regimes 
under conditions of political threat to elites, ethnic or religious segmentation of the 
population, and elite capture of media and communication markets (Toft 2013, 10).  
Since armed conflict is akin to regime transition in terms of uncertainty and political 
instability, ethnic conflicts featuring elite and/or government domination of the media 
may be primed for the increasing use of ethnic nationalist claims should political elites’ 
power be threatened.  Successful execution of this strategy may enable threatened 
wartime ethno-religious leaders to pre-empt and/or repress those threatening their power, 
much as ethnic outbidding may achieve similar outcomes during elections between rival 
ethnic parties (Hislope 1997, 473).        
Another key resource that threatened wartime ethno-religious leaders may rally to 
their side via ethnic nationalist claims is the polity’s security apparatus, particularly its 
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armed forces.  Especially during ethnic conflict, state armies may be ethnically 
homogenous.  In fact, some research suggests that during war audiences such as the army 
and security forces may be more important and significant for ethnic outbidding 
processes than the general public (Caspersen 2008, 259).  In part, this is because military 
forces offer leaders a more readily available tool with which to repress possible 
challengers during wartime (Caspersen 2004). Accordingly, domestic ethnic nationalist 
claims may offer top wartime ethno-religious leaders the chance to build and/or confirm 
their support from among the security forces.  If this support is confirmed, potential 
challengers, who are also observing these public nationalist claims, should infer an 
implicit threat of repression from the call and response between the top ethno-religious 
leaders and military authorities and abandon their challenge to the top leaders’ power. 
In Bosnia, the top wartime political leader experienced a significant threat to his 
power in the summer of 1993.  By June of that year, the Bosnian government was run by 
a collective Presidency, which included three Serbs, three Croats, and four Bosnian 
Muslims.  The head of this collective Presidency, known as the President of the 
Presidency, was Alija Izetbegović.  This effectively meant that he was the country’s top 
leader.  In fact, the position of President of the Presidency was supposed to have rotated 
among the members of the collective Presidency, but this rotation was suspended during 
the war.  
In early June of 1993, Izetbegović had begun a plan to secure his position at the 
top of the government, selecting a new military leader in whose loyalty he felt more 
confident (Hoare 2004).  However, on June 21
st
, the rest of the collective Presidency, 
minus Izetbegović and Rasim Delić, the new army chief, met in Zagreb, Croatia to 
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discuss the ongoing peace negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland.  Regarding this meeting, 
international media sources reported that Izetbegović was “rumored to be on the point of 
being ousted”, that other members of the Presidency had accused him of being weak, and 
that the other members were urging the Bosnian army to be placed under the command of 
the entire collective Presidency rather than the President (Agence France Presse 1993). 
The next day the international press reported that the collective Presidency had 
voted seven to one in Izetbegović’s absence to go to Geneva to discuss a peace plan 
Izetbegović vehemently opposed (Agence France Presse 1993).  The day after that, June 
23
rd
, Delić lent public support to Izetbegović’s position (Agence France Presse 1993).  
Once both Izetbegović and Ejup Ganić, another Bosnian Muslim member of the 
Presidency, were back in Sarajevo that day, reports stated that they tried to “drum up 
support from the high command of the mainly Moslem army [sic]” (Agence France 
Presse 1993).  Other reports noted that the other members of the Bosnian Presidency 
“seem to lack much popular backing by Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian military” 
(Lewis 1993, A1).  Several weeks later the crisis was resolved with an official 
endorsement of Izetbegović’s views on the peace negotiations (Burns 1993, A8).   
Textual analysis of Izetbegović’s ideological claims in the period between the 
start of the challenge to his power and the resolution of the crisis demonstrates the shift to 
ethnic nationalist claims in domestic media in order to withstand the challenge.  In the 
wake of the threat to his leadership, President Izetbegović initially maintained a 
commitment to civic nationalism.  On July 9
th
, for example, he stated in reference to the 
ongoing Geneva peace negotiations that “the ethnic division of Bosnia-Hercegovina is 
out” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993).    
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However, shortly thereafter, on July 18
th
, Izetbegović adopted the rhetoric of 
ethnic nationalism, stressing that “My intimate preoccupation is also the fate of the 
Muslim nation. I think that nobody can blame me for the fact that on some occasions I 
have to feel as a member of this nation. The fate of this nation is in jeopardy now. I think 
that the Serb and the Croat nations will somehow find a way out of this Golgotha and that 
at least their bare survival is not threatened” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Herzegovina 1993).  Izetbegović thus made sure that members of the public listening to 
Bosnian domestic media would realize that he was the champion of the Bosnian Muslim 
cause, giving the group special priority in contrast to the other ethno-religious groups in 
Bosnia and dropping any mention of Bosnians or their status and rights as individuals.   
He then used another ethnic nationalist claim on Bosnian media on July 26
th
 to 
demonstrate his connection with the Bosnian Muslims.  While initially repeating the civic 
nationalist tenet that “We are going to strive for a free and democratic Bosnia-
Hercegovina”, he went on to say, “I hope nobody will criticize me if I say that the 
Muslim people will be an object of special concern for me at these negotiations because I 
belong to that people, because [it] remains a special target of this aggression and because 
it has suffered the most.  I have two aims: the state and the people.  This is what I am 
going to try to defend” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993).  No 
longer was it enough for Izetbegović to defend the state of Bosnia and the Bosnian 
people.  Within a month of a serious challenge to his wartime power, he had officially 
wrapped himself in the mantle of the Bosnian Muslim ethno-religious group, thereby 
building further support among members of that group and reminding other listeners 
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within the wartime political and governing elite that he had a strong public base behind 
him.   
In addition to the public, Izetbegović also used ethnic nationalism to call out to 
and signal his support from the Bosnian army.  On July 31
st
, he declared: 
…the focus of our struggle, the struggle of our soldiers who managed to preserve Bosnia-
Hercegovina, has slightly shifted. Our soldiers have become closer to the Bosnian Muslim nation - 
the target of the aggression - as the primary aim was not the destruction of Bosnia as a state, as 
much as the extermination, the literal extermination of the Muslim nation…I often recall now that 
it was due to the sacrifices of our troops during this war that Bosnia has survived as a state and 
will continue to survive for hundreds of years to come. It was in fact due to them that the Muslim 
nation has survived despite the huge losses it has suffered…Our aims remain the same: a state and 
a nation, but with a slight shift to pay greater attention to the nation which has recently been just 
out of focus but which, thank God, has remained alive, has salvaged its honour and has not lost its 
dignity (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993). 
Izetbegović officially sings the praises of the Bosnian army in this statement, 
underscoring the importance of its troops’ “sacrifices”, particularly with respect to 
ensuring the survival of the “Muslim nation.”  In doing so, his implicit message is that he 
stands with the Bosnian army and the Bosnian Muslim people and that they stand by him.  
With the reminder of his firm support from the people and the military, potential 
opponents and challengers to Izetbegović’s authority within the government have been 
put on notice that they lack both the legitimacy and instruments of coercion to unseat him 
and would do well to avoid such challenges in the future.   
4.5.7 Peace Proposals: Another Opportunity for an Ideological Shift  
 An additional contingent wartime event which may produce a shift from civic to 
ethnic nationalism at the level of ethno-religious leaders’ official domestic rhetoric is an 
internationally-sponsored peace proposal.  More specifically, if international mediators 
propose peace plans based on the ethnic partition of warring parties, then the top leaders 
of warring ethno-religious groups will have an incentive to utilize ethnic nationalist 
claims in order to adapt their vision of the future political order to that called for in the 
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peace proposals.  This relationship between peace processes originating outside a polity 
and domestic politics within it has been described as an example of a nested game in 
which warring actors are motivated to compete for advantage against both wartime 
enemies and internal political rivals (Pearlman 2008/2009, 83).  This body of work, 
however, has mostly analyzed the relationship in terms of how internal factional politics 
may facilitate or undermine international peace processes (Pearlman 2008/2009, 82).  In 
contrast, I argue that an international peace process can reshape internal politics and 
ideology.    
Accordingly, if ethnic partition becomes the dominant solution for an armed 
conflict, then top wartime ethno-religious leaders will be incentivized to employ more 
ethnic nationalist rhetoric in an attempt to show their acceptance of the terms of the peace 
proposals.  They may also wish to prepare their population for the coming settlement and 
the nature of the post-war political order.  Moreover, using ethnic nationalist claims may 
enable top leaders to gain an early advantage in any jockeying for post-war political 
power.  In this sense, adapting official domestic rhetoric to align with the language of 
external peace mediators offers domestic political elites an opportunity to maintain their 
stature and relevance for the negotiation process and future domestic politics.    
 In Bosnia, shortly after the height of the factional struggles within the 
government, the international community officially endorsed the Owen-Stoltenberg peace 
plan on August 20
th
, 1993.  This plan replaced the Vance-Owen proposal which had been 
put forth in January of that year and rejected in May.  Owen-Stoltenberg called for a very 
loose confederation of three ethnic mini-states within Bosnia, with almost no power 
reserved for the central government, including over its military forces (Friedman 1996).  
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Essentially, the plan would have created three ethnic entities, each with its own 
constitution and democratic government (Burg and Shoup 1999).  Thus, the international 
community abandoned the goal which had animated the Vance-Owen plan, namely to 
avoid linking ethnicity with territory (Aitken 2007).   
 Politically, the result of this proposal for the Bosnian government was the onset of 
what one historian labeled “a defeatist attitude”, with many officials increasingly coming 
to terms with and advocating partition in order to end the war (Hoare 2004).  In fact, in 
August and September of 1993, many of Izetbegović’s close advisors pushed him to 
restrict the government’s territorial goals in the war to areas with Bosnian Muslim 
majorities (Hoare 2004).  In turn, the ethnic nationalist faction of the SDA increased its 
political influence (Interview with Marko Hoare 2015).  The culmination of these 
developments was that Izetbegović put the Owen-Stoltenberg plan to a vote before a 
special assembly of exclusively Bosnian Muslim political, military, cultural, and religious 
leaders on September 27
th
, 1993, with the stated intention of subsequently submitting it to 
the actual Bosnian wartime parliament.  However, the assembly rejected the plan, 
effectively terminating its viability as a peace proposal (Hoare 2004).             
Textual analysis indicates that Izetbegović and other Bosnian leaders employed 
ethnic nationalist claims in domestic media between the plan’s official unveiling and its 
rejection in order to advocate on behalf of its vision of ethnic territories and the 
corresponding promotion of specifically Bosnian Muslim definitions of citizenship and 
statehood.  Thus, in September of 1993, Izetbegović noted, “There are some allegations 
that there is no longer the will or the possibility to live [together] - to build the state of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina. Of course, we must differentiate between living together and 
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building a state together. I think it is not contentious that the Muslims and the Serbs can 
live together: what is contentious is whether they can build a state together. People as 
individuals can live together, they can respect each other, they can love each other etc. 
However, a state is built with people, not with individuals” (Radio Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993).   
Though Izetbegović indicated in this response an ongoing commitment to 
multiethnic tolerance and coexistence, i.e. living together, the overall tenor and thrust was 
toward ethnic nationalism, since he explicitly mentioned both the Muslim and Serb 
people and noted that building a functioning state would require people to work together 
on a collective ethnic basis rather than as individuals.  This meant that the political 
legitimacy of the future Bosnian state would have to rest on the ethnic nationalist 
foundation of ethnic groups rather than the civic nationalist foundation of individual 
citizens. 
At the same time, he also indicated acceptance of the ethnic partitionist premises 
of the peace plan, lamenting, “A state cannot survive if the vast majority of its population 
is opposed to it. Personally, I myself would also like to resolve this dilemma: does the 
Serb nation want to live in this state?  If it does not, it should not be forced to” (Radio 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993).  Again, the focus of this claim is on a 
nation (i.e. ethnic group) as opposed to individuals.  It also implicitly accepts the notion 
that separation of ethnic groups is necessary to achieve peace. 
 The debate over the Owen-Stoltenberg plan culminated in a climax of ethnic 
nationalism at the Bosnian Muslim elite assembly at the end of September, whereby the 
leaders present adopted the use of the word “Bosniak” to officially refer to the Bosnian 
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Muslim group.  This term served as both an ethnic nationalist alternative to the civic 
nationalist modifier ‘Bosnian’ and an attempt to move beyond the religious connotation 
and ambiguity of the ‘Bosnian Muslim’ label.  The partition plan had thus galvanized 
those in Bosnia’s wartime elite who wanted to create a new group label and ethnic 
nationalist identity for the Bosnian Muslims.  Izetbegović immediately incorporated this 
term into his rhetoric in Bosnian domestic media, responding to a break-away Bosnian 
Muslim faction in northwest Bosnia by declaring “This is an attack on the unity and the 
identity of the Muslim Bosniak people now when we need unity more than ever” (Radio 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993).  The unity and strength of the 
“Bosniak” people had thus become paramount. 
4.5.8 The End of Opportune Moments: Ideological Reversion  
After September of 1993 the Owen-Stoltenberg plan was no longer under 
consideration.  And over the next month Izetbegović eliminated unofficial security forces 
and militias in Sarajevo and succeeded in placing loyal SDA party officials in key 
government positions and cabinet seats.  By the end of October, the consolidation of his 
power, begun in the wake of the factional crisis in June, had been accomplished.  No 
longer needing either to trumpet his support from the people and the military or to build 
acceptance for a peace settlement based on ethnically homogenous administrative 
territories, he reverted to promoting civic nationalist themes in official Bosnian domestic 
media.  However, civic nationalism did not dominate his rhetoric on Bosnian media as 
exclusively as it had in the first year of the war, thereby revealing the lingering impact of 
the events of mid-1993 and suggesting that ideological shifts can be difficult to reverse 
completely once initiated.        
129 
 
 Thus, for example, on November 14
th
, 1993,  Izetbegović declared that the war 
should continue to be fought in two phases, whereby “in phase one we should, by 
military means, secure the liberation of areas which used to be predominantly Muslim 
populated, because it is the people that suffered the hardest and they are the ones who are 
most interested in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the people who are surely loyal, because they do 
not have another homeland, and they paid the highest price in the war for Bosnia-
Hercegovina” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993).  Izetbegović 
could therefore no longer avoid mention of the special attention due to the interests of the 
Bosnian Muslim group in particular.   
On the other hand, he also proclaimed that, “In this part of Bosnia-Hercegovina 
under the rule of Bosnia-Hercegovina's authorities and its army, we are going to strive, 
for the sake of our own principles, to achieve a level of existence, a system governed by 
democratic principles, human freedoms and, what I have already called a definition in 
negative terms - a system which will not persecute anyone affiliated to any religion, 
nation or political organization” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993).  
Izetbegović had thus returned to emphasizing rhetoric supportive of Western liberal 
principles and civic nationalist values of individual rights.  
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 offer further evidence of this partial and compromised return 
to civic nationalism in Bosnian leaders’ ideological claims.  The figures show that the use 
of civic nationalism increased during 1994 and 1995 while ethnic nationalism declined.  
However, both trends are modest, indicating a prevalence of civic nationalist claims 













































4.5.9 Exploring an Alternative Explanation 
 Though the evidence thus suggests that the foregoing mechanisms spurred 
wartime Bosnian Muslim leaders in the Bosnian government to shift from civic to ethnic 
nationalist rhetoric in domestic media before mostly reverting back to the civic option, 
one possible alternative explanation is that these leaders’ wartime enemies, i.e. the 
Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, may have shaped Bosnian Muslim leaders’ nationalist 
ideology in a dyadic process of ideological articulation and reaction.  For purposes of this 
dissertation, I do not have the evidence needed to systematically evaluate this 
proposition, since my dataset covers speech acts by Bosnian Muslim government leaders 
and not speech acts by top Bosnian Croat or Bosnian Serb separatist leaders.  However, 
the fact is that the latter were distinct separatist ethnic groups tied to ethnic nationalist 
leaders in Croatia and Serbia.  As such, both the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs 
maintained a fairly consistent focus on ethnic nationalism in their rhetoric.   
Cursory examination of the speech acts by Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban and 
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić that were included in my collection of news 
stories indicates a constant use of ethnic nationalist values and goals.  Boban thus 
frequently referred to the Croatian nation, the Muslim army, the Muslim republic, and 
called Izetbegović the president of the Muslim nation.  Similarly, Karadžić extolled the 
Serbian nation and people and labeled the Bosnian government the Muslim government.  
Accordingly, since the Bosnian government leadership’s domestic ideological rhetoric 
varied between civic and ethnic nationalism while their wartime enemies’ ideological 
rhetoric remained constant, the latter is not a compelling explanation for the former in 
this case.  However, systematic testing of the impact that wartime opponents have on 
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each other’s ideologies, nationalist or otherwise, will be a fruitful and important research 
project in the future. 
4.6 Conclusion 
 This chapter offered an explanation as to how and why the leaders of warring 
ethno-religious groups may try to change the dominant domestic nationalist ideology 
within their group and state during armed conflict.  In particular, it examined when a 
specific type of ideological shift, from civic to ethnic nationalism, is likely to happen at 
the level of official wartime rhetoric.  The process behind this shift on the part of Bosnian 
Muslim government leaders in wartime Bosnia reveals how the mechanisms described in 
my theory interact to produce this type of shift.  The onset of internal armed conflict in 
the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia in the early 1990s discredited a path dependent 
Yugoslav civic nationalist ideology which had been established to help maintain social 
peace and order in a multiethnic society.  When the war began, the top leaders of the 
Bosnian government, all of them belonging to the Bosnian Muslim ethno-religious group, 
personally preferred ethnic or religious nationalism over civic nationalism.  This was 
especially true for Bosnia’s top leader, Alija Izetbegović.   
However, the initial calculus of political gain at the outset of the war favored the 
continued official use of civic nationalism.  Consequently, these leaders instituted a 
program of ideological infrastructure construction at other levels of Bosnian society to 
help spread ethnic nationalism.  Thus, when Izetbegović’s power was threatened and 
international mediators promoted peace based on ethnic partition in the second year of 
the war, he and other top wartime Bosnian leaders could rely on these underlying 
ideological resources to derive political benefit from using ethnic nationalist claims in 
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Bosnian domestic media.  Doing so enabled Izetbegović to maintain power and allowed 
the Bosnian government to temporarily adapt its post-war goals and plans to a new vision 
of post-war Bosnia while also spreading the tenets of Izetbegović’s favored nationalist 
ideology among the populace.  
 The interaction of these mechanisms suggests that their variation can produce 
different outcomes for wartime nationalist ideology.  Under one counterfactual scenario, 
had Bosnia’s top wartime leaders personally favored civic nationalism instead of ethnic 
nationalism, then they would likely have continued to promote the former even though 
the onset of internal armed conflict had undermined its perceived societal value.  
Alternatively, given their personal preference for ethnic nationalism, had the war’s 
political calculus initially conferred greater political benefits on using this ideology, the 
leaders would likely have affected an immediate ideological shift in domestic media 
without investing in ideological infrastructure at the grassroots level.  Finally, even with 
the construction of infrastructure favoring ethnic nationalism, absence of the wartime 
threat to Izetbegović’s power and/or the Owen-Stoltenberg partition plan would likely 
have relegated the ideological shift to unofficial segments of Bosnian society, meaning 
that it would not have been visible in top leaders’ rhetoric in wartime domestic media.        
   Instead, as a result of these events, Izetbegović had to employ ethnic nationalist 
claims in Bosnian domestic media in order to reinforce his support from the Bosnian 
Muslim people and Bosnian army while also reminding those listening of these support 
bases.  In utilizing these claims as both a call and response to his supporters and a signal 
of his ability to withstand any threats to oust him, Izetbegović was also able to expose 
Bosnia and the Bosnian Muslims more broadly to ideological principles that historical 
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evidence suggests he personally favored.  Shortly thereafter, he had to use the same types 
of nationalist claims in order to take advantage of the political reality of a likely post-war 
settlement based on ethnic partition.     
Thus, my analysis sheds light on when exactly some warring groups and countries 
are likely to experience a punctuation or break from a path dependent nationalist 
ideology.  Significantly, this can occur as a result of one set of leaders or elites altering 
their nationalist ideology rather than a new set of leaders with a different nationalist 
ideology coming to power.  Even so, Izetbegović’s return to predominantly civic 
nationalist rhetoric in Bosnian domestic media following the conclusion of the debate 
over the peace plan and the termination of internal factional struggles suggests that such 
breaks may be temporary or incomplete in the context of war, at least at the most visible 
levels of public rhetoric.  In fact, the project to shift the Bosnian state toward an ethnic 
nationalist foundation based on the primacy of the Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) people 
continued at lower levels of official government and military authority, as further 
wartime events did not provide a similar opportunity or need to use ethnic nationalist 
claims to quite the same degree in Bosnian domestic media.  
This chapter’s findings thus contribute to the growing research program on the 
sources and nature of ideology and ideological shifts during internal armed conflict.  
However, building on these findings will require moving beyond the scope of the 
configuration of mechanisms outlined here.  Future extensions should test permutations 
and variations of these mechanisms, including some of the counterfactual scenarios 
outlined above.  Other ideas for future research include examination of different types of 
ethnic groups besides ethno-religious ones, as well as forms of ideology besides 
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nationalism.  These extensions will help illuminate our understanding of why certain 
ideologies are used in specific types of armed conflicts and during certain stages of armed 
conflict, potentially laying the foundation for a future research program to examine how 
wartime ideological shifts impact elite and mass behavior more broadly.   
In addition, exploring how the dyadic interaction of enemy leaders’ rhetoric 
shapes both sides’ ideologies during armed conflict offers a promising area for future 
research.  Carrying out this project, however, will require collecting and coding a 
systematic dataset of speech acts and ideological rhetoric for multiple parties or groups in 
a conflict rather than just one.  Brief examination of this dynamic in the Bosnian case 
suggested that it did not play a major role in explaining shifts in Bosnian government 
leaders’ domestic wartime nationalist ideology, but closer study of this relationship in 
other contexts may yield different outcomes. 
At this stage, however, I offer another type of extension.  Whereas this chapter 
examined shifts in the content of ideological claims made to domestic audiences, in the 
next chapter I examine how armed conflict may also impact the content of the ideological 




5. Ideological Shifts in the Bosnian War: Civic and 
Religious Nationalism in Foreign Media 
5.1. Introduction 
 On May 14
th
, 1994, speaking to the New York Times, Haris Silajdžić, Bosnia’s 
wartime Prime Minister and a member of the Bosnian Muslim ethno-religious group, 
asserted his view that the plan for a Muslim-Croat Federation within Bosnia “represents 
hope that this monument of civilization in Europe -- multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, 
democratic and not fascist -- will win” (Greenhouse 1994, A4).  Speaking on Pakistan TV 
just a few months later, on September 7
th
, 1994, Silajdžić said of Bosnia:  
I am here today to tell you that we are past that stage, we are beyond the annihilation and that we 
shall, by God's will, win. Morally, we have already won, physically they cannot defeat us - we are 
past that stage. Thanks to God and all our friends that helped, and we hope they will continue to 
help. Dear brothers and sisters, dear friends…the Bosnian [sic] have remained true to their historic 
mission, have remained true to the best tradition of Islam and are now victors without a stain 
(Pakistan TV 1994). 
Thus, from a view extolling a multi-ethnic state and nation, Silajdžić was now 
emphasizing God’s role in his country’s cause and intertwining Bosnia and Bosnians with 
Islam and Islamic traditions.  In this chapter I examine what prompts leaders of warring 
ethno-religious groups to vary the content of their ideological claims to foreign 
audiences.    
My explanation for this variation combines prior research findings concerning 
external support in civil wars with a novel approach based on the dynamics of 
international relations.  Specifically, I show that ethno-religious leaders will vary the 
content of their ideological claims to foreign audiences during war depending on the 
likelihood of military intervention from leading Western countries, in particular the 
United States.  My argument rests on the notion that the need for external aid in war will 
force leaders of warring ethno-religious groups to market themselves as agents to 
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different external state principals.  This marketing will be directed to the elites and 
policymakers in potential external supporters in an attempt to convince them that their 
interests and values will benefit from supporting the ethno-religious group’s cause.  At 
the same time, these leaders will try to increase empathy among non-elites within 
potential external supporters, in the hope that citizens in these countries will pressure 
their own leaders to support the group’s war effort and/or that these citizens will aid the 
war effort directly.  
In order to increase the odds that this marketing and empathy generation will 
succeed, I argue that leaders of warring ethno-religious groups will employ nationalist 
ideological claims that align with the dominant values and ideological principles of 
potential supporter countries, so as to demonstrate that their group is similar to these 
countries’ leaders and citizens and holds similar values and political goals.  I posit that 
their assumption is that creating and/or enhancing the perception of shared ideals and 
values between their group and external supporters will push these potential supporters’ 
leaders and citizens to invest in their cause in the conflict.   
However, employing a novel mechanism rooted in international politics, I also 
argue that in the post-Cold War period, leaders of ethno-religious groups involved in 
armed conflicts with a low likelihood of Western military intervention will be forced to 
use religious nationalist claims exclusively to garner external support.  Conversely, 
leaders of ethno-religious groups involved in armed conflicts where Western military 
intervention is more likely and obtainable will use civic nationalist claims in an attempt 
to persuade Western powers to intervene on their behalf.  Concurrently, since this 
intervention is still uncertain, they will also use religious nationalist claims in order to 
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attract co-religionist support.  Thus, opportunities to obtain aid from external actors will 
make certain kinds of ideological rhetoric more useful for some wartime ethno-religious 
leaders.   
The likelihood of Western military intervention in the post-Cold War period may 
be shaped by several factors, including Western countries’ national interests, whether the 
ethno-religious group is a principal perpetrator or victim of one-sided violence during the 
conflict, and great power politics.  In this chapter, I focus on the latter factor by arguing 
that leaders of ethno-religious groups fighting a non-Western great power will know or 
quickly realize that Western military intervention on their behalf will not be forthcoming 
owing to Western powers’ desire to avoid large-scale conflict with another great power 
by intervening within its borders.  Consequently, groups in this situation will not use 
civic nationalist claims to obtain external support, focusing solely on religious nationalist 
appeals.       
Testing the plausibility of my theory, I show that Bosnian Muslim wartime 
leaders demonstrated a strong tendency to use civic nationalist claims in media sources in 
Europe and the United States, along with an overwhelming propensity to use religious 
nationalist claims in media sources in Muslim-majority countries.  This pattern of 
nationalist ideological claims fits Bosnia’s wartime circumstances as a polity which had 
an uncertain but increasingly likely chance of receiving Western military support.  I also 
provide additional support for my theory through a brief historical analysis of the first 
Chechen-Russian war, demonstrating how Russia’s status as a non-Western great power 
precluded Western military support and thereby undermined Chechen leaders’ pre-war 
use of civic nationalist principles.  
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Thus, unlike the previous chapter, the ideological claims in this chapter vary 
between civic and religious nationalism rather than civic and ethnic nationalism.  In part, 
this is because a particularistic and narrow Bosnian Muslim ethnic nationalism could not 
have had a broad external appeal.  In addition, my assumption in this analysis is that war 
produced information constraints for citizens, such that they did not have ready access to 
the foreign speech acts in which Bosnian Muslim leaders veered between civic and 
religious nationalism.  Thus, the leadership could oscillate between civic and ethnic 
nationalism in its domestic rhetoric in response to threats to its power and peace 
proposals, as demonstrated in chapter four, while getting away with shifting between 
civic and religious nationalism in its foreign rhetoric in response to its need for external 
support, as shown in this chapter.    
My theory and results make three significant contributions.  First, I demonstrate 
how international politics and a need for external support during war combine to shape 
the content of ethno-religious leaders’ ideological claims in foreign media.  Second, I 
advance an innovative theoretical explanation for this relationship which rests on 
marketing and empathy.  In doing so, I demonstrate that before principals (i.e. external 
states) decide which agents to offer support to in conflict, agents (i.e. parties to armed 
conflicts) may take the initiative and actively attempt to persuade various principals to 
support them.   
Third, my results also suggest when leaders of ethno-religious groups in conflict 
will employ religious nationalist rhetoric.  Since the civil war research literature posits 
that organizations guided by religious ideology are less willing to negotiate a settlement 
to a conflict (Toft 2006), more willing and able to use greater violence (Berman and 
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Laitin 2008), and that civil wars involving religion are longer, more intense, and more 
prone to recurrence than other kinds of civil wars (Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2009), 
explaining when these leaders will use religious nationalist ideological claims during war 
may have beneficial implications for conflict resolution.    
 The chapter is structured as follows.  Section two presents my theoretical 
argument as to how demand for external support and the likelihood of Western military 
intervention in the post-Cold War international system combine to shape the content of 
the ideological claims that leaders of warring ethno-religious groups make to foreign 
audiences.  Section three presents the results of my quantitative analysis of Bosnian 
leaders’ ideological claims to foreign audiences.  It also offers some qualitative analysis 
of their contrasting claims in foreign media.  The fourth section elaborates a brief 
historical analysis of the first Chechen-Russian war as additional evidence for the 
plausibility of the theory.  Section five concludes.    
5.2. Theory: How External Support and International Politics Shape Ideological 
Claims 
 I restrict the scope of my theory to the post-Cold War era, thus assuming (as noted 
in chapter one) that religious nationalism has taken the place of Marxist communism as 
the primary ideological competitor to political ideologies predominant in the West, 
including civic nationalism.  In this context, I argue that an ethno-religious group’s 
likelihood of obtaining Western military intervention on its behalf in an armed conflict is 
central to explaining which types of ideological claims its leaders will make in their 
official rhetoric to foreign audiences.  Given that the Western great powers, particularly 
the United States, have possessed the most military and economic power in the 
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international system since the end of the Cold War, I argue that the prospect of Western 
military support is highly enticing for wartime ethno-religious leaders.  On the other 
hand, Western powers still have limited resources, thereby constraining their ability and 
willingness to intervene militarily in foreign conflicts.   
In particular, if an ethno-religious group is at war against a non-Western great 
power, I argue that Western powers like the United States will refrain from considering 
military intervention.  This is because they will want to avoid a potentially large-scale 
military conflict with another great power.  Once the ethno-religious group’s leaders 
realize that Western military intervention is not forthcoming, they will abandon any 
attempts to use civic nationalism to attract support from Western governments.  
Consequently, they will be forced to turn to civic nationalism’s ideological substitute in 
the post-Cold War international system: religious nationalism.  By appealing to state and 
non-state actors which share their religious views, these leaders can hope to secure both 
military and economic aid on their behalf.  
 Conversely, ethno-religious groups fighting a different type of opponent know 
that Western military intervention is possible but uncertain.  In an attempt to gain 
Western support, I posit that they will utilize civic nationalist claims in their official 
rhetoric to Western audiences depending on their perception of the likelihood of this 
support.  However, they will also appeal to co-religionist actors in order to hedge their 
bets should Western intervention not materialize.  As a result, these leaders may also use 
religious nationalist claims.   
In these contexts, the likelihood of Western military intervention may be shaped 
by additional factors, potentially including the ethno-religious group’s behavior in the 
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conflict and Western powers’ national interests.  For example, groups who are perceived 
as principal victims of wartime violence, especially one-sided violence, may be more 
likely to receive Western support because Western governments will feel pressure to 
champion liberal norms of human rights in the face of targeted violence and atrocities 
against a particular group.  Even in this case, however, Western military intervention may 
only become highly likely if Western political leaders also come to view intervention as 
contributing to their government’s national interest, rather than solely upholding moral 
norms. 
 My theory follows in the tradition of Peter Gourevitch’s use of the concept of the 
“second image reversed” to describe how internal political phenomena are often derived 
from phenomena within the international system (Gourevitch 1978).  In this chapter, I 
extend this concept to show how internal conflict and international actors can interact to 
shape leaders’ political values and ideological principles.  It also expands on work that 
examines why leaders of secessionist groups mobilize around one identity instead of 
another (Saideman, Dougherty, and Jenne 2005) by shifting the analysis to ethno-
religious groups and by utilizing a more comprehensive set of categories for the 
dependent variable.   
I also build on research regarding external intervention in internal armed conflict.  
Though most of this work focuses on which kinds of conflicts draw more outside 
intervention (Regan 2000) and how outside intervention impacts conflict duration 
(Cunningham 2010) and onset or escalation (Gleditsch 2007), some scholars have taken 
an actor-specific focus similar to mine, inquiring as to which states intervene and why 
they intervene on behalf of a particular side (Findley and Teo 2006).  Most of this work, 
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however, points to the link between ethnicity and external support, as outside intervention 
is expected to increase in the presence of co-ethnic ties between the intervener and one of 
the warring sides (Nome 2013; Saideman 2002).  In contrast to this focus on ethnic kin, 
in this chapter I show how Bosnian Muslim wartime leaders, who entered conflict with 
few external co-ethnic ties, still attracted outside support by using other types of 
ideological claims at their disposal, namely civic and religious nationalism.  These claims 
can then substitute for co-ethnic ties and offer different paths for establishing a 
perception of kinship or affinity between potential outside supporters and warring groups.  
More recently, Idean Salehyan, Kristian Gleditsch, and David Cunningham have 
employed a principal-agent model to argue that possible external state supporters decide 
to offer aid to competent groups whose preferences match theirs (Salehyan, Gleditsch, 
and Cunningham 2011).  Similar to their work, I focus on the importance of shared 
preferences and values between principals and agents.  However, I move beyond their 
emphasis on shared ethnicity or religion as effective screening mechanisms for shared 
preferences to include civic nationalism as a potential source of shared values and 
preferences in the absence of ethnic or religious ties.  I also take a different angle on this 
relationship by analyzing the actions that leaders of warring ethno-religious groups can 
take as agents to motivate certain principals (e.g. external states) to offer their support in 
the first place.   
My theory thus focuses on these leaders’ need to adopt certain types of nationalist 
ideological claims in their rhetoric to foreign audiences in order to market their cause to 
foreign policymakers and increase empathy for their plight among foreign citizens.  This 
argument is in line with research that shows that the anticipation and/or likelihood of 
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third party intervention in internal armed conflict can shape belligerent groups’ behavior 
in regards to their military strategy and the use of violence against their opponents (Poast 
2015).  I extend this reasoning to argue that the hope for and anticipation of outside 
intervention can also shape warring parties’ rhetoric and ideological claims.  Below I 
detail the logic driving the relationship between external support and warring ethno-
religious group leaders’ decision to use specific types of nationalist ideological claims in 
their rhetoric in foreign media.  
I start by assuming that these leaders have to obtain resources and intervention 
from third party actors.  This assumption is highly plausible given that war tends to 
impair and/or destroy the effective functioning of countries’ domestic economies and 
infrastructure.  This means that production of war material may be impaired, thereby 
prompting these leaders to seek military supplies and/or outright military intervention 
from external actors. I also assume that leaders who are able to appeal to more than one 
outside actor and actually do so will have a higher probability of receiving the benefit of 
external aid.  
 These leaders must therefore convince potential foreign supporters to invest in 
and provide resources to their war effort rather than to other conflicts.  Previous work has 
suggested that the context of international relations when it comes to armed conflict is in 
fact one of many needy warring parties seeking help paired with limited transnational 
resources (Bob 2001).  Leaders of different groups involved in armed conflicts are thus 
competing over many of the same possible external supporters, giving them an incentive 
to devise methods to enhance their appeal to foreign elites and decision makers. 
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One potentially effective marketing strategy ethno-religious elites can use to gain 
the support of foreign policymakers would be to convince these foreign leaders that 
investing in their conflict is in their national interest or would promote their own security 
needs.  Along these lines, prior research indicates that many cases of successful outside 
intervention in civil wars have occurred when the intervening power perceived a clear 
national interest at stake in the intervention (Cooper and Berdal 1993).  In turn, different 
outside states may perceive their national interests and goals in different ways.   
In fact, some prominent scholars have suggested that humanitarian motives for 
intervention have increasingly come to be defined as part of many countries’ national 
interests after the Cold War, especially the United States (Finnemore 1996).  However, 
others dispute this notion and maintain that traditional political and strategic motives still 
form the core of states’ motivations for intervention and aid to groups fighting civil wars 
(Gent 2007). Offering a different view, Patrick Regan argues that states may gain the 
benefit of enhanced reputational capital by intervening in humanitarian crises and 
winning domestic and/or international praise for doing so (Regan 1998).     
Wartime leaders of ethno-religious groups thus have an incentive to convince 
outside powers that aiding their cause will help promote their interests.  To do so, I argue 
that these leaders would benefit from branding and advertising themselves in the same 
way as the target of their aid request brands its own country’s values and goals in the 
international system.  The logic of this kind of appeal would be to persuade the potential 
outside intervener that it will benefit from intervening in the conflict over the long run 
through its relationship with a polity that shares its values and goals and, therefore, by 
implication, may offer the intervener space to promote its economic, cultural, and/or 
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international policy objectives both during and after the conflict.  This strategy may be 
especially helpful if a state or group is a relatively new actor on the international scene, 
as making certain kinds of appeals may allow it to credibly convince outside states that it 
is an ally (Saideman, Dougherty, and Jenne 2005).   
Further support for this strategy comes from the work of Clifford Bob, who 
argues that localized social movements’ chances of wining support from international 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) depend on effectively “pitching” and 
“matching” themselves to specific organizations (Bob 2001).  By pitching he means 
raising awareness for the movement’s cause, while matching requires aligning the 
movement’s causes and goals with the agendas of specific NGOs.  The NGOs, in turn, 
need to observe this type of alignment owing to the risk they take in supporting a social 
movement which, in the long run, may or may not retain local legitimacy and/or serve the 
NGOs’ larger goals (Bob 2001).  To match to NGOs successfully, Bob argues that local 
social movements have to couch their causes and goals in the language of trans-national 
discourse and transnational claims (Bob 2001).  I argue that leaders of warring ethno-
religious groups have to utilize nationalist ideological claims in much the same way in 
order to gain the support of policymakers in foreign countries.    
In addition to security concerns and self-interest, foreign policy decision makers 
in potential external supporter states may also wish to spread their country’s official 
ideology and political beliefs to other states and areas of the world.  John Owen, for 
example, posits that powerful states often forcibly promote their regimes abroad, such 
that potential intervener states may view ideology and ideas as independent components 
of their national interests and/or as mechanisms for gaining power internationally, rather 
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than just a means to obtain more security (Owen 2002).  For the United States in 
particular, Owen notes that states whose domestic institutions and official ideals and 
values hew to liberal ideology are less likely to counter-balance American power (Owen 
2001/2002).   
This behavior should also apply to countries which are comprised mostly of an 
ethno-religious group’s co-religionists, particularly those with governments that lend 
state support to the faith, as these countries’ leaders are likely to see the religion’s 
principles as part of their official state ideology in a manner similar to Western leaders’ 
view of liberalism.  Accordingly, these countries’ leaders will perceive support of 
warring ethno-religious group elites who use religious nationalist claims as an 
opportunity to enhance their international power and prestige by extending their influence 
to different actors in the international system.  Thus, wartime ethno-religious leaders 
seeking support from the leaders of the United States and other powerful Western 
countries would have an incentive to adopt ideological rhetoric endorsing civic 
nationalism and political liberalism when speaking to Western media.  In contrast, they 
would have an incentive to promote religious nationalism when speaking in media 
sources in co-religionist countries in order to take advantage of these states’ wish to 
spread the religion’s principles as a conduit of cultural and political power on the 
international stage.     
Aside from using nationalist ideological claims as marketing tools to gain support 
from external elites and policymakers, I argue that wartime ethno-religious group leaders 
will also utilize these claims to generate empathy from citizens in foreign countries, in 
the hope that these citizens will put further pressure on their country’s leaders to provide 
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aid to their side in the conflict.  In doing so, these leaders must still choose nationalist 
ideological claims that resonate with foreign audiences, i.e. that match the values and 
beliefs that specific sets of foreign citizens tend to hold.  I posit that these leaders have to 
devise ways to increase foreign audiences’ empathy because I assume that most people’s 
baseline attitude toward providing support for groups in foreign conflicts is one of apathy 
(Käpylä and Kennedy 2014).   
Research indicates that generating empathy is an important strategy for 
overcoming this apathetic response, as increasing empathy motivates people to support 
remedies for human rights violations (Harff 1987).  In addition, theoretical work suggests 
heightened altruism among democratic citizens increases state support for foreign aid 
because the median democratic voter becomes more altruistic, thereby forcing democratic 
leaders to increase foreign aid and humanitarian relief in order to increase the utility and 
welfare of the median voter (Seiglie 1999).  Following in this work, I posit that certain 
types of nationalist ideological claims during conflict may be likely to shift foreign 
citizens’ empathy and/or foreign median voters’ altruism for the ethno-religious group 
making the claims.   
 Nationalist ideological claims can have this effect if they make the ethno-religious 
group’s members appear similar to people in foreign countries.  For example, one key to 
greater media attention for conflicts is an audience’s ability to identify and/or sympathize 
with the conflict (Hawkins 2011), which can be achieved through the use of narratives 
and stories that create a sense of familiarity and intimacy between the foreign audiences 
and those affected by the conflict (Käpylä and Kennedy 2014).  Wartime leaders’ use of 
specific types of nationalist ideological claims serves this narrative purpose.  Provided 
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the claims fit into the foreign country’s official ideological values, principles, and myths, 
the leaders can demonstrate that their own people are the same as the citizens in the 
foreign country, meaning that they think and believe in the same values, want to organize 
their country in the same way, and seek to realize the same principles in their society 
after the conflict ends.  The implicit message is thus that foreign citizens will actually be 
helping themselves and acting in accordance with their own identity and values if they 
lend greater support to the group’s war effort.   
 Therefore, given that these leaders have to use nationalist ideological claims that 
resonate with foreign elites and citizens in order to market themselves and generate 
empathy effectively, they will need to employ different types of nationalist claims in their 
foreign rhetoric depending on the country from which they are seeking help.  In this 
context, both civic and religious nationalism can potentially serve as international 
ideologies, in the sense that they can mobilize support from beyond the wartime ethno-
religious group’s borders.  Civic nationalism can do so because of its links to notions of 
universal citizenship, individual rights, and humanitarianism and because it is the 
dominant official nationalist ideology in powerful Western countries, such as the United 
States and France.  Religious nationalism can also serve this purpose because it calls 
forth and extols a community which exists trans-nationally.   
 More specifically, civic nationalism’s focus on individual rights, a community of 
laws, citizenship based on residency, and multi-ethnic assimilation should resonate 
particularly well with leaders and citizens in Western countries.  The official nationalist 
myth in the United States, for example, is that of the multi-ethnic melting pot, with civic 
ideals and laws serving as the common foundation for an American nation made up of 
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many different ethnic and/or immigrant groups.  Civic nationalism’s focus on human and 
individual rights also touches on the cornerstone of American political development, 
harkening back to the emphasis on human equality and individual rights found in the 
Declaration of Independence.  Similar principles can be found in official French 
nationalist ideology and myth, especially the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity.  
Ethno-religious group elites would thus benefit from emphasizing themes of human 
rights and humanitarianism within their wartime civic nationalist appeals in an attempt to 
demonstrate how supporting the group upholds Western nations’ human rights norms.       
 Conversely, religious nationalism’s promotion of a group’s religious rituals and 
traditions and its identification with fellow religious believers across state borders should 
appeal to countries in which a majority of citizens share the ethno-religious group 
leaders’ faith, regardless of whether or not they share their ethnicity.  Ethno-religious 
groups fighting an armed conflict with little to no likelihood of Western military 
intervention on their behalf will thus be forced to use these claims predominantly or 
exclusively in the absence of a strategic advantage for employing civic nationalism.  On 
the other hand, ethno-religious groups fighting an armed conflict with a relatively greater 
chance of Western military intervention will be able to employ both civic and religious 
nationalism. 
My theory thus generates the following hypotheses: 
H1: After the Cold War, leaders of ethno-religious groups fighting armed conflicts will 
utilize both civic nationalist and religious nationalist claims in their rhetoric to foreign 
audiences if their likelihood of obtaining Western military support is not low or non-
existent.  These leaders will predominantly use civic nationalist claims in their rhetoric to 
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Western countries and religious nationalist claims in their rhetoric to countries comprised 
of a majority of their co-religionists. 
H2: Leaders of ethno-religious groups fighting armed conflicts where the likelihood of 
obtaining Western military support is low or non-existent will use religious nationalist 
claims exclusively in their rhetoric to foreign audiences.                  
5.3.1 Statistical Analysis of Bosnian Leaders’ Ideological Claims in Foreign Media 
In this chapter’s analysis the principal independent variables are the foreign media 
sources in which Bosnian government leaders made their speech acts.  Western Media is 
a dummy variable coded one if the speech act occurred in a media source from either the 
United States or a country in Europe that was neither one of the post-Yugoslav states nor 
a Muslim-majority country.  Islamic Media is a dummy variable coded one if the speech 
act occurred in a media source from a Muslim-majority country.  The dependent variables 
are coded using the same methods described in chapters three and four. 
To provide an illustration of what the variation in Bosnian leaders’ wartime 
nationalist ideological claims looked like, I constructed the following table of the top ten 
words used in ideological claims in the media sources under analysis.  Produced in R, this 
word frequency list is based on the text of all the ideological claims made by Bosnian 
leaders during the war, excluding a list of commonly used stop words.  The word 
frequencies indicate a greater emphasis on the relationship between the Bosnian “state” 
and “Europe” along with the civic nationalist and liberal values of “freedom” and 
“democracy” in Western media sources.  In contrast, Bosnian leaders were much more 
likely to emphasize the “Islamic” faith and “God” in ideological claims made in Islamic 
media sources.   
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Table 5.1: Word Frequency – Ideological Claims by Media Source 
Rank Western Media Frequency Islamic Media Frequency 
1 State - 15 Islamic - 15 
2 Europe - 11 God - 10 
3 Ethnic - 10 Hope - 10 
4 Serbs - 8 International - 9 
5 World - 8 State - 9 
6 Freedom - 7 Support - 9 
7 Government - 7 World - 9 
8 Sarajevo - 7 Europe - 8 
9 Serbia - 7 Arms - 7 
10 Democracy - 6 Continue - 7 
 
I then proceeded to test the hypotheses via a pair of statistical models.  Model 1 in 
Table 2 thus includes the results of my analysis of the likelihood that Bosnian leaders 
made civic nationalist claims. This model indicates that these leaders were, on average, 
much more likely to use civic nationalist claims in Western media sources.  Moreover, 
this relationship is statistically significant at 99% confidence.  However, since the 
coefficients from a non-linear model cannot be interpreted on their own, I used the model 
results to calculate the substantive impact that Western media sources had on the 
predicted probability that Bosnian leaders utilized civic nationalist ideological claims.  
The calculation indicates that shifting from a non-Western to a Western media source 
corresponded, on average, with a 22 percentage point increase in the likelihood of a civic 
nationalist ideological claim, thereby providing strong support for the first hypothesis.   
Model 2 in Table 2 also demonstrates that Bosnian leaders were, on average, 
much more likely to use religious nationalist claims in media sources from Muslim-
majority countries, a relationship which is statistically significant at 99% confidence.  
Substantively, shifting from a non-Islamic to an Islamic media source corresponded, on 
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average, with a 55 percentage point increase in the likelihood of a religious nationalist 
ideological claim.  These results thus provide strong additional support for the first 
hypothesis.  In tandem, these results also support the first hypothesis’s prediction that 
wartime leaders of an ethno-religious group which is at least somewhat likely to receive 
Western military intervention will use both civic and religious nationalist claims in their 
official rhetoric to foreign audiences.  The following section supplements the results of 
these statistical analyses with qualitative illustrations of the Bosnian leadership’s use of 
distinct nationalist claims in foreign media. 
Table 5.2: Probability of Civic and Religious Nationalist Claims vs. Media Source 
 Model 1:         
Civic  
Nationalism 
Model 2:   
Religious 
Nationalism 




 (0.223)  
   
Islamic Media  1.759
***
 
  (0.237) 




 (0.0754) (0.111) 
Observations 322 322 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
5.3.2 Qualitative Examination of Bosnian Leaders’ Ideological Claims in Foreign 
Media 
Quoted in the New York Times on July 9
th
, 1993, Bosnian President Izetbegović 
informed its readers that, “You may take this statement of mine as an appeal to the 
American Government [sic] and people, to help preserve the multiethnic and 
multireligious [sic] state that Bosnia and Herzegovina has always been. Any support, 
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particularly in military terms, would be welcome...I think my message can be much better 
understood by the United States, because it represents a multicultural and multiethnic 
state” (Burns 1993, A6).  Illustrating my theoretical argument, Izetbegović appealed to 
both policy makers in the US (i.e. the “American government”) and the American 
“people” with a specific request for military intervention on his government’s behalf.  By 
emphasizing Bosnia’s multiethnic and multi-religious historical foundation and drawing a 
parallel to the multiethnic and multicultural ideals of the United States, Izetbegović 
sought to demonstrate the similarity between his country’s civic ethos and the American 
national myth rooted in cultural diversity and individual rights. 
 Towards the beginning of the following year, Prime Minister Silajdžić promoted 
liberalism and humanitarianism on German television, proclaiming, “We think that 
whatever is lost in Bosnia also applies to the rest of the world. Much is at stake here, 
democracy, human rights, humanity, in short, civilization. We believe it is time to state: 
better late than never. This applies to those forces in Bosnia which are fighting for 
democracy and against aggressive nationalism, which stand for order and do not embody 
chaos and dictatorship” (N-TV Berlin 1994).  Here, support for Bosnia is joined with the 
cause of democracy and individual human rights, two of the core tenets of Western 
liberalism. 
 Though Izetbegović and Silajdžić continued to appeal to Western countries on the 
basis of civic nationalism, their speech acts in media sources in Islamic countries 
emphasized the religious identity of the Bosnian Muslims.  Thus, in September of 1992 
Izetbegović told the Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran media channel that, “In these 
dark and troubled days, the hearts of the Muslim and captive people of Bosnia-
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Hercegovina are warmed and their hopes are raised when they hear that they are not 
alone in this world of mayhem. Muslims, freemen and free women in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran support our righteous struggle in the defence of our identity, ethnicity 
and our Islamic religion and faith” (Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1992).  Unlike 
the appeals to the US and France, this ideological claim urges continued Iranian support 
for the Bosnian cause by emphasizing the religious component of Bosnia’s culture and 
underscoring that Bosnia’s war is in part a defense of Islam.  
 Three months later, Izetbegović lamented to Saudi television viewers, “Why do 
the world and in particular its leaders fail today to see what is extremely clear? Is it 
because it is not Belgrade that is being besieged and exposed to annihilation, but 
Sarajevo? Is it also because it is not half of Serbia that is occupied but because it is 
Bosnia that is occupied? Is it because the group of one million refugees who have crossed 
Europe are Muslims and those who oppress them while they are running from the face of 
oppression are Christians? Why, instead of being provided with true protection in 
accordance with justice and international law, are they packing up and emigrating to 
other lands? Is this due to any ethical weakness in today's civilisation? Or is it because 
the victims have been Muslims?” (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia TV 1992).  Therefore, the 
Bosnian leadership’s rhetoric to Muslim audiences painted the war as a religious struggle 
between Christians and Muslims, rather than the struggle between “aggressive 
nationalism” and multiethnic democracy presented to Western audiences. 
Overall, these analyses demonstrate that Bosnian leaders, knowing they could 
potentially obtain support from either or both Western and co-religionist countries but 
unsure of the certainty of this support, utilized both civic and religious nationalism on a 
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consistent basis.  In doing so, these leaders tailored their ideological claims in ways that 
would resonate with specific foreign leaders and citizens.  Furthermore, this analysis 
implies a counterfactual, whereby if the Bosnian leaders had been fighting in an armed 
conflict where their likelihood of receiving Western military support was low to non-
existent, they would not have used civic nationalist claims in foreign media, owing to the 
impossibility of obtaining Western support. 
5.4 Historical Analysis of Chechen Leaders’ Shift Towards Religious Nationalism 
Along these lines, historical analysis of the first Chechen-Russian armed conflict 
provides additional evidence for the theory’s predictions. During and after the Chechen 
government’s declaration of independence from Russia in November of 1991, its top 
leader, Dzhokhar Dudayev, promoted secular nationalism fairly consistently.  However, 
once Russia initiated armed conflict with Chechnya in December of 1994, the lack of 
Western support owing to Russia’s status as a non-Western great power arguably 
contributed to Chechen leaders’ extensive reliance on external support from co-religionist 
actors, which in turn shifted their political rhetoric in the direction of both religious 
nationalism and religious fundamentalism.  
Thus, although Dudayev was sworn in on the Koran in 1991, he remained a 
secular nationalist in his personal views (Gammer 2005).  To that end, his campaign 
platform that year barely mentioned Islam, while its section on “The Spiritual Sphere” 
focused on civic nationalist principles such as human rights, pluralism, and democracy 
(Lieven 1998).  The constitution of the separatist Chechen government written in March 
of 1992 also stated that, “‘The Chechen Republic is a sovereign and independent 
157 
 
democratic law-based state, founded as a result of the self-determination of the Chechen 
people’” (quoted in Hughes 2007, 65).   
The following year, Dudayev rejected both the Iranian and Turkish views of the 
relationship between Islam and politics.  Instead he said that, “‘The place for Islam in 
Chechnya will depend on the political situation in the republic and on the external 
pressure which will be exerted.  That means exclusively on external factors.  With the 
increase of negative external factors Islam is bound to grow’” (quoted in Hughes 2007, 
66).  Overall, the historical record indicates that religion and religious nationalism did not 
play a major role in the rhetoric or identity of the separatist Chechen state at this time 
(Hughes 2007; Speckhard and Akhmedova 2006).  However, this pattern changed once 
the first war with Russia began in December of 1994, with the external factors alluded to 
by Dudayev playing a major role.  
At this point, Dudayev reinvigorated traditional Chechen Islamic institutions and 
even promoted the use of mosques for the purpose of organizing the armed Chechen 
defense (Hughes 2007).  Religious political rhetoric, specifically religious nationalist 
rhetoric centering on political Islam, became much more common and began to serve as a 
primary tool and symbol for mobilizing the Chechen resistance to the Russian forces 
(Lieven 1998).  One major explanation for Chechen leaders’ increasing use of religious 
nationalism lay in the fact that their most successful military leaders were committed to 
Islamist principles and that the military prowess of these soldiers inspired widespread 
popular emulation of their personal values (Hughes 2007).  However, a significant 
catalyst for this rhetorical shift also lay in the Chechen leadership’s connections to 
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external co-religionist sources of recruits and funds, particularly radical Islamist sources 
(Hughes 2007).   
Early in the war, the Chechen leadership had also become disillusioned with 
Western countries’ view that the war in Chechnya was an internal matter for the Russian 
government to resolve (Speckhard and Akhmedova 2006).  In the words of one scholar, 
“Realizing that Western governments, by and large, would not be of much help in the 
independence process, separatist fighters began to rely on any financial and technological 
means they could, and were only too happy to begin receiving support from Arab fighters 
from Afghanistan and Wahhabi charities” (Swirszcz 2009, 76).  Echoing this assessment, 
Julie Wilhelmsen argues that in their “isolated” position, Chechen leaders decided to use 
the resources offered by Islamic organizations and networks in the Middle East and parts 
of Asia (Wilhelmsen 2005, 40).  By the end of the war, Chechen leaders had come to rely 
on Muslim-majority countries for much of the financing needed for the war effort, 
particularly Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar (Hughes 2007).     
 Further examination of the reasons for the link between external co-religionist 
support for the Chechen war effort and shifts in Chechen leader rhetoric reveals the 
important role played by the international status of Chechnya’s opponent in the war.  In 
one scholar’s assessment, the first Chechen-Russian conflict bore great similarity to the 
contemporaneous war in Bosnia in terms of the scale of the war and the violation of 
international laws on the use of force.  However, the US government at the time saw 
Russian President Yeltsin as an important ally in building a new post-Cold War 
international order (Hughes 2007).   
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More to the point, “Russia was a nuclear and strong military power, with a 
Security Council veto.  It simply could not be forced to comply with Western demands 
over Chechnya, even if Western governments had been proactive” (Hughes 2007, 129).  
Unlike the humanitarian relief effort and eventual NATO military intervention in Bosnia, 
the United States and other Western countries deemed Chechnya to be an internal matter 
for Russia to resolve, did not issue any calls for international intervention, and did not 
promote the idea of an international tribunal for war crimes in Chechnya (Hughes 2007).  
And had they tried to do so, Russia would have vetoed the effort through the UN Security 
Council (Hughes 2007).   
At the same time, multi-lateral European institutions such as the OSCE did not 
possess sufficient leverage or capability to hold the Russian government accountable for 
its military’s actions in Chechnya (Hughes 2007).  In addition, it is interesting to note that 
many governments in the Middle East, particularly Iran, were also reluctant to criticize 
the Russian government and provide military aid to the Chechens, instead upholding 
respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Russia (Malek 2008).  Therefore, 
Chechen leaders faced both a non-existent chance of Western military intervention on 
their behalf as well as uncertain support from some co-religionist state leaders.  
Nonetheless, their use of religious nationalist rhetoric still served as the most effective 
potential instrument for attracting the support of co-religionist state and non-state actors. 
 In these circumstances, it would not have made strategic sense for Chechen 
leaders to continue using the secular civic nationalist values and principles promoted in 
their pre-war rhetoric, given that this form of nationalism aligned most closely with 
Western countries’ nationalist ideologies.  With no hope for meaningful external support 
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from the West owing to Russia’s status and prerogatives as a great power in post-Cold 
War international politics and international institutions, Chechen leaders had to rely 
mostly on external support from co-religionist actors.  The outcome was a shift toward 
religious nationalism.  Therefore, the evidence from this case study provides strong 
support for the second hypothesis.      
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates that a comprehensive explanation of ethno-religious 
group leaders’ adoption of specific types of nationalist rhetoric must go beyond the 
domestic sphere to incorporate the role of armed conflict and post-Cold War international 
relations. The chapter supports this finding through several important results.  First, the 
structure of the international system helps shape the ideological claims of leaders of 
warring ethno-religious groups.  In the midst of tremendous suffering, the Bosnian 
Muslim leaders of the Bosnian government held one relative advantage, namely that their 
country had a reasonable likelihood of receiving Western military intervention.   
As a result, its leaders could appeal to Western powers for relief and military 
intervention, ultimately obtaining both.  In contrast, Chechen leaders shifted away from 
civic nationalist rhetoric once war with Russia began.  Western unwillingness to provide 
military support for a secessionist group fighting a post-Cold War great power 
significantly affected this rhetorical shift, as Chechen leaders turned increasingly to co-
religionist external actors for support, and, consequently, to religious ideals and values. 
Second, leaders of ethno-religious groups fighting armed conflicts will take the 
initiative as agents to actively pursue external state principals who can offer them support 
in the conflict.  To do so, they will employ nationalist ideological claims that resonate 
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with the official nationalist ideologies and myths of specific foreign countries.  By using 
these claims, these leaders are essentially marketing their cause to foreign political elites 
and attempting to persuade them that coming to the polity’s aid is both in their national 
security interests and a means of further spreading their values and principles across the 
international system.  In addition, these leaders also use these types of claims to increase 
foreign citizens’ empathy for their plight, expecting that domestic public pressure on 
foreign elites may galvanize them to act if the elite-directed marketing strategy proves 
insufficient on its own.   
In return, potential external supporter states receive an opportunity to extend their 
influence and power on the world stage by spreading their official state ideologies abroad 
and incurring good will and gratitude in exchange for their material support.  For leading 
Western countries, civic nationalist claims indicate that an ethno-religious group may 
facilitate the spread of liberalism, particularly the principles of democracy and human 
rights.  For co-religionist countries, religious nationalist claims indicate that they may be 
able to spread their society's religious precepts and thus lay the foundation for greater 
material influence in the future.                
In terms of the implications of the results, it is important to emphasize that this 
chapter's analyses are limited to ethno-religious groups in armed conflict.  Within that 
scope, however, the results suggest several concrete conclusions for other hypothetical 
conflicts.  First, similar to the Chechen case, an ethno-religious group which pursues 
armed rebellion against the Chinese government is likely to resort to religious nationalist 
rhetoric in appealing for help from foreign audiences, given that the likelihood of 
Western military intervention will be very low to nonexistent.   
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Conversely, ethno-religious groups who go to war with opponents that are not 
non-Western great powers will initially enjoy a higher likelihood of Western military 
intervention.  Thus, for example, a wartime Sunni organization in the Middle East will 
theoretically enter conflict with the ability to use either or both civic and religious 
nationalism to obtain external support.  However, its likelihood of Western support may 
depend on its ensuing behavior.  If, unlike the Bosnian Muslims, this group is a principal 
perpetrator of atrocities, mass killing, and/or brutal acts of violence against civilians, then 
Western intervention on its behalf will be very unlikely, such that it will not make sense 
for this group to issue civic nationalist appeals.   
If, on the other hand, this group is a principal victim of violence (similar to the 
Bosnian Muslims), then its chances of Western support will be better, although still 
potentially limited by Western leaders' decision as to whether or not their national 
security interests are enhanced by active involvement in the conflict.  Such a group would 
be much more likely to make civic nationalist appeals in foreign media, but it may hedge 
its bets by using religious nationalist claims as well.  It is also likely to increase its 
reliance on the latter if Western military intervention on its behalf appears to become less 
likely over the course of the conflict.          
Although this chapter thus constitutes an initial demonstration of how the 
combination of international politics and the need for support during armed conflict can 
shape and alter official ideological claims for specific types of ethnic groups, future work 
can expand on several facets of this chapter.  For example, additional research may 
illuminate whether and how domestic state and rebel leaders’ ideological claims in 
foreign media impact and/or shape each other through a dyadic process.  Future research 
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should also examine a variable which remained unexplored in this chapter: the size and 
role of ethnic diasporas.  Regardless of where they are fighting, leaders of warring ethno-
religious groups with large diasporas have another potential avenue of external support 
besides Western powers or co-religionist actors.  In that case, depending on which 
nationalist ideology predominates among the diaspora, these leaders’ ideological appeals 
to foreign audiences may use ethnic nationalism instead of either civic or religious 
nationalism.  However, since the Bosnian Muslims and Chechens both lacked large 
diasporas during their respective conflicts, ethnic nationalism was not a useful option for 
either group’s leaders in their wartime rhetoric to foreign audiences.           
Finally, this chapter's findings suggest that conflict mediators seeking to prevent 
the spread of religious nationalism have room to maneuver in conflicts where an ethno-
religious group is not fighting a non-Western great power.  In cases similar to the 
Bosnian Muslims, these mediators must make sure that wartime ethno-religious group 
leaders do not have to turn to or rely on co-religionist sources of support in the first place.  






6. Identity Shifts in the Bosnian War: IDPs, Religiosity, 
and Post-War Politics 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I shift the focus of my analysis from ethno-religious elite ideology 
to ethno-religious mass identity.  Specifically, I examine the effect of armed conflict on 
ethno-religious group members’ religiosity, along with the post-war political impact of 
any conflict-induced shift in religious identity.  In doing so, I explore how war may push 
ordinary citizens away from both secular civic and ethnic nationalist conceptions of their 
identities toward religious nationalist ones by making religious identity more useful in 
coping with traumatic experiences induced by intense wartime violence.   
In exploring the link between violence-induced displacement and ethno-religious 
identity, this chapter connects to chapter three, showing that wartime violence indirectly 
impacts ethno-religious group members’ identities in addition to directly affecting ethno-
religious elites’ use of ideological rhetoric.  The chapter’s analysis of a grassroots shift 
toward greater religiosity during wartime also suggests that ethno-religious elites may 
benefit from using rhetoric that aligns with their population’s changing sentiments.  This 
incentive may help to explain these elites’ ability to use both ethnic and religious 
nationalist claims in different media sources and at different stages of armed conflict.  In 
addition, this chapter connects to chapter two by illuminating the wartime tension and 
competition between religious versus civic and ethnic views of Bosnian Muslim identity.  
The chapter builds on previous research that suggests that armed conflicts 
centered on an ethnic or religious cleavage are likely to prime the ethnic or religious 
identities of members of the warring groups.  If such a war is followed by a democratic 
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regime, citizens should thus be primed to vote for political parties making appeals on the 
basis of ethnicity or religion.  Not all citizens behave this way, however.  In this chapter, 
I ask why this is the case.  More specifically, following an ethno-religious armed conflict, 
why do some members of ethno-religious groups vote for political parties that use 
religious appeals while other members do not?  Previous findings in the literature 
concerning armed conflict’s impact on post-war electoral politics do not address this 
question directly, focusing instead on how experiencing wartime violence heightens post-
war political participation or how wartime victimization at the hands of specific actors 
shapes post-war political attitudes (Blattman 2009; Balcells 2012). 
Here, I present a new relationship between wartime experiences and post-war 
political outcomes.  I argue that ethno-religious group members who become internally 
displaced during armed conflict are more likely to vote for religiously oriented political 
parties after the conflict ends.  The reasoning behind the argument is as follows.  
Individuals who become internally displaced during armed conflict are more likely to 
have had lower incomes and lived in rural areas before the war compared to those who do 
not become internally displaced.  Given that people from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds and rural areas tend to be more religious than relatively wealthier 
individuals living in cities, the population of internally displaced persons during conflict 
is likely to have been more religious prior to the start of war than other members of the 
ethno-religious group.   
Since internal displacement is a traumatic experience, internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) will thus be able to use their religiosity as a coping mechanism with which to deal 
with this trauma.  In doing so, they will attach even more value to their religion, such that 
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their religiosity becomes even stronger during and after the war.  Consequently, they will 
demonstrate greater affinity with and preferences for political parties whose platforms 
and leaders promote policies rooted in ethno-religious customs and religious beliefs, 
along with the group’s ethno-religious traditions and religious rhetoric in general.        
In order to hold constant as many variables as possible while also selecting a 
difficult case for analysis, I focus on the Bosnian Muslims as my ethno-religious group of 
interest.  Using data from an extensive survey carried out by the Norwegian Research 
Council in 2003-2004, I show that Bosnian Muslim respondents who were internally 
displaced during the 1990s Bosnian war were more likely to vote for the ethno-religious 
nationalist Party of Democratic Action (SDA) representing the Bosnian Muslims several 
years after the conflict.  I also provide evidence for the mechanisms within the argument 
by demonstrating that internally displaced Bosnian Muslim respondents attended 
religious services more frequently before the war and were more likely to report 
becoming more religious after the war compared to non-displaced Bosnian Muslim 
respondents.  In doing so, I employ a matching analysis to verify the latter mechanism.     
I also test several alternative explanations for SDA vote choice, showing that the 
experience of different types of wartime violence, mistrust of other ethnic groups, lower 
socio-economic status, and pre-war rural residence are not significantly related to voting 
for the SDA after accounting for wartime IDP status.  As a robustness check, I use an 
original set of municipal level data from Bosnia to provide an additional test of the 
relationship between displacement and post-war political behavior.  I find that 
municipalities containing a much higher proportion of Bosnian Muslim IDPs after the 
war relative to the 1991 municipal population tended to give much greater electoral 
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support to the SDA in the 2004 municipal elections compared to the last pre-war election 
in 1990. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section two elaborates the theoretical 
argument.  The third section describes the research design.  The fourth section presents 
and discusses the results.  The final section concludes.  
6.2 Theory: Internal Displacement, Religiosity, and Post-War Political Outcomes 
The scope conditions and key concepts for my theory are as follows. 
Contextually, a war has started in one country between two distinct ethnic groups, one of 
which is an ethno-religious group.  At the start of the war, this ethno-religious group’s 
identity is predominantly secular, with relatively few members who are highly religious.   
Reviewing the definition outlined in the first chapter, by “ethno-religious” groups 
I refer to groups whose ethnic and religious identity markers overlap, such that individual 
group members can choose to prioritize either the ethnic or religious component of their 
group’s identity (Ruane and Todd 2010).  Prioritizing the ethnic component of the 
identity signifies that individual members identify with the group’s customs and 
traditions in a secular fashion.  This may include observance of holidays and rituals 
derived from religious sources but separated from any faith in the supernatural aspects of 
religion and/or regular attendance at religious services.  On the other hand, prioritizing 
the religious component of group identity signifies that individual members believe in 
supernatural aspects of the group’s religion, adhere to scriptural tenets and guidelines, 
and attend religious services regularly.   
Thus, these are the set of beliefs and practices that I refer to collectively as 
“religious identity” in this chapter.  Similarly, when I refer to “religiosity”, I build on 
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prior work in referring to attitudes and actions that principally include attendance at 
religious services, performance of religious rituals (prayer in particular), and spiritual 
beliefs and faith (Ringdal and Ringdal 2010).  For internally displaced persons, I 
incorporate the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ 
definition of IDPs, using the term to refer to people who are forced to flee their homes 
and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (UN OCHA 2004).  
However, I limit my use of the concept to individuals displaced by armed conflict.   
Despite the many public policy challenges posed by a large global population of 
IDPs, political science research has thus far not devoted much attention to this issue.  The 
few studies that have examined the political role and impact of IDPs have produced 
mixed results concerning their political agency.  Thus, individuals displaced by election 
violence in Kenya were more likely to reject the use of violence as an acceptable form of 
political expression (Linke 2013) while displaced persons in Aceh, Indonesia were more 
likely to vote in post-conflict elections than non-displaced persons (Shewfelt 2008).  On 
the other hand, while IDPs in Georgia successfully mobilized for collective action in both 
formal and informal organizations, their success was largely predicated on assistance 
from international actors in Georgia who advocated on their behalf (Røkke 2012).    
In terms of the relationship between IDPs and religious identity, prior theoretical 
and empirical work suggests that internal displacement is more likely to occur in 
countries and regions with fewer economic opportunities and that, all else equal, people 
with lower incomes are more likely to be displaced (Adhikari 2013).  In turn, research on 
the sociology of religion indicates that poorer individuals tend to be more religious 
(Norris and Inglehart 2011).  Taken together, these findings would suggest that IDPs are 
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more likely to be religious than non-IDPs prior to the start of armed conflict.  This non-
IDP group would include refugees, because even though both refugees and IDPs 
constitute displaced populations, leaving the country as a refugee is arguably a more 
dangerous, costlier, and more resource-intensive task than becoming an IDP or remaining 
in place during conflict (Mundt and Ferris 2008).  This would suggest that refugees are 
more likely to have relatively higher incomes and/or greater economic resources than 
IDPs.   
However, individuals who are internally displaced during war may also be more 
likely to suffer trauma.  Mental health research, for example, indicates that conflict-
induced IDPs have much higher rates of post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and 
depression than the general population (Thapa and Hauff 2005).  This is not surprising, 
given that internal displacement produces significant physical and psychological loss and 
grief, along with a heightened risk of experiencing violence directly.  If this is the case, 
then wartime IDPs, arguably likely to be relatively more religious than other group 
members prior to displacement, may become even more religious owing to the trauma 
tied to the experience of displacement.   
The reason for this is that in a context of profound loss, as is the case during 
internal displacement, individuals may turn to structured mental schemas that promise to 
alleviate trauma.  A prime candidate for this kind of schema would be a readily available 
religious tradition, which can offer therapy by explaining the meaning and purpose 
behind seemingly purposeless events while also giving individuals a renewed sense of 
control over their lives.  In addition, continued observance of religious rituals can 
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substitute for lost routine and structure in other areas of life and provide a social bond to 
withstand the trauma of displacement.   
Many studies point to the benefits that religion and religiosity may have in easing 
trauma. For example, some studies of Holocaust survivors have shown them to be more 
religious (Carmil and Breznitz 1991).  Furthermore, studies in the US have revealed a 
correlation between a state’s religiosity and its position on an ‘index of misery’ (Gray and 
Wegner 2010), as well as much stronger short-term religious identity among college 
students in the aftermath of September 11th (Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010).  
Victims of political violence in the Peruvian highlands were also more likely to convert 
to evangelical Protestantism during and after the conflict there (Gamarra 2000).  
Taking a longer view, Rodney Stark has argued that Christianity spread so 
quickly and widely in the ancient world partly because of its effectiveness at providing 
meaning, coherence, and purpose in the wake of vast crises and tragedy (Stark 1996).  
Lab experiments have also demonstrated that being more aware of death, seeing the 
world as random and uncertain, and perceiving a loss of control all heighten belief in God 
(Norenzayan and Gervais 2013). Moreover, once a religious identity is strengthened, it 
may lead people to go to great efforts to defend it, particularly if this identity is tied to 
one’s ego and protection from trauma (Hogg 2010).   
In this vein, though some studies suggest that trauma may have a negative impact 
on religious beliefs, most research indicates that well-developed religious beliefs are 
resilient to trauma and become even stronger in the wake of traumatic events (e.g. 
Overcash et al. 1996).  Furthermore, individuals who use their religiosity to cope with 
trauma by strengthening their spiritual beliefs are able to sustain a positive outlook on the 
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world (i.e. seeing it as benevolent and meaningful), which helps shield them from the 
psychological impact of trauma (Zukerman and Korn 2014).  People with strong intrinsic 
religious beliefs are also more likely to maintain positive emotions and a sense of control 
over their lives in the face of a heightened threat of terrorism (Fischer et al. 2006).  In 
addition, whereas individuals who experience post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) from 
a single or isolated traumatic event will tend to develop weaker religious beliefs, those 
experiencing multiple instances of traumatic victimization independent of PTSD are 
likely to strengthen their intrinsic religious beliefs (Falsetti, Resick, and Davis 2003).  
In line with these findings, since individuals likely to become IDPs during armed 
conflict are also likely to have a relatively stronger foundation of religious beliefs and 
practices, these beliefs and practices may grow even stronger as they experience the 
trauma associated with wartime displacement.  Using religion as a coping mechanism 
may also protect them from some of the psychological symptoms of trauma or ameliorate 
their severity, though the intensity and duration of the trauma of displacement arguably 
makes it unlikely that they will be able to avoid many of these symptoms entirely.  The 
research finding regarding multiple instances of victimization is particularly apt in this 
respect, as conflict-induced IDPs are more likely to experience trauma this way than as 
an isolated occurrence, thus increasing the chances that their religiosity will intensify.  
Therefore, in relying on their faith to withstand the trauma of displacement, I posit that 
IDPs will come to identify with it even more fervently as they practice it and reaffirm 
their beliefs, thus becoming even more religious than they were prior to the conflict.  
Subsequently, since political science research has demonstrated that attitudes and 
preference shifts borne of war can have long-lasting effects on political participation and 
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attitudes, any strengthened religious identity among ethno-religious group members may 
also have significant repercussions for post-war politics, particularly if the post-war 
regime is a democracy.  In this case, those individuals who became more religious as a 
result of armed conflict may be more likely to identity with and support political leaders 
and parties whose policies and platforms match their religious values.  Accordingly, 
political leaders will have an incentive to signal their ethno-religious bona-fides to these 
potential voters through their public rhetoric, personal behavior, and/or campaign 
promises.     
Furthermore, there may be a strong link between these individuals’ beliefs and 
attitudes and the act of voting for religiously oriented political parties and leaders.  This 
link starts from the assumption that individuals who have become more religious are 
more likely to take an active role in religious institutions.  These institutions, in turn, are 
likely to possess the well-developed social capital (i.e. networks, activists, leaders, 
monetary resources, infrastructure) needed to register individual members to vote, take 
them to or host political campaign events, and help them turn out to vote.  Assuming that 
most of the leaders of these religious institutions also support more religiously oriented 
political parties and politicians, individual members of these organizations will not only 
turn out to vote in relatively greater numbers than individuals who do not belong to the 
organizations, but will also vote for these types of political parties.      
The subsequent hypothesis is: 
Members of ethno-religious groups who were internally displaced as a result of armed 
conflict are more likely to vote for religiously oriented political parties following conflict 
than those who were not internally displaced. 
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 Alternative explanations for post-war vote choice stem from the experience of 
wartime violence, mistrust of other ethnic groups, lower socio-economic status, and pre-
war voting patterns.  In terms of violence, individuals who are victimized by intense 
violence during war experience a context where there does not appear to be a clear order 
or structure to victimization, leaving them helpless in trying to learn how to avoid 
violence.  Thus, this context is also likely to produce trauma directly, potentially spurring 
those experiencing this kind of violence to strengthen their religiosity.  Ultimately, this 
process may also lead them to support religiously oriented political parties following the 
conflict.   The first rival hypothesis is thus: 
R1: Members of ethno-religious groups who experience high levels of intense violence 
during armed conflict are more likely to vote for religiously oriented political parties 
following conflict than those who do not experience this type of violence. 
 On the other hand, following an ethnic conflict, it is possible that individual 
members of an ethno-religious group may have very low levels of trust regarding other 
ethnic groups in the polity.  This may be especially true for IDPs, given that their 
displacement likely resulted from the actions of members of other ethnic groups.  In the 
presence of lingering feelings of fear and mistrust of other ethnic groups, individual 
ethno-religious group members may find solace and a sense of protection by supporting 
politicians who represent their ethno-religious group exclusively.  They may also find 
rhetoric and policies promoting ethno-religious nationalism to be comforting and 
reassuring signals that these politicians will follow through on promises of benefits and 
protection from future depredation and attacks by other ethnic groups.  The second rival 
hypothesis is thus: 
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R2: Members of ethno-religious groups who greatly mistrust other ethnic groups in the 
polity are more likely to vote for religiously oriented political parties following conflict 
than those who do not greatly mistrust other ethnic groups.        
 Conversely, since IDPs tend to have fewer economic resources after armed 
conflict, it could be that they support political parties which promote policies that benefit 
individuals from lower socioeconomic backgrounds.  Since lower socioeconomic status 
and greater religiosity are correlated, religiously oriented political parties may promote 
policies that benefit lower status voters not because these individuals are religious but 
because they are poor.  In this case, IDPs’ voting preference for this type of party may 
not be related to heightened religiosity per se, but to class status and material needs.  
Thus: 
R3: Members of ethno-religious groups from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds are 
more likely to vote for religiously oriented political parties following conflict than those 
from wealthier socioeconomic backgrounds.        
 Finally, individuals who become internally displaced during armed conflict may 
have been more likely to vote for a religiously oriented political party before conflict, 
such that any tendency to vote for such a party after conflict is a reflection of pre-war 
attitudes and behavior instead of greater religiosity.  This pattern may be particularly 
applicable to individuals who grow up in rural areas, as they tend to be more religious 
and give more support to politicians who espouse conservative and traditional ethnic and 
religious values.  They are also more likely to be displaced during conflict.  The 
alternative hypothesis is:    
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R4: Members of ethno-religious groups who grew up in rural areas are more likely to 
vote for religiously oriented political parties following conflict than those who did not 
grow up in rural areas. 
6.3 Research Design: Coding Survey Data from Post-War Bosnia  
 To test my hypothesis, I analyzed individual-level survey data from Bosnian 
Muslim respondents following the Bosnian conflict.  Since the Bosnian Muslims were 
highly secular before the war, they provide a difficult case for testing my hypothesis.  If 
my analysis reveals that internally displaced members of the group were more likely to 
vote for the SDA after the war, and that this occurred because the trauma of displacement 
strengthened these individuals’ religiosity, then ethno-religious groups that do not enter 
armed conflict with as many secular members should be even more susceptible to voting 
for religiously oriented parties following conflict.      
 The survey data I analyze in this chapter come from the 2003-2004 South East 
European Social Survey Project, which was funded by the Research Council of Norway 
(Simkus 2013).  Carried out in six different Balkan countries, the survey contained 
21,916 respondents in total, including 6, 809 from Bosnia, of which 2,559 were Bosnian 
Muslim. Accordingly, I only analyzed the Bosnian Muslim respondents for purposes of 
this chapter.  The survey asked respondents to answer a wide range of questions, 
including items relating to voting behavior, religious practices and religiosity, and 
wartime experiences and displacement status.  One item in particular asked respondents 
which political party they voted for in the last election prior to the survey.  I recoded this 
item as a dummy variable, so that my main dependent variable, SDA Vote, takes the value 
of 1 if the respondent voted for the SDA in the 2002 elections. 
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 As discussed in chapter four, in its outlook and many of its wartime policies, the 
SDA tried to appeal to all Bosnian Muslims for support by using a mixture of civic, 
ethnic, and religious nationalism.  However, it also promoted a more religious identity for 
the group at a grassroots level, orienting many of its appeals on this level.  In turn, many 
of its attempts to influence and gain allegiance from all Bosnian Muslims did not result in 
universal support from members of this group during the war (Maček 2009).  In addition, 
not all Bosnian Muslims voted for it after the war ended, meaning that ethnic ties alone 
are insufficient to explain variation in the party’s performance in post-war elections.   
In the immediate aftermath of the war, the SDA also attempted to build support 
from the Bosnian Muslim IDP population, which included promises of significant 
improvements in their circumstances.  They did not deliver on these promises, however, 
to the point that IDPs came to realize they were lying (Halilovich 2013).  Since the 
survey data used in this chapter ask which party respondents voted for in the 2002 
elections, evidence of continued strong electoral support for the SDA among Bosnian 
Muslim IDPs seven years after the war would suggest other sources of affinity besides 
empty promises of material gains. 
The primary independent variable, Wartime IDP, takes the value of 1 if the 
respondent reported being internally displaced during the war and 0 otherwise.  Another 
survey item asked, “Have you changed how religious you are since 1990?  Would you 
say you have become…”, with the response options listed as “Much more religious”, 
“More religious”, “Stayed the same, not more religious, not less religious”, “Less 
religious”, and “Much less religious.”  Recoding this response, the variable More 
Religious takes the value of 1 if respondents reported that they were either more religious 
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or much more religious compared to before the war and 0 otherwise.  The variable Daily 
Attend 1990 serves as a dichotomous proxy for respondents’ pre-war religiosity, taking 
the value of 1 if the respondent attended religious services either “once a day, every day” 
or “several times a day” in 1990.      
 Other items asked respondents whether they personally saw or witnessed 
shooting, artillery fire, and airstrikes directed at them, their family, or their community 
during the war.  I coded these three variables, Violence1, Violence2, and Violence3, as 
dichotomous indicators taking the value of 1 if the respondents answered yes and 0 if 
they said no.  I used just these variables as indicators of violence because I wanted to 
focus on highly intense experiences of wartime violence.  Another question asked 
respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that “Among nations 
[ethnic groups] it is possible to create cooperation, but not full trust.”  Ethnic Mistrust is 
thus a dichotomous indicator taking the value of 1 if respondents either agreed or strongly 
agreed with this statement.   
 I also coded several control variables.  These variables included Gender, taking 
the value of 2 if respondents were female and 1 if they were male.  In the context of the 
Bosnian conflict, women were more likely to experience internal displacement owing to 
their higher wartime survival rates compared to men.  I also included Age, with the 
variable coded according to each respondent’s age in years, since older people may also 
suffer more displacement during war.  To test the potential role of socioeconomic status 
outlined in R3, I included Education, coded in ascending order of the highest degree the 
respondent obtained, and Income, reflecting the respondent’s total net income per month.  
In the case of the Bosnian Muslims, individuals with less education were more likely to 
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have voted for the SDA before the conflict (Bougarel and Rashid 1997).  Moreover, per 
R3, voters with less income, which includes many IDPs, may vote for the SDA on class 
lines.   
To test R4, I included the variable Rural Upbringing, taking the value of 1 if 
respondents lived in a rural area when they were fourteen and 0 otherwise.  This measure 
thus accounts for rural residents’ greater likelihood of being internally displaced during 
war, and, in this case, rural Bosnian Muslim residents’ greater tendency to vote for the 
SDA before the war.  According to R4, respondents with this background may become 
displaced but simply maintain their pre-war voting patterns.   In order to create this 
variable, I restricted the sample to those older than twenty-five, since respondents who 
were fourteen in the last year before the war (1991) would have been born, at the latest, 
in 1977.  Since administration of the survey started in 2003, these respondents would 
have been at least twenty-six when the survey was conducted.     
6.4.1 Analysis: SDA Vote Choice 
To test my hypothesis against the rival explanations outlined above, I used several 
multivariate probit regressions.  Looking at hypothesis R1, Model 1 of Table 6.1 shows 
that none of the forms of experiencing violent attack are significantly related to voting for 
the SDA.  On the other hand, education and age are negatively related to voting for the 
SDA at the 99% level of statistical significance.  The result for education conforms to 
pre-war voting patterns and thereby provides some support for R3, with more educated 
respondents less likely to vote for the SDA.  However, the income variable does not 
demonstrate a statistically significant relationship with voting for the SDA, which 
undermines R3.  In terms of age, it is likely that older respondents, having grown up 
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under an officially atheist socialist regime, were not as willing to support a political party 
oriented toward religious and ethnic nationalism.  In contrast, rural upbringing 
demonstrates a positive and statistically significant relationship with voting for the SDA, 
thus bolstering R4.         
Incorporating the ethnic mistrust variable, Model 2 of Table 6.1 indicates that all 
three forms of experiencing violent attack remain statistically insignificant.  Interestingly, 
Bosnian Muslim respondents who do not believe full trust can be established with 
members of other ethnic groups were more likely to vote for the SDA, a result that is 
statistically significant at 95% confidence.  This result lends support to hypothesis R2, 
whereby ethno-religious group members are likely to turn to ethno-religious nationalist 
parties following ethnic conflict simply because they believe these parties are more 
trustworthy and more likely to protect them.  Age and education retain the same 
relationship to voting for the SDA as in Model 1, but rural upbringing is no longer 
significant in the presence of ethnic mistrust, suggesting that attitude shifts generated by 
war, captured in R2, are more powerful predictors of post-war voting than pre-war 
residence and voting patterns. 
However, once wartime IDP status is introduced in Model 3 of Table 6.1, the 
ethnic mistrust variable is no longer statistically significant.  In turn, having been 
internally displaced during the war is positively related to voting for the SDA following 
the conflict, demonstrating statistical significance at 99% confidence.  Having witnessed 
shooting is now also a statistically significant positive correlate of post-war SDA vote 
choice.  This suggests that intense wartime violence may play an indirect role in 
enhancing religiosity, as it is linked to (and may be the cause of) internal displacement 
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and the ensuing trauma resulting from displacement.  Thus, whereas wartime violence 
may have a direct impact in shaping ethno-religious leaders’ use of ideological rhetoric, 
per chapter three, it may also have an indirect role in altering ethno-religious group 
members’ religious identity via internal displacement and trauma. 
On the other hand, since this violence variable was not significant prior to the 
introduction of the IDP status variable, Model 3 indicates that it is the general set of 
traumatic experiences stemming from being an IDP which still connects most strongly 
with voting for religious nationalist politicians following armed conflict.  These traumatic 
experiences may include violence, but they could also potentially extend to a broader 
array of traumatizing events associated with displacement from respondents’ pre-war 
residence.  Furthermore, education, income, and rural upbringing are now statistically 
insignificant in the presence of wartime IDP status.   
Overall, the models in Table 6.1 lend greater support to my hypothesis compared 
to the rival hypotheses.  Having experienced wartime internal displacement is a more 
powerful predictor that a Bosnian Muslim respondent voted for the SDA seven years 
after the war than having experienced violence alone, lacking trust in other ethnic groups, 
having lower socioeconomic status, or growing up in an area in which most people voted 








Table 6.1: SDA Vote Choice - Bosnian Muslims in the 2002 Bosnian Elections 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Violence1 0.393 0.357 1.184
*
 
 (0.268) (0.272) (0.571) 
    
Violence2 -0.199 -0.215 -0.763 
 (0.221) (0.224) (0.440) 
    
Violence3 0.158 0.142 0.418 
 (0.133) (0.136) (0.224) 
    
Gender 0.0560 0.00414 0.252 
 (0.120) (0.122) (0.200) 








 (0.00416) (0.00422) (0.00693) 






 (0.0504) (0.0510) (0.0814) 
    
Income -0.0265 -0.0288 -0.0227 
 (0.0242) (0.0247) (0.0480) 
    
Rural Upbringing 0.259
*
 0.240 0.226 
 (0.122) (0.125) (0.205) 
    
Ethnic Mistrust  0.268
*
 0.248 
  (0.116) (0.189) 
    
Wartime IDP   0.565
*
 
   (0.231) 
    
Constant 0.431 0.494 -0.246 
 (0.483) (0.494) (0.874) 
Observations 506 493 204 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
 Substantively, since the coefficients from a non-linear model cannot be 
interpreted on their own, I used the results from Model 3 of Table 6.1 to calculate the 
tangible impact that having been a wartime IDP had on the predicted probability that a 
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Bosnian Muslim respondent voted for the SDA after the war, holding the control 
variables at their observed values (Hanmer and Kalkan 2013).  I computed both a single 
calculation of the predicted probability, as well as one thousand simulations of the 
calculation, which provided the mean effect and 95% confidence interval for the 
predicted probability.  The results indicate that experiencing internal displacement during 
the war corresponded, on average, with a nearly twenty percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of voting for the SDA seven years after the war.  This mean effect is also 
statistically significant at 95% confidence.  This outcome bolsters support for my 
hypothesis and indicates that wartime IDP status can have a major impact on post-war 
voting behavior.        
In terms of the mechanisms linking the relationship between IDP status and SDA 
vote choice, a comparison of means test indicates that respondents who were internally 
displaced during the war were more likely to have attended religious services at least 
once a day before the war.  This result is significant at 99% confidence, thereby 
confirming the premise that Bosnian Muslim IDPs had a more well-developed and 
stronger set of religious beliefs and practices to fall back on in the face of trauma than 
other members of the group.  In turn, another comparison of means test indicates that 
Bosnian Muslim IDPs had also become more religious or much more religious than 
before the war.   
Statistically significant at 90% confidence, this result suggests that the traumatic 
experience of wartime displacement led Bosnian Muslim IDPs to become even more 
religious than they were prior to the war, arguably as a result of the process of utilizing 
their religiosity to withstand their traumatic experience.  Conversely, a comparison of 
183 
 
means tests shows no statistically significant relationship between wartime IDP status 
and greater mistrust of other ethnic groups in Bosnia.  In combination, these results 
provide strong support for my argument, whereby heightened religiosity resulting from 
the trauma of wartime internal displacement spurs IDPs to vote for religiously oriented 
parties and politicians in post-war elections.          
6.4.2 Matching: Greater Religiosity and IDP Status 
In order to verify that the religiosity of Bosnian Muslim IDPs had increased 
compared to before the war, I also analyzed this relationship with a matched sample of 
Bosnian Muslim respondents.  I used this technique in an attempt to account for the fact 
that IDPs likely differ from non-IDPs on other key variables related to both displacement 
and religiosity, i.e. that internal displacement as a result of armed conflict is not randomly 
assigned.  Following suggested practice, the matched sample thus contained individuals 
who were highly similar on a set of key covariates, with the key difference being that 
some were internally displaced during the war while others were not (Ho et al. 2007).  In 
this way, I created a subset of respondents who differed only in that some received the 
“treatment” of internal displacement.  Using propensity score matching, I then analyzed 
whether those who received the displacement treatment were more likely to have become 
more religious since the start of the war.   
To generate the matched sample, I used the gender, age, education, and rural 
upbringing variables as my key covariates.  Table 6.2 shows the results of the analysis 






Table 6.2: Matched Sample – Greater Religiosity vs. IDP Status, Bosnian Muslims 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**




Matching on these covariates, respondents who were internally displaced during the war 
were much more likely to have become more religious than those who had not been 
internally displaced.  Moreover, this result is statistically significant at 99% confidence.  
The matching analysis thereby confirms the religiosity mechanism linking wartime IDP 
status with post-war voting support for the SDA.    
6.4.3 Robustness Check: Bosnian Municipal Data 
 As an additional means of validating my hypothesis, I collected and assembled an 
original dataset of municipal-level variables in Bosnia.  Prior to the war, the data include 
each municipality’s total population, municipal income, the number of rural residents in 
the municipality, and the number of municipal council seats the SDA won in the 1990 
election.  I also added data regarding the number of people killed in each municipality in 
each year of the war.  Post-war, the data include the number of IDPs registered in each 
municipality as of 2005, categorized by ethnicity, as well as the number of votes cast for 
the SDA in the 2004 municipal elections.     
 The pre-war demographic variables are from the 1991-1992 Bosnian census 
conducted and maintained by the Bosnian State Statistical Office and Bosnian Federal 
Statistical Office (1994; 1998).  The 1990 election results were published by Suad 
Arnautović, a professor at the University of Sarajevo (1996).  Stefano Costalli and 
Francesco Moro made wartime casualty data available in a publication examining the 
severity of violence in Bosnian municipalities during the war (2012).  I located all of the 
IDP data in a report published by the Bosnian Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees 
in 2005 (Nenadić et al. 2005).  Results for all post-war Bosnian elections are available on 
the website of the Bosnian Election Commission (2016).  
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 The dependent variable in the municipal-level analysis is SDA Support Increase, 
coded as the difference between the proportion of the vote won by the SDA in each 
municipality in the 2004 local elections versus the proportion of municipal council seats 
it won in the 1990 election.  Although the proportion of municipal council seats won in 
1990 is not an ideal measure for comparison, it represents the best measure given the 
limitations of available data.  An additional caveat is that post-war elections included 
votes from both inside and outside the municipality owing to the peace agreement’s 
stipulation that displaced residents and refugees could cast their votes in their pre-war 
municipality.  I coded the proportion of votes cast for the SDA from both inside and 
outside the municipality, as well as the proportion of total votes.  However, I used only 
the latter measure in constructing my dependent variable.    
The principal independent variable in this analysis is 2005 Bosnian Muslim IDPs, 
coded as the proportion of Bosnian Muslim IDPs registered as living in a municipality in 
2005 relative to the total 1991 municipal population.  This variable is thus meant to 
capture the relative influx of internally displaced Bosnian Muslims living in a 
municipality after the war.  Control variables include 1991 Per Capita Income and 1991 
Percent Rural Population, both measured at the municipal level.  These variables were 
the best proxies available to measure municipal income and rural residence at the time of 
the survey because Bosnia did not publish any official census results between 1991 and 
2016.  My other control variable is Percent Total War Victims, which measures the 
percentage of a municipality’s population killed during the war relative to its 1991 
population.  All three of these variables may have been related to the proportion of IDPs 
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originating from a given municipality during the war, as well as the degree of municipal 
electoral support for the SDA in the 1990 elections.   
As an additional note concerning this dataset, the post-war political settlement 
also created new municipalities in Bosnia.  Where applicable, I matched data on IDPs and 
election results to the appropriate pre-war municipality. Thus, as confirmation of this 
chapter’s main hypothesis, we should observe that municipalities with a higher 
proportion of Bosnian Muslim IDPs after the war gave more support to the SDA in the 
2004 election than prior to the war. 
Table 6.3 presents regression results testing the hypothesis at the municipal level.  
This model demonstrates that, holding all else constant, a statistically significant 
relationship exists between relatively greater post-war municipal electoral support for the 
SDA nearly a decade after the war and the proportion of Bosnian Muslim IDPs residing 
in the municipality relative to its pre-war population.  Interestingly, municipalities with 
higher proportions of wartime casualties were significantly less likely to vote for the 
SDA in post-war local elections.  This result suggests that, on a municipal level, the 
experience of wartime ethnic violence may exhaust a community’s tolerance for ethnic or 
religious nationalist political parties after conflict.  Wealthier municipalities also 
provided greater support for the SDA, which may indicate that IDPs tended to settle in 
localities with more material resources.    
Substantively, the relationship between the influx of Bosnian Muslim IDPs and 
the increase in electoral support for the SDA at the municipal level is also significant.  
Holding the other variables at their observed values, municipalities with no Bosnian 
Muslim IDPs experienced a five percent net loss in voting support for the SDA in 2004 
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relative to 1990, while municipalities experiencing an influx of IDPs equal to five percent 
of their pre-war population experienced a five percent net gain in support.  This outcome 
demonstrates that the individual-level relationship between the experience of conflict-
induced internal displacement and post-war political support for religious nationalist 
politicians may have an impact on a collective level.             
 
Table 6.3: Municipal SDA Support vs. Influx of Bosnian Muslim IDPs, 1990-2004 
 
  

























Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01; one-tailed hypothesis tests.   
 
6.5 Conclusion 
  In sum, the findings presented in this chapter indicate that traumatic wartime 
experiences can shape the voting behavior of individual ethno-religious group members 
following armed conflict.  The direct mechanism linking this relationship runs through 
internal displacement and heightened wartime religiosity.  Wartime violence may also 
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play an indirect role in this relationship by creating internal displacement in the first 
place.  Once displaced, ethno-religious IDPs are likely to strengthen their religiosity as 
they utilize their pre-existing religious faith and practices to cope with the trauma of 
displacement.  Following the trauma of displacement, IDPs’ increased religiosity in turn 
leads them to support religiously oriented parties in post-war elections.  In contrast, the 
direct experience of wartime violence, feelings of mistrust toward ethnic groups, lower 
socio-economic status, and pre-war rural residence cannot explain individuals’ support 
for these types of parties outside the experience of internal displacement.   
The results of this study thus demonstrate that wartime events can have significant 
post-war political consequences by heightening individual ethno-religious group 
members’ religious beliefs and practices.  By showing a link between internal 
displacement, strengthened religiosity, and post-war political attitudes and behavior, my 
findings indicate the need to undertake a broader examination of how traumatic wartime 
experiences combined with shifts in religious attitudes can shape individuals’ identities 
and political preferences following the end of conflict.       
In addition, on a collective level, the chapter shows that localities with greater 
numbers of IDPs relative to their pre-war population also lend greater post-war political 
support to the religious nationalist parties preferred by IDPs.  This municipal-level 
analysis also addresses one limitation of the individual-level survey data, since the survey 
did not ask respondents which political party they voted for in the last election before the 
war and therefore could not capture any change in political party preferences.  In tandem, 
the chapter’s findings thus suggest that widespread conflict-induced internal 
displacement is the most significant factor in whether an ethno-religious group becomes 
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more religious on a collective level during and after war, with greater internal 
displacement corresponding to heightened religiosity.   
On balance, these results indicate that IDPs are a politically significant group who 
merit greater study in political science.  Post-war Bosnia has seen the SDA maintain 
largely monopolistic control over Bosnian Muslim politics, such that the relationship 
between IDP status, heightened religious identity and values, and taking steps to apply 
those values to politics has both academic and practical importance.  Further study of this 
relationship may yield broader findings concerning the stability and health of post-war 
democratic political competition and the types of policies it is likely to produce.  
In terms of generalizability, this chapter’s findings may thus be applicable to 
other post-war democracies in which one or more political parties make extensive appeals 
to ethno-religious group members on the basis of religious beliefs and policies.  Going 
forward, additional surveys and interviews could also help verify the theory’s 
mechanisms, especially the unresolved question of which specific wartime experiences 
stemming from internal displacement are most likely to produce trauma and heightened 
religiosity.  This approach would require more studies focusing on just one or a few 
ethnic groups, since IDP data at the large N cross-national level is sparse and of poor 
quality.  It would also require political science researchers to delve deeper into the 
research literature in psychology and conduct more inter-disciplinary studies.      
Finally, if extended and tested further, this chapter’s findings could help mitigate 
armed conflicts.  Specifically, by demonstrating when and why individuals and groups 
involved in armed conflict become more religious, this study and others like it could 
enable outside actors to hone in on the conditions favoring the adoption of this 
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worldview.  Policymakers can then attempt to alter these conditions so as to prevent 
religious identity from taking hold more broadly in the population and thereby avert a 
more intense and long-lasting war.  The results of this chapter suggest that they should 
focus on staunching the number of internally displaced persons during conflict and 
providing extensive mental health services for those who do become internally displaced. 
Combined with the results of the previous three chapters, this dissertation’s 
empirical analyses speak to the powerful impact that armed conflict can have on the 
ideas, values, and beliefs that animate both mass and elite members of ethno-religious 
groups.  Although the ideological shifts detailed in chapters four and five appear to have 
been a short-lived product of the Bosnian war in terms of their appearance in official 
political rhetoric, the continuing non-viability of a civic nationalist political order in post-
war Bosnia speaks to their legacy and relevance. In turn, this chapter’s evidence that 
identity shifts among non-elites can have practical political consequences in a post-war 
electoral environment reinforces warfare’s ability to remake a community’s self-




 This conclusion starts by framing the dissertation’s empirical results in terms of 
their implications for the Bosnian war, the study of rhetoric and ideology during armed 
conflict, the consequences of ideological rhetoric, and the study of ethnicity, nationalism, 
and religion in politics.  The subsequent section lists plausible rival hypotheses that could 
not be addressed within the scope of the dissertation.  It also proposes future research that 
could address some of these hypotheses as well as other extensions flowing from this 
dissertation’s results.  The last section discusses the dissertation’s policy implications.         
The Bosnian War 
The results of the dissertation have two significant implications for studies of the 
1990s Bosnian war.  First, my analysis explains the reasons why Bosnian President Alija 
Izetbegović put forth a multi-faceted and at times contradictory set of ideological 
principles in his official wartime rhetoric.  This analysis helps allay the uncertainty and 
hesitation that some historians have had in labeling Izetbegović and his views with a 
particular ideological designation, be it liberalism, civic nationalism, or religious 
fundamentalism (Ramet 2006; Burg and Shoup 1999).  Though some of these historians 
have termed Izetbegović a political opportunist because of the variation in his ideological 
principles, they have not traced the timing or motivations for this opportunism.   
My dissertation reveals the rationale behind Izetbegović’s ideological shifts, as 
well as the rationale behind the ideological variation in the official rhetoric of other 
Bosnian Muslim politicians leading the wartime Bosnian government.  The lesson is that 
Izetbegović and other Bosnian leaders cannot really be labeled as civic, ethnic, or 
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religious nationalists per se based on their public rhetoric.  Labels must be reserved for 
the content of the rhetoric.    
Second, the dissertation indicates why a wartime program to change the official 
ideology and identity of an ethno-religious group and state in an ethnic or religious 
nationalist direction may not succeed or last beyond the conflict.  In this case, Western 
countries in the NATO alliance ultimately came to Bosnia’s aid militarily, thereby 
obviating the need for Bosnian government leaders to keep making religious nationalist 
claims in media channels from Muslim-majority countries.  The end of the war also 
meant that Bosnians would once again have greater access to a variety of media sources, 
which meant that their leaders’ inconsistent use of different nationalist ideological claims 
to domestic and foreign audiences would be more noticeable.  Furthermore, the 
ideological infrastructure needed to support a lasting official shift to a new nationalist 
ideology was not completely in place by the time the war ended.  Accordingly, had the 
war lasted significantly longer, there would have been a much higher probability that 
ethnic and religious nationalism would have taken permanent and dominant root within 
the official rhetoric of Bosnian Muslim political leaders.   
The other factors that limited the rise of ethnic nationalism in the domestic sphere 
included the fact that the power struggle within the Bosnian government ended relatively 
quickly with the consolidation of Izetbegović’s authority.  Also, the primary peace 
proposal following the Owen-Stoltenberg plan did not emphasize ethnic partition to 
nearly the same degree.  At the same time, however, the Dayton peace agreement did 
create a post-war political order featuring ethnic power sharing and ethnically-based 
political entities within Bosnia.  Combined with the war’s impact on heightening the 
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religiosity of ordinary people, this political structure helps to explain the post-war 
political success of ethnic and religious nationalist parties despite the fact that ethnic or 
religious nationalist ideology is not necessarily dominant within society as a whole.      
Rhetoric and Ideology in Armed Conflict 
 Four implications regarding the study of rhetoric and ideology in armed conflict 
follow from the dissertation’s analyses.  First, the period after wartime leaders’ group or 
state has experienced a major increase in violence against it offers observers a window in 
which to listen to and absorb the leaders’ more frequent use of ideological principles.  
Doing so should also illuminate the type of ideology dominant in these leaders’ rhetoric 
at the time.  This knowledge could help analysts understand the demands the leaders are 
likely to push for in a post-war political settlement.  However, observing a shift in the 
content of these leaders’ official ideological principles is conditional on contingent 
wartime events, in this case an internal power struggle and the promotion of specific 
peace proposals by outside mediators.  Such events thus do not alter the frequency of 
ideological principles in leaders’ official domestic rhetoric, but rather the type of 
ideological principles they espouse.  Observers and analysts will then have to adjust their 
understanding of leaders’ ideological demands and political goals accordingly.  
Second, groups’ and states’ wartime ideological shifts may be rare or even non-
existent in official domestic media in the absence of the contingent events incentivizing 
leaders to use new ideological claims in official domestic media.  At the same time, 
though, these leaders may still attempt to shift their citizens’ ideology and identity in a 
more active manner below the level of official media.  Their strategies for doing so may 
include manipulating the content of wartime school curricula, altering the names of street 
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signs, and changing everyday linguistic discourse.  Without reinforcement from above at 
an official level, however, this grassroots push may not prove sufficient to create a lasting 
shift in the dominant nationalist ideology within a group or state. 
Third, although external actors play a major role in spurring shifts in the type of 
nationalist claims wartime ethno-religious leaders use in foreign and domestic media, in 
several ways domestic actors too may both constrain and expand leaders’ ability to use 
nationalist rhetoric.  In the Bosnian case, the continued civic nationalist sympathies of the 
residents of the capital of Sarajevo limited Bosnian leaders’ attempts to make a consistent 
and permanent official shift toward ethnic nationalism.  In addition, the presence of a 
religious nationalist faction within the SDA political party and its connections to religious 
institutions offered a ready vehicle for spreading religious nationalism among Bosnian 
Muslims.  This, along with the growing religiosity of internally displaced members of the 
Bosnian Muslim population, arguably made Bosnian leaders’ dual use of religious 
nationalism to foreign audiences and ethnic nationalism to domestic audiences credible.       
Fourth, leaders’ personal preferences for different ideologies are not decisive for 
determining the content of the ideological claims in their official rhetoric but they are not 
wholly irrelevant either.  Consequently, ideology during armed conflict is not purely a 
reflection of political elites’ strategic calculations for maintaining and expanding their 
power.  Instead, leaders’ personal views help inform their calculation of the benefits and 
costs of using a particular set of ideological claims at a particular time.  If beneficial 
events and circumstances arise, leaders may take advantage of an opportunity to derive 
both personal and strategic rewards from promoting a specific ideology.  In Bosnia, 
Izetbegović responded to a challenge to his power by wielding ethnic nationalism as a 
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necessary strategic tool and in the process also lent official reinforcement to his desired 
ideological shift for Bosnian society.     
The Consequences of Ideology 
The analysis of the Bosnian case suggests that the consequences of ideological 
wartime elite rhetoric may be limited in scope and duration.  The chief impact of 
nationalist ideology may thus lie in the tangible benefits it can bring to a wartime state, 
especially its leaders.  Its impact on the population, on the other hand, may be temporary, 
though this may also vary depending on the length of the conflict.  In this case, a four 
year war did generate significant pressure among large parts of the Bosnian Muslim 
population to conform to more ethnic and religious customs and behaviors, including, for 
example, the wearing of conservative dress for women.  However, many Bosnian Muslim 
residents of Sarajevo resisted such pressures or only gave the appearance of conforming 
to them in public.   
Furthermore, the Bosnian Muslim leadership could not abandon civic nationalism 
completely.  This dynamic suggests that wartime ideological principles issued in 
domestic media may have limited ability to persuade or really change the minds of people 
who are firmly opposed to a set of given principles.  On the other hand, the analysis of 
post-war survey data indicated that many individuals whose identity leaned in a more 
religious direction to begin with came to embrace that identity more fully during and after 
the war.  This finding supplements one author’s assessment that whereas only a third of 
young Bosnian Muslims considered themselves religious right before the war, just over 
three-quarters did so by the end of the 1990s (Fazlić 2011).  Thus, perhaps one result of 
an attempted ideological shift at official levels during a relatively short conflict may be to 
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exacerbate divisions and tensions within an ethno-religious group between those who are 
more secular and those who favor ethnic or religious nationalism.   
This has played out in post-war Bosnia in the form of resentments and frustrations 
felt by the established “native” urban Bosnian Muslim population towards those Bosnian 
Muslims who have arrived more recently (Maček  2009).  Conversely, the heightened 
religiosity of IDPs since the war suggests that the SDA still has an incentive to produce 
more ethnic or religious nationalist rhetoric to mobilize the support of a specific 
constituency.  Ideology thus retains a role as a bond between the party’s leaders and 
certain sections of the populace.  Future research is thus needed to determine the degree 
to which ideological rhetoric is responsible for some of these postwar phenomena and 
whether it has similar consequences in other conflicts.    
Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Religion  
In terms of ethnicity, nationalism, and religion, the dissertation’s findings also 
suggest three main implications.  First, although changes in domestic nationalist 
ideology, ethnic identity, and religiosity may be endogenous to war, they do not 
automatically occur in the process of armed combat between rival ethnic groups.  Instead, 
such changes are specifically endogenous to the internal displacement of an ethnic 
group’s population and to contingent wartime events.   
Widespread internal displacement may produce changes in a population’s 
religiosity, and therefore its ethnic identity in the case of an ethno-religious group, while 
contingent events like internal power struggles or international peace proposals may 
prompt a change in the nationalist ideology predominant among elites.  Displacement 
may also indirectly shape elites’ nationalist ideology, in that a more religious identity 
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among an ethno-religious group’s members can arguably enhance its leaders’ incentives 
and credibility for using religious nationalist claims.  In either instance, these shifts do 
not require structural changes in the level of economic inequality, number of ethnic 
groups, or degree of ethnic heterogeneity within society.              
Second, armed conflict does provide a major critical juncture within which 
wartime political elites can attempt to push their society away from a previously 
dominant nationalist ideology.  That does not mean they are guaranteed to succeed in the 
attempt, however.  It does mean, though, that the official nationalist ideology of ethno-
religious groups can resemble a punctuated equilibrium, with long periods of stability 
interrupted by short spurts of rapid ideological change during war.  In order for internal 
armed conflict to induce such rapid changes, however, a given conflict must contain a 
specific combination of starting conditions and wartime events.  In that context, the same 
set of leaders can effect a change in the form of nationalism predominant in official 
communications channels.  
Third, even in the presence of a critical juncture like armed conflict, a previously 
dominant path dependent nationalist ideology may have significant staying power.  This 
is particularly likely if wartime ethno-religious leaders are based in an area where they 
have to draw organizational personnel from a population that was highly supportive of 
the path dependent ideology before the war.  In Bosnia, the top leaders of the wartime 
state experienced this constraint because many of the residents of the capital city of 
Sarajevo remained sympathetic to civic nationalist principles.  Subsequently, these 
leaders had to tread carefully to avoid promoting alternate forms of nationalism too 
aggressively in domestic media.  Ultimately, once the strategic windows of opportunity 
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for officially promoting ethnic nationalism had closed, the Bosnian leaders had to revert 
back to civic nationalist rhetoric, albeit not as exclusively as before.  Had these leaders 
been based in a different location with a local population that had different attitudes 
towards civic nationalism, they might have pursued more frequent and potentially lasting 
shifts away from civic nationalism in their official rhetoric.    
Outstanding Rival Hypotheses and Research Extensions 
 As a result of the scope and nature of this dissertation’s methodological approach 
to studying nationalist ideology and ethno-religious identity during armed conflict, 
several plausible rival explanations could not be evaluated against the empirical evidence 
and must await further investigation.  First, a large N analysis of speech acts and survey 
data from one actor involved in an internal armed conflict still leaves open the possibility 
that some structural variables may have an important role to play in wartime ideological 
shifts.  For example, poverty and economic deprivation may still play a part in shaping 
the religiosity of wartime populations relative to experiencing internal displacement.   
A cross-conflict approach would enable comparison of conflicts in countries with 
different economic conditions at the outset of war or conflicts that resulted in different 
relative declines in economic performance (contingent on the availability of these data). 
Similarly, provided data are available, cross-conflict analysis would give greater leverage 
for testing the importance of the role of political institutions for wartime nationalist 
ideology and identity, including both the type of institutions and significant changes 
within the institutions. 
Second, it is possible that the frequency and even the content of ideological 
claims may be shaped significantly by the results of wartime battles and military 
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engagements rather than just violence against civilian populations.  Arguably, the 
combination of losses on the battlefield together with civilian victimization by intense 
violence may make the need for ideological rhetoric even greater in order to maintain 
fighting morale and military recruitment.  Evaluating this explanation could still be done 
with data from a single conflict, provided precise and detailed information about battle 
victories can be located and validated.   
Third, an ethno-religious group’s wartime identity, and ultimately its ideological 
attitudes, may be altered by organizations or actors working apart from or below the 
group’s official leaders.  The combination of official ideological rhetoric combined with 
ideological promotion by unofficial groups or splinter organizations may also produce an 
inconsistent and competing set of ideological claims.  In that case, top leaders’ official 
ideological rhetoric may increasingly come to be a response to these unofficial actors’ 
ideological principles, with the goal of winning back exclusive power and control over 
the production and content of the ideological claims made on behalf of the group and 
society.  This explanation would require historical analysis of broader sets of documents 
and speech acts from one or a few cases of armed conflict.      
Fourth, the empirical finding that internally displaced populations (IDPs) are 
much more likely to support religiously oriented politicians and parties after internal 
ethnic armed conflict could be explained with more specific mechanisms.  In this 
dissertation, I presented evidence that IDPs are particularly likely to have their religiosity 
strengthened following the traumatic experience of displacement itself.  In turn, this 
heightened religiosity may lead them to have more affinity with politicians whom they 
perceive as devout stalwarts of their religious traditions and champions of their ethno-
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religious principles in politics and society.  However, to evaluate which types of 
traumatic experiences during displacement are particularly likely to spur heightened 
religiosity and support for these types of politicians, future surveys or interviews with 
IDPs from other ethnic groups would be necessary. 
Aside from the extensions proposed above, this dissertation provides a foundation 
for several potentially fruitful future research studies.  The primary task in this vein will 
be to broaden the scope of this dissertation’s findings and verify their generalizability.  
One method for doing so, as noted earlier, is to employ a cross-country and cross-conflict 
research design, provided that necessary data are available and wartime ideological shifts 
are not obscured.  In principle, the lessons from the case of the Bosnian Muslims could be 
extended and tested in a number of other cases, particularly armed conflicts involving 
ethnic groups whose identity is derived from and distinguished by a religious faith.   
Setting this condition means these other cases would include groups whose 
leaders and members could draw upon both ethnic nationalism and religious nationalism.  
However, these groups would also have to possess some tradition of or exposure to 
liberalism and/or civic nationalism, so that its leaders would be able to utilize the same 
three ideal types of nationalism as the Bosnian Muslims.  In addition to groups like the 
Armenians and Sikhs, this condition would thereby enable researchers to test lessons 
from the Bosnian case with a larger set of ethnic groups in regions like post-Soviet 
Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.    
The key lessons to be tested in these other cases would whether civic nationalism 
in other contexts is particularly vulnerable to internal power struggles and international 
peace proposals, whether other ethno-religious leaders can use both civic and religious 
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nationalism to particular foreign audiences, and whether internally-displaced ethno-
religious group members become less secular and more willing to support religious 
nationalism over time. 
Other possibilities abound however, offering an opportunity to test the 
generalizability of the findings in a way that may still allow researchers to conduct in-
depth analysis on large N micro-data.  One way to do this would be to examine the 
frequency and content of ideological claims for several ethno-religious groups fighting 
each other in the same conflict.  This would also enable testing of potential dyadic 
hypotheses concerning shifts in wartime ideological rhetoric.  In addition, other types of 
ethnic groups could be examined to determine whether variation in their leaders’ 
ideological rhetoric also follows variation in wartime violence and wartime events such 
as internal power struggles.   
The same analysis could then be done for non-ethnic internal armed conflicts, 
particularly with respect to determining whether political elites in non-ethnic conflicts in 
the post-Cold War period also mostly utilize different forms of nationalist ideology or 
whether they resort to different kinds of ideological principles altogether.  Conversely, 
examining the rhetoric of rebel or insurgent group leaders in internal armed conflicts 
instead of just government leaders may generate insight into the degree to which access 
to state resources for purposes of ideological infrastructure construction shapes the 
likelihood and content of a wartime ideological shift.  This focus can also produce dyadic 
analyses of rebel-state interaction in terms of ideological rhetoric.  Ideally, research in 
this vein would eventually extend to explaining variation in political elites’ ideologies 
during inter-state war and after major terrorist attacks as well. 
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The other major research project building off this dissertation’s theories and 
findings would seek to connect changes in political elites’ wartime ideology with shifts in 
the ethnic identity or religiosity of the wartime population.  Testing whether elite rhetoric 
actually impacts the political, ethnic, and religious identities of non-elites would reveal 
whether ideological rhetoric is truly effective for purposes of maintaining wartime morale 
and comforting the population.  On the other hand, it is possible that wartime elites may 
alter their official ideological principles based on information they receive concerning 
incipient identity shifts within the wartime population.  Verifying whether the 
relationship between elite ideology and mass identity during war is one-sided or 
reciprocal would also produce a much richer understanding of how nationalism and 
ethnicity are constructed during critical societal junctures and which segments of society 
play the most significant role in this process.   
Policy Connections 
This dissertation suggests three important lessons for individuals and 
organizations wishing to protect and uphold a civic nationalist ideology and identity for 
warring groups and states.   Given the circumstances of the case under analysis, these 
lessons are limited to countries and groups entering conflict with a predominantly civic 
nationalist outlook.  Thus, the lessons are meant to help prevent a shift away from civic 
nationalism but cannot necessarily aid those actors seeking a shift toward it.         
In terms of the risk of a wartime shift toward ethnic nationalism by political elites, 
the lesson is that outside mediators must resist promoting peace proposals rooted in 
ethnic partition and instead find ways to incentivize continued multiethnic leadership 
within and across warring ethnic groups, along with ethnic political integration.  At the 
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same time, key internal and external actors favoring civic nationalism should exercise 
whatever influence they have to stave off internal power struggles or resolve them 
quickly.  This may mean fostering or accepting a more centralized or hierarchical 
wartime power structure or state apparatus if it ensures the continued dominance of civic 
nationalism.  In contrast, more egalitarian and decentralized power structures may have to 
be avoided if they increase the risk of internal squabbling and power struggles conducive 
to the rise of ethnic nationalism.  
Regarding an elite shift to religious nationalist ideology, the lesson is that if an 
ethno-religious group is not at war with a non-Western post-Cold War great power, then 
external actors championing civic nationalism must ensure that this group receives more 
resources and help from Western countries than ones led by co-religionists.  On the other 
hand, if an ethno-religious group is fighting a non-Western post-Cold War great power, 
then pro-civic nationalist external actors could make greater initial investments in 
diplomatic engagements with the great power’s government in order to try to end the 
conflict quickly.  They could also attempt to subvert the geopolitical dynamic at play by 
secretly channeling aid to non-state actors sharing the group’s religious faith, with the 
understanding that these organizations will promote civic principles underneath a veneer 
of religiosity.  However, this strategy arguably carries much more risk given that it may 
be difficult for the pro-civic nationalist external actor to monitor the actual principles 
espoused by the supposedly moderate non-state religious organization it is funding. 
As concerns the mass of the population, the lesson is that individuals and 
organizations wishing to uphold civic nationalism should focus on the internally 
displaced population both during and after conflict.  Specifically, projects and programs 
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seeking to promote reconciliation and greater tolerance toward out groups should give 
priority to inculcating these attitudes and desires among the internally displaced.  
Furthermore, IDPs’ relatively stronger religiosity could be channeled toward greater 
support for inter-communal peace and understanding via the support of religious 
institutions and officials.  Providing this segment of the population with greater material 
support and security may also undercut their need to look to co-ethnic leaders as the 
providers of these basic needs.  The goal of all of these strategies would be to cut the link 
between IDPs and ethno-religious politicians, which would encourage IDPs to vote for 
multi-ethnic and non-religious parties and thereby bolster the power of civic nationalist 
leaders and principles.     
Therefore, careful analysis of one case of a wartime ethno-religious group, the 
Bosnian Muslims, has yielded a host of new findings regarding shifts and fluctuations in 
the frequency of ideological rhetoric, form of nationalist ideology, interpretation of ethnic 
identity, and post-war political attitudes of members of ethno-religious groups in conflict.  
The results suggest both a number of promising new research projects and potential 
practical implications for international politics.  In particular, when other ethno-religious 
groups fall into armed conflict, liberal or civic nationalism, if initially predominant within 
a group, may be challenged by illiberal counter-ideologies.  The Bosnian Muslim case 
lights the initial part of the path to understanding and confronting these threats to civic 
nationalism, ones which may change the self-image and behavior of groups and states in 
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